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## **Soviet Union**

**KOMMUNIST**

No 11, July 1989

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# Soviet Union KOMMUNIST No 11, July 1989

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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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**KOMMUNIST**

No 11, July 1989

[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

**PERESTROYKA: THEORY AND PRACTICE**

**The State Plan: New Tasks, a New Model**

18020017a Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 11, Jul 89 (signed to press 17 Jul 89) pp 3-9

[Article by Aleksandr Semenovich Bim, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Central Economic-Mathematical Institute, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] With the end of the current 5-year period, in the course of which a number of socioeconomic problems became aggravated to a critical level, hopes for the next, the 13th 5-Year Plan, have become widespread. It is suggested that, for a limited time, "exceptional measures" be taken, mobilizing one and all to neutralize negative trends and then, somehow starting "with a clean sheet," determine the fate of perestroika during the 13th 5-year period.

To what extent is this justified? What comes first in the fate of perestroika: the need to come out of the crisis or the prompt drafting (not knowing as yet when and how we can come out of the crisis) a "good" 5-year plan? Furthermore, do we not require in general, in terms of planning, both in connection with the sharp aggravation of the socioeconomic situation as well as in the light of the tasks of the radical reform of the economic mechanism, to make much more decisive changes than are contemplated today?

I believe that without answering all these questions, any reliance on the next 5-year plan does not seem all that convincing. Furthermore, in our view, in his article, Academician L. Abalkin (*KOMMUNIST* No 6, 1989) leads us close to the conclusion that, considering the current condition of reproduction processes, any concern for the quality of the 13th 5-Year Plan would be premature.

Instead, entirely different conclusions suggest themselves. First, we must concentrate precisely on steps to improve the socioeconomic situation and consider such steps essential. Second, the existing principles and methods of managing our national economy through the 5-year plan do not fit at all the program for the democratization of social life and the radical economic reform. Let us try to substantiate these conclusions.

Let us begin with the correlation between "exceptional measures" and the 5-year plan. A program of "exceptional measures" aimed at achieving a minimally acceptable level in balancing the economy, the need to neutralize and compensate for inflationary trends, and securing realistic basic social guarantees is, for the present, the most important plan. Without solving such problems we cannot make any profound changes in the economic system. Their implementation will require nontraditional approaches and methods. In formulating such a program it would be unwise to subordinate its strict beginning to the new 5-year period, starting with 1991. Previous experience should have taught us now to avoid efforts to complete various measures "before lunch," before an a priori set deadline. The realistic assessment of the contemporary economic situation indicates that we cannot achieve a more or less balanced state of the economy by the start of 1991 and that the steps which must be taken in the areas of production, prices, structural and budget policy, and credit relations will require a longer period of time. The creation of prerequisites for the systematic intensification of the reform and for a prompt start of the next 5-year plan are tasks of different magnitude in terms of their importance to the country. To the soberly thinking person the choice of priorities here is entirely obvious.

There are reasons to fear that what are sometimes meant by "exceptional" are measures to stop the reform and turn management practices back to the old traditional forms. Views have been voiced on the need to restore to the state the power instruments lost in connection with the reform. The logic of this approach is familiar: let us first "create conditions" for new developments and only then introduce the new economic forms. We believe that this is unlikely to happen. Had the old methods made solving problems possible, in all likelihood the question of the need for a radical reform would not have arisen, i.e., of abandoning those same methods. It is precisely their unpromising nature that forces us to seek and master new ones. It is especially necessary to note that the existing forms of planning were precisely those which did not ensure the efficiency of the power instruments: phenomena of uncontrollability and disparity between actual development and formulated tasks became dangerously widespread.

Even the extremely tense socioeconomic situation does not allow us to adopt this approach. The art of politics in the transitional period should consist of coordinating the improvement of the socioeconomic situation with mastering the new principles and methods of economic management.

We cannot say that the difficulties of "coupling" efficient steps for improving the economy with the new 5-year period were not realized (albeit not explicitly) by the professionals. A reflection of these difficulties is the idea of the planning authorities to break down the 13th 5-year period into two stages: a 2-year and a 3-year period. But is it necessary to follow such a halfway system?

Existing planning practices are the creation of the administrative-command management of the economy and, to this day, also a powerful means of its preservation. To realize this, suffice it to consider planning not from the viewpoint of a strictly economic position but from a position of the more general aspects of social development from the 1930s to the first half of the 1980s.

The planning process is structured in such a way that the planning system encompasses and governs the totality of economic processes in society. The plan parameters (essentially to this day) are mandatory and specific assignments. This system is the main, the basic channel through which the management apparatus influences all factors governing the development of the economy and the social area and, above all, the human factor, the individual, at work and in society. One of the most important principles of the Stalinist administrative-command management system was the ubiquitous nature of the directing and controlling influence of power institutions, refined through the practices of economic planning and comprehensive approach.

All elements of the planning system consistently lead to a hierarchical management structure. The approval of the plan (of late, the formulation of its essential features) on any level is the prerogative of the superior administrative body which makes the "allocation," distribution and paternalistic principles guiding and fundamental in the management process.

The purely economic consequences of said planning features are quite well known. It is important to emphasize that planning, as it exists, makes it possible to provide less economic than administrative management of the economy. This is entirely consistent with the bureaucratic-centralist type and style of management, which developed in its time within the framework of the political system and its structures, and which was gradually applied to the economy. Consequently, the task is to surmount the profound sociopolitical deformations and to create a model of a plan consistent with another, a democratic type of functioning of both society and the state.

Democracy in a state does not mean uncontrolled social development. These are categories on different levels. Ensuring a purposeful development is the basic function of any state.

The democratic state, which ensures the formulation of ideas and implementation of the steps they require, based on constitutionally defined democratic procedures, is identified by the type of distribution of management functions among its different levels, reflecting the high degree of reciprocal coordination of interests of the basic social groups. This presumes a substantial autonomy on the managerial levels the functions of which are not reduced to a primitive hierarchical system of subordinations. This feature is essential from the viewpoint of the model of the plan to be used, and means

that on each management level an entirely independent plan will be formulated and democratically approved, reflecting the specific way in which the corresponding project will function and the legislatively defined role of that specific level of management in ensuring its development. The reciprocal cost subordination of the plans and levels of management will, naturally, be retained. However, such a cost subordination will be of lesser importance than the specific nature of the plans. This approach is entirely consistent with the steps aimed at ensuring the democratic nature of social and economic development.

Taking this into consideration, the state plan for the economic and social development of the country must be a system of target-oriented stipulations and measures which will ensure the solution of general government problems through the efforts and resources of the state itself (the central authority).

We believe that all the necessary reasons exist for agreeing with L. Abalkin in that the plan should be the sum of comprehensive target programs, the levels and stages of implementation of which will be determined by their purpose and content. It is hardly necessary in this case to try to promote uniformity, for programs are bound to differ depending on their target, means and organization-production and organization-management features. One requirement, however, is mandatory: the targets must be expressed through their specific method, not only through quantitative (formal) but, above all, through qualitative (meaningful) stipulations.

If the plan is a sum of national target programs, it means an inevitable reduction of the "share" of socioeconomic development of the country, as directly reflected in the state plan. Many of the processes will be self-regulating on the basis of the activeness of the economic management subjects—enterprises, cooperatives and working people—stimulated by the plan's guidelines and rates. It is precisely the plan guidelines, rates and other regulatory and economic management conditions and not indicators of output by sector and region that, under the new circumstances, should ensure the implementation of the plan's basic functions. It is they (with the proper differentiation and consideration of the specifics of the different national economic complexes) that will give the plan its unified and integral nature.

We must now firmly abandon planning methods which do not contribute to attaining the purpose of the plan and which hinder the broadening of autonomy and the efficient work of enterprises and other targets of economic management. So far little has been done in this respect. The new methods, introduced under the pressure of the central authorities and the scientific community, are being made public and are coexisting with the old. As a rule, this coexistence quickly ends with the absorption of the new by the old and already established customary apparatus.



It is very important to abandon the related planning of output from top to bottom. Yet this is the key aspect of present-day planning. It is precisely the related, the hierarchically subordinated type of system of plans that is one of the determining features of the existing planning model, a form of "superimposing" the comprehensive political power on the economy. This was essentially the basis for the concept of the state order and the independent formulation of enterprise production programs.

The forms of concealing obsolete planning methods are becoming increasingly refined. Furthermore, control figures, as has been repeatedly pointed out, have by no means become a planning-orienting mechanism but a means of coordinating the old with the new approaches to planning, in which the latter clearly play the leading role. Today's planning methods seem to be extraneous to the plan itself without, however, having lost their nature. Thus, in formulating their production programs, the enterprises must proceed from the "supplier-consumer" tie which developed earlier, under the conditions of mandatory-target planning. The fact that this procedure is regulated by legal documents which are extraneous in terms of the plan does not change anything.

These problems are extremely pressing, for we know that the formulation of plans for the 13th 5-year period has already been started on the basis of the existing procedure for the formulation of control figures and their accompanying documentation concerning direct relations.

Yet, in our view, in terms of production planning, it is necessary, in addition to state orders, which would apply to a limited and increasingly shrinking range of products of "strategic" importance, for the Gosplan, Gosstat and other authorities not to engage in planning and issuing enterprises their production program. They should not even provide estimates. Production indicators, including some dealing with the growth rate, should be excluded from planning on the national economic and sectorial levels. Production indicators must be retained only on the level of the enterprises and determined by them independently, as stipulated in the Law on the Enterprise.

It is difficult to agree with the view that a consolidated enterprise plan should or could be included in some aspect in the state plan. This would lead to confusing the functions of the center with those of the enterprises and to a "struggle" between planning authorities and the ministries concerning their purpose and the responsibility of labor collectives, to the detriment of the latter and regardless of the existence of truly national tasks.

It is hardly admissible today to assign to the state plan the task of balancing the economy in the customary "product" terms. That is why it is difficult to agree with the requirements formulated by L. Abalkin for a "full and efficient balancing of the plan, including the creation of the necessary reserves" (KOMMUNIST No 6,

1989, p 12). This essentially conflicts with what the author writes in the same article concerning the new model of the plan. It is not the plan itself that should be balanced, for that which is today the target of balancing on the macrolevel should be entirely excluded. It would be more accurate to apply this requirement to the state budget.

Achieving a balance on the microproportional level is the prerogative of horizontal relations achieved through the market. The state plan can and must provide a balance, conceived as the consistency between macroproportions and its target nature, applying specific market controls through economic methods. Nonetheless, planning relations should not hinder the possibility of the market to solve specific tasks related to maintaining the balance. The only essential restriction is the inadmissibility of social destabilization.

Abandoning the practice of related and comprehensive material planning would make it possible to take further steps in the restructuring of planning activities.

For the time being, in terms of growth, planning assignments are formulated on the basis of the "gross output" approach, ignoring the suitable assessment of targets and essential development characteristics. For the sake of reaching the stipulated pace, the enterprises are asked to increase output in physical terms and cash volume indicators. Economists and journalists have already become tired of writing about the paradoxical consequences of such practices, but changes remain sluggish. The main reason is the natural interconnection between the "gross output" rate and related production planning. Without the latter the rates would lose their self-seeking significance.

Historically, the situation developed in such a way that the plan indicators, including rates, are also statistical accountability indicators. Gradually, this essentially accurate concept became distorted: a great deal of that which must mandatorily be a target of accounting and analysis began to be considered (or was kept) as a planning target. We believe that it is necessary to free the plan of indicators which do not reflect any whatsoever purposeful actions on the part of the state. This applies above all precisely to the growth rate. Meanwhile, we must intensify and broaden accountability and analysis. By no means everything that is considered should be a subject of planning. Conversely, all processes in the national economy, including unplanned ones, should be represented as completely and in as great a detail as possible in statistical and other types of accountability.

It is on the basis of such positions that we should consider not only the pace but also the other so-called combined or consolidation indicators. They reflect extremely poorly the planned quality changes in the economy. However, they successfully preserve inertial processes and cumbersome management structure. The social section of the plan is an example of this: it includes the indicator of the average wage of workers and

employees. Today increased earnings at enterprises are achieved, to a decisive extent, not as a result of the centralized measures taken by the state but of the economic activities of collectives. The fact that this indicator prevents any limitation in above-plan wage increase is self-evident. Therefore, what is the sense of planning it on the macrolevel? Is it not better, instead, to include in the plan new indicators which would truly reflect the efforts and outlays of the state, aimed at upgrading the well-being of the people such as, for example, the size of and procedure for annual increases of wages and pensions related to the rising overall price level.

If the plan does not include production assignments or set growth rates, the question of the time frame of planning arises in a new way. The bulk of the plan should consist of target programs of various time spans and natures. Its second element is the country's national budget, which is drafted and approved annually. The budget lists expenditures for the implementation of governmental target programs according to the urgency, nature and planned deadlines for their implementation. The third part of the plan (or, strictly speaking, the state organization of planning relations) should provide the legal system which should govern the functioning of enterprises and other economic management targets, codified essentially in the laws.

The final component of the planned control of the economy consists of rates and regulations of economic management which could be formulated as follows:

In target programs, to the extent to which they affect them;

In the state budget (various types of penalties and subsidies); in legislative acts of a general nature, which ensure the purposeful course of reproduction and are based on long-term developments (such as the laws on leasing and the cooperative);

In special legislative acts which regulate the current socioeconomic situation (minimal levels of population income, set by the state; measures to control inflationary processes, etc.).

Upgrading the significance of the state budget and the rate-legal system of functioning of the subjects of economic management presumes the increased role of financial relations and, consequently, of the authorities in charge of formulating financial policy, the legislative authorities above all.

Based on the suggested model, it becomes possible substantially to increase the purposefulness of management and to relieve, at the same time, the national economic level of the need to supervise enterprises, regions, etc. This model, in our view, is consistent with the forthcoming changes in the structure and nature of ownership. On the basis of legislative decisions, the

subjects of ownership are given stable economic-legal conditions for engaging in autonomous economic activities.

Freeing relations and forms of planning from control-dispatching and distribution functions would make it unnecessary for socioeconomic processes to fit the Procrustean bed of the plans through strictly set deadlines. There would simply be no need for a traditional 5-year plan. It would be quite timely, from all viewpoints, practically to solve the problem of replacing the plan model immediately, at the end of the present and the as yet anticipated next 5-year plan.

Naturally, rejecting the existing model of the 5-year plan is difficult for a number of reasons, ranging from psychological to technical-organizational. We believe, however, that in this case as in fact always we need comprehensive and organically interrelated steps. It will be possible to untangle the Gordian knot of the "gross output" approach, the conservative sectorial projections (the diktat of ministries in the area of planning), outlay rates, the universality of plan regulations, and the fetishizing of temporary levels, only by totally rejecting the archaic model of the plan which combines all of these areas. The 5-year plan, with its basic characteristics, has become obsolete as an integral, consistent and internally logical type of a planned organization of the economy under the conditions of a totalitarian social system.

Obviously, under contemporary conditions a model state plan cannot be based on the qualitative enhancement of the role of democratic political decisions in the economy. It is a question of ensuring the legislative nature (in the direct and not the figurative sense) of planning decisions. Otherwise we could not even conceive of any real changes in the nature of planning.

Upgrading the role of expertise and control on the part of the legislative authorities in the planning of economic and social development will require of government departments, in particular, the drafting of projects in a way which will provide a clear idea of their target, the target-reaching measures, planned results and expected consequences.

Under present-day conditions, the right of the legislator to formulate a state plan and a state budget could be blocked by the nature and even the form of the respective documents: by the fact that they are classified into basic and supplementary, their volume, complex structure, abundance of interrelated quantitative indicators and other specific parameters. This nature and form of planning documents are based on obsolete concepts both concerning the content of planning as well as the role of the legislator in plan implementation.

Therefore, changes in the principles and mechanisms for the implementation of this function and restricting the content of state planning documents to resolutions directly related exclusively to the activities of the state itself (the central authority) are not important only of

and into themselves. They are necessary from the viewpoint of the true exercise of the legislator's rights. The Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet will be able competently to consider and to truly influence the drafts of resolutions, the volume, content and structure of which, as they reflect the active role of the state in the implementation of its inherent functions, will be accessible and open to study, discussion and, if so required, to making necessary amendments.

It is important to emphasize that the clash between political concepts and specific economic decisions played a negative role in the initial years of perestroika. In the course of formulating democratic ways of organizing the economic management system, we must find efficient ways of eliminating the separation between political and organizational-executive units. To this effect, once the concept of the plan has been accepted on the political level, obviously it will be necessary to instruct its authors and developers to head the key sectors of economic management, including the Gosplan. This will make it possible to obtain a professionally prepared draft and naturally to reflect the responsibility of authors and developers of the concept for its consistency with other legislatively stipulated projects. On this basis, we believe, it will be possible to increase the responsibility of the Gosplan and the executive authorities as a whole for the quality of the projects and the course and result of the implementation of the plan. It is only superficially that this problem appears not to be directly related to planning. Actually, it is one of the "links" in efficiently ensuring the planning of political processes in society as well: democratization and increasing the responsibility of the administrative apparatus for the efficiency of the decisions made.

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### On the Economy, Shortages and the 'Economics of Scarcity'

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[Article by Janos Kornai, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Harvard University professor of economics]

[Text] Janos Kornai, the noted Hungarian economist, is well-known throughout the world for his study of economic laws and principles governing the functioning of the real socialist economy and the conditions governing commodity-monetary balancing and the economic-mathematical models of national economic proportions. His books "*Supercentralization in Economic Management*," "*Anti-Equilibrium*," "*The Economics of Scarcity*," "*Economic Growth, Scarcity and Efficiency*," and "*Contradictions and Dilemmas*," have been translated in a number of languages and undergone dozens of editions in socialist and capitalist countries.

So far, the books by Professor Kornai have not been published in the Soviet Union. Only a few of his articles have been translated and published. Now, in accordance with numerous wishes expressed by the scientific public, Izdatelstvo Nauka is preparing for publication what is considered to be the most popular book by J. Kornai "*The Economics of Scarcity*" (1980). The author was kind enough to give our journal a preface especially written for the Russian edition of the book.

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It is a my great pleasure and honor that the book "*The Economics of Scarcity*," is being published in the Soviet Union. The phenomenon it discusses is well-familiar to the readers. Hungarians, Soviets, Chinese, Romanians, Cubans and Poles equally well know what it means to stand in line for meat or shoes and instead of making their purchases, to be listening to the abuse of salesclerks. For years they have to wait in line for an apartment, or to experience production stops at enterprises due to the lack of materials or complementing items. Scarcity entails numerous and varied losses: the level of satisfaction of the consumer drops, the production rhythm is disrupted and technical development is deprived of important incentives. The greatest harm, probably, is that the seller enjoys an advantage over the purchaser and the independence and freedom of the individual are thus harmed. The domination of the seller over the purchaser puts the person in a subordinate and, in frequent cases, a degrading position, whether it is a question of a customer in a store or a worker in an enterprise. Obviously, this touches upon one of the most specific areas of research in political economy: instead of studying the interconnection between men and objects we analyze social relations among people in an effort to determine the reasons for and consequences of chronic shortages.

Soviet economic science has long drawn attention to this problem. I used in my studies, for example, the works of L. Kritsman and V. Novozhilov written, respectively, in 1925 and 1926. Subsequently, however, for decades, the people spoke of shortages only in their family circle or while standing in line. Scarcity was not mentioned in scientific studies on political economy. That is worth thinking about: What, actually, is the task of the economist who is studying the problems of socialism?

In the lengthy period during which economic scientists in the socialist countries bypassed the study of shortages and other similar "tricky" problems, their philosophy was based on the following: socialism, they reasoned, is the type of system which is consistent with the age-old aspirations of mankind. All of its laws are, by definition, beneficial. Consequently, any adverse and harmful phenomenon which may cause human suffering or economic damage is nothing but a temporary unpleasantness, the result of the carelessness or poor work of individuals. It may also be that adverse phenomena are the result of the errors made by leaders who were given exceptional power such as, for example, Stalin or Mao Zedong. It is

precisely because of the tremendous influence which these individuals had that the harm they caused was quite substantial. However, one unquestionable thing is consistent with such considerations: the problems which arose do not depend on the basic social relations within the existing system, for under socialism all laws are "good." Difficulties and problems, if they exist at all, appear only because individuals failed to understand the "good" law, applied it poorly or else opposed it.

Works based on such considerations confuse the various functions and tasks of the economist: to observe, describe and explain reality, to assess a situation and to formulate practical recommendations and suggestions and programs for action. We find in worldwide scientific literature a variety of names for such functions; there is a pitting of "positive" (descriptive-explanatory) against "normative" (evaluating and recommending) theories. We find in the works in which the reader is presented with the views we already quoted a mixture of the answer to two different and logically clearly distinct questions. What is and what should be? What is the nature of reality and what is the desired status? In the works we mentioned, the imaginary features of an ideal picture, a utopia of the perfect society, are described as the "objective law," while the real internal contradictions of the real society are not even mentioned. The most important requirement of a work of science remained unsatisfied: to compare definitions and assertions to observations, experience and facts.

Like the works of some other authors, my books are based on views and approaches different from the ones I cited above. Above all, they proceed from the fact that we must look at reality straight in the eyes, regardless of whether we like what we see or not. The first question which the conscientious researcher should ask himself is not whether that which we are observing is "good" but whether it is what we are claiming to be the truth? Are the facts consistent with the study made by the author? If the scientist, honestly answering this question, believes that his assertions are consistent with this the only possible scientific criterion, he has the right to provide a detailed description and explanation, regardless of whether or not the truth which thus becomes apparent is pleasant or unpleasant.

The concept of "law" is linked to so many abuses and has so frequently been the reason for various misunderstandings, that this author is unwilling to use it. Let us try to do with more modest expressions and speak of patterns and trends in social development, predispositions of the system and its characteristic or typical behavior. The basic stipulation formulated and developed by the author consists of the following: the economic system characteristic of the socialist national economy before the reforms aimed at decentralizing management inevitably causes scarcity. Consequently, it is a trend of social development which inevitably arises under certain social circumstances.

This is a universal phenomenon. No one is saying that in such a system there are always shortages of everything. The assertion is more limited and consists of the following: no single important economic area is free of scarcity. Scarcity has been rooted in the market for consumer goods and services, in production, in the distribution of manpower and in the areas of capital investments, foreign trade and international payment relations. It is a chronic phenomenon which is noted at all times; after a possible temporary success in the efforts to surmount it, it invariably reappears. The system itself contributes to the systematic existence of scarcity. It has the inherent feature of self-reproduction, for scarcity generates scarcity. It is intensive in nature: it appears very forcefully and has a very profound impact on the behavior of all members of society. When a comprehensive, chronic, self-reproducing and intensive scarcity appears in a system, in the limited sense we used to characterize it, that same system could be described as the economics of scarcity.

This book is an attempt to analyze the reasons for the appearance of scarcity. If the phenomenon is of a mass, persistent and intensive nature it cannot be explained by accidental errors made by individuals. Nor does the argument according to which the scarcity is due either to errors and blunders in planning or the egotism and negligence of the management of individual enterprises or else the lack of attention on the part of some sellers, convincing. We must seek the deeper reasons.

Unlike the traditional approach, the analysis offered to the reader follows the opposite direction: from a consideration of superficial to more complex, more fundamental reasons, invading ever deeper strata of cause and effect relations. It is a study of the extent to which the phenomena of scarcity can be explained in terms of various contradictions and frictions which appear in the economy, and weaknesses and shortcomings in the information system and in the making and execution of decisions.

The next level of analysis is the extent to which chronic scarcity is related to the influence of different social mechanisms: the aspiration for economic expansion, chase after gross output, "investment hunger," the trend to stockpile reserves, and the almost never saturated demand for resources from the state sector, namely investment funds and supplies. An even deeper level is the following: how to explain these trends with the weak responsiveness of state enterprises to prices and profits, and the lack of coercion and incentives to increase profitability, i.e., the group of phenomena which is characterized in the "economics of scarcity" as the "soft budget restriction of enterprises." This is related to the fact that the state enterprise depends to a significantly greater extent on the superior bureaucracy than on the consumer. Its life or death, decline or development, depend not on its competitiveness on the market but on the intentions of departments which command it and, at the same time, take care of it in a paternal way. Obviously, the cause and effect analysis could be extended



but, after each answer, again and again the question arises: "Why?" However, the study provided in the book already shows that the scarcity is constantly reproduced as long as the vertical dependence of enterprises remains the dominant production relation.

The publication of "*The Economics of Scarcity*," triggered a number of debates both in Hungary and abroad. In 10 to 20 years, after numerous debates and, one would hope, after a number of empirical studies, based on extensive factual data, the science of economics would be probably able to explain better the problem of scarcity than was possible in writing this work. I am relying on the fact that this book will also trigger debates among my Soviet colleagues. However, I would very much like for them to understand that which is probably more important than any economic problem it discusses, i.e., the **scientific philosophy and scientific ethics** on which the book is based. The greatest possible number of people should agree with the fact that the facts must be looked in the eye even if they bring no satisfaction. We have no right to avoid uncomfortable truths. We must not be satisfied with superficial answers. We must try to find the deep roots of our difficulties and problems. We must identify the true laws governing the development of the economic reality around us and find a true explanation for the comprehensively repeated phenomena and durable trends.

Unquestionably, even among the people who share these views there will be those who will put the book down with a feeling of despondency, for the author does not supply ready-made recommendations on how to cure the disease. What is the worth of a diagnosis without treatment?

Let us stop to consider this medical comparison. Several years ago, I wrote a work in which I drew an analogy between economics and medicine. Recently, that article was published in its Russian translation in the Soviet journal EKO. Today I would like to go back to the views I expressed in that study. Unquestionably, the most important thing is for the patient to remain among the living and, furthermore, if possible, to recover fully. However, this cannot be achieved by ordering the physician: prescribe a medicine, because this patient must be healed. For thousands of years people suffered from consumption which was subsequently given the scientific term tuberculosis of the lungs. They initially turned for help to sorcerers and shamans; later they turned to "priests," who described themselves as physicians, begging or threatening them. The sick tried everything: prayers and exorcism of the forces of darkness, hot and cold baths, and a great variety of medicinal plants and chemicals. It was only in 1890 that modern bacteriology was able to establish that bacillus caused tuberculosis. However, Robert Koch, who discovered it, could not say how to defeat such bacillus. More than half a century had to pass before a truly highly efficient medicine was found, streptomycin, and tuberculosis stopped being a mass, devastating and lethal disease. It is true that

identifying the reasons for the disease led to the discovery of a truly efficient medicine used in more expedient and efficient forms of treatment: the patients were prescribed a light diet, fresh air, a variety of means for lowering the temperature of the body and, sometimes, surgical intervention, removing part of the damaged lung. In other words, the Hippocratic rule familiar to medicine was observed: do not harm the patient.

But let us now return to our professional problems. The complex laws governing the functioning of the socialist system have not been discovered so far. In this respect our situation is much worse compared to that of economics in the capitalist countries in terms of understanding the functioning of their own system. Essentially we are only now beginning this tremendous project. Some people are quite self-confident: all they have to do is look around them and they already know what should be done. This author does not belong to that category. He does not have an absolutely accurate diagnosis for the "patient," the socialist economy. It is not a question of a single disease but of an entire array of negative symptoms. How are they interconnected? Are they triggered by a variety of independent factors or are they the consequence of common reasons? Are they features inherent in any socialist system, whatever the specific mechanism of its functioning may be or are they the exclusive consequence of one of the varieties of socialism, the supercentralized directive-based economy? Are all diseases curable or do they include one which is invincible, in which case we can hope to alleviate the symptoms? There are so many questions to which, for the time being, we lack convincing answers!

Such questions, formulated in general, could be concretized in terms of the problems of scarcity. Although I have been studying this topic for a great many years, I must nonetheless admit that I have failed to find a specific answer to an entire array of questions. I already pointed out that a deficit is an inevitable attribute of an economy governed by directives, using the old supercentralized mechanism. It does not follow from this, however, that such a claim could be simply "turned around" by saying that it would be sufficient to eliminate a directive-based management and grant greater autonomy to state enterprises and that this in itself would eliminate the scarcity. It seems to me that although such steps are necessary they are nonetheless insufficient for the elimination of the scarcity aspect of the system. Such steps are insufficient for the customers to stop competing among themselves for the favors of the sellers and, conversely, for the manufacturers and sellers to begin to fight for customers. For the time being all the adequate and necessary conditions for the elimination of scarcity have not been identified properly.

A scientific analysis cannot provide a definitive answer to such open questions. This cannot be achieved for the reason alone that the economic reforms which have been actually carried so far have failed as yet to provide uniform results. I consider myself one of the old, sincere and ardent supporters of reforms and would like to see

them be as convincingly successful as possible. However, a scientist, and let me once again strongly emphasize this, should proceed not from wishes but from the facts he observes. Reforms have been going on for 40 years in Yugoslavia, 20 years in Hungary and nearly a decade in China. All three countries are examples of a specific combination of brilliant successes with crushing failures. It would be unconscientious to note only the positive results for the sake of praises and "propaganda" of the reforms or else to indicate exclusively their failures, for the sake of "counterpropaganda." Incidentally, also from the viewpoint of the topic of scarcity and the related other severe and difficult problem, that of inflation, the experience of these three countries does not uniformly point at the way of surmounting difficulties. The range of tasks set in this brief statement does not include a summation of the results of the reforms or determining the reasons for the different situations and the slow rates of progress. Let me merely note that we do not have the type of program for action for the elimination of scarcity in the economy which would be scientifically substantiated in the strict meaning of the term.

The previous reforms, regardless of the socialist country in which they were carried out, could be considered "experimental" on the scientific-theoretical level. However, even with a small number of experiments one could risk making far-reaching conclusions should the results be uniform. Unfortunately, the efforts at reform undertaken so far, to this day, have not turned out to be sufficiently uniform and productive to lead to conclusions which could make a scientific summation possible.

It does not follow from this, and I would not suggest to anyone to do so, that we must stop and wait before taking tactical steps until science has definitely and irrefutably identified the problem and suggested a program for action. Let us proceed from the comparison with medicine and emphasize that history is not accustomed to waiting for the scientists to understand the problem and find a way to solve it. There is a division of labor not only in economics and industry but also in sociopolitical life. There is, first of all, a division of labor between politics and science. The steps taken by a political manager or a state leader who participates in the management of society are determined by the need to act. He realizes that he must take a step even when he does not know exactly what the consequences of this step may be and what interconnection will determine the development of this complex social environment within which he performs his political activities. In the majority of cases his actions are determined more by inner convictions and faith than by a strict and objective scientific analysis.

As to the scientists, a division of labor exists among them as well. Not all of them undertake to solve the same problems. Some researchers are capable of quickly and decisively taking a specific position in solving practical problems, based on already achieved scientific results and, in truth, based on greater realism and common sense. Meanwhile, other economists feel an attraction for

basic research and are unsuitable to play the role of practical advisors participating in the implementation of current resolutions.

Economists who concentrate on the formulation of efficient suggestions and practical programs for action, planned for immediate implementation, deserve our greatest respect. Their work is needed and the policy of reform demands their participation. They could contribute to the formulation of better planned changes and to making fuller use of international experience. However, although I respect them sincerely, I consider no less worthy of respect those who have set themselves a different task: medicine needed a person like Robert Koch, looking into a microscope, even though throughout his life he had not healed a single victim of tuberculosis. Some people operate, daringly invading the living tissue; others would not dare to take a scalpel in their hand but would try, in the laboratory, to unravel the secrets of the body. Obviously, the work of the theoretician in the area of basic research as well has instant practical value; the results of his analysis could inhibit thoughtless leaders in taking showy but practically useless or simply harmful steps; they could cool off and reduce excessive expectations which begin by triggering illusions followed by disappointment. In addition to such thankless but useful "sobering up" functions, sooner or later basic research and theoretical analysis, after many obstacles and with great delay, could help to re-evaluate the existing situation and, in the final account, practically to contribute to the development of society.

Mutual respect, understanding and tolerance of someone else's views are something quite necessary in our scientific world. No establishment, organization, movement or scientific or political leader should feel infallible. Through my works, including *"The Economics of Scarcity,"* with the discoveries and errors they contain, I would like to make a contribution to the strengthening of this spirit and the development of scientific discussions.

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### A Place in the Shade

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[Report by Aleksandr Iosifovich Leshchevskiy, KOMMUNIST special correspondent]

[Text] An ideological study was made last year at the Zavod Krasnoye Sormovo Production Association. The shop workers were asked to rate the activities of the administration and the shop public organizations. The forms to be filled were not to be signed, thus guaranteeing anonymity, so that even the most timid would not have to fear that anyone would try to settle the score for a frankly expressed view. After the forms had been collected and the positive assessments counted, it turned out that the administration had received many more



positive assessments than the party, trade union or Komsomol organizations and was quite ahead of them in virtually all shops.

Here is another detail which gives food for thought. The same surveys included the following request: write the names of the most authoritative people in the shop. Once again the lists were headed by the economic managers: the shop chief or one of his deputies. In frequent cases the names of shop party bureau organization secretaries were not found anywhere. The workers, of whom party members average 13.2 percent, explained this fact simply: we do not know how to rate them; there is a party committee, let the party committee determine whether the secretary punctually collects the dues and holds the meetings on time. The sociologists tried to tell the people that it was a question of authority. However, the people stuck to their view: they were unable to say anything about party work.

Ye. Kopeykin, the party committee secretary of the association, who was present during our conversation at the plant's sociological laboratory, said that the Sormovo people assess individuals on the basis of their specific actions. The result of the work of an economic manager can be clearly seen by everyone. If the shop is fulfilling its plan it means that the chief is good. The shop chiefs now working at the association are professionally knowledgeable and energetic (for which, let us note, the party committee deserves a great deal of credit) so that here year after year contracts are being fulfilled 100 percent. It is much more difficult to determine the usefulness of the social organizations. Hence the results of the survey. It was obvious that they did not worry Yevgeniy Pavlovich.

Perhaps far-reaching conclusions should not be drawn on the basis of a single sociological study. However, there is something to think about here. The results of the work of an economic manager are indeed much more visible than that of the ideologue. However, was this the only factor in the rating of people with authority? The workers refused to assess "party work." Does this mean that they saw it only as consisting of collecting dues and holding meetings? Could it be that they do not sense the role which the party organization plays in the life of their labor collective?

Other factors which should be studied exist as well. Some frontranking workers are unwilling to join the party. This applies, for example, to A. Bulkin, the head of a ship-assembling brigade. He is an active man with a strong character and with a personal view on many contemporary problems. He is also one of the best brigade leaders in the association.

"This is a general problem: the people are not joining the party," said A. Pakhomov, deputy head of the defense department, Gorkiy CPSU Obkom. "They are unwilling. In the past we kept asking: give us the possibility of accepting engineering and technical workers and we shall correct all the figures. Now we have this right. And what

happened? We have a thin stream instead of a flood. Nonparty members have now begun to be elected to command positions and applicants are all of a sudden not in a hurry to join. There are even fewer candidates among the workers."

Anatoliy Aleksandrovich and I had another discussion on the day which followed the election of USSR people's deputies. He and several other members of the oblast party committee apparat were somewhat despondent. In many electoral districts the people had voted less for any specific candidate than against candidates nominated and supported by local party and soviet authorities. "They drove out the chiefs." B. Vidyayev, general director of the GAZ, and N. Zharkov, general director of Krasnoye Sormovo. V. Kozlov, chief physician at the hospital No 33, who was believed to have been recommended by the raykom, also lost. Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Pakhomov claimed that such moods were largely caused by the exposure of the actions of people like Rashidov, Churbanov and Medunov. He recalled the time an elderly woman came to see him with a request to help her solve housing difficulties. Even in her petition which dealt with a specific personal problem she had found place to insert a paragraph on the corruption of the communists. "Why are you accusing everyone indiscriminately?" Pakhomov asked her. "That is what the papers are writing. I dare say it is unpleasant to read the truth," maliciously responded the visitor.

Naturally, publications which shed light on dirt which for a long time had accumulated in the corners could trigger such a reaction as well. We have exposed a great deal of it during the period of perestroika. However, to consider this the only reason for the negative mood of the people is obviously wrong. Here is what I was told by N. Zharkov, Krasnoye Sormovo general director, who had campaigned for the position of people's deputy but, as we said, had lost to V. Kuzubov, a shop chief at a neighboring association. One of the voters advanced to the rostrum and asked him: "Are you a member of the obkom?" Having received an affirmative answer, the person addressed himself to the public in the hall: "Zharkov may be a good person and a worthy candidate. However, I shall vote against him. As member of the party obkom he is responsible for the fact that the oblast has been brought down to such a sorry condition."

Therefore the "local component," we believe, has a great impact and will continue to affect the party's authority. It is influencing much more substantially the views and actions of the people than are exposures in the press. Incidentally, the Krasnoye Sormovo workers with whom I had the occasion to talk, have an entirely normal attitude toward them: the dirt must be swept off. They credit the CPSU with improvements in the climate in our society, initiated by the party. That same Sormovo brigade leader A. Bulkin is unwilling to join the party not in the least because somewhere or other a bribe taker with a party card was exposed. The main reason is "local."

"Honestly, I do not see among the party members someone to take as an example," Aleksandr Aleksandrovich admitted. "You can ask anyone about the way I work. However, obviously, some people may have less stamina. As I understand it, however, the party members should stand out through their responsibility and conscientiousness. Yet in my brigade, against the background of some nonparty people, the party members do not particularly stand out."

Finally, here is another fact directly related to the authority of the party organization. Cases of resigning from the CPSU have become quite frequent at Krasnoye Sormovo. I tried to talk with two workers who had resigned from the party and to understand the reasons for their action.

One of them was a retired military. He was not a drunk, a truant or loafer. He was one of those people to whom internal self-discipline would not allow any kind of careless work. At the plant as well he worked conscientiously.

"Are you short of money to pay your membership dues or are you in poor health?" I asked.

"Health... you are joking...." He grinned. "I am in good health and I earn decently. As to my reasons, I shall not be talking, do not waste your time. Once I have made up my mind, that is it."

The last sentence was addressed to the chairman of the party commission of the association's party committee, who had invited me to participate in their talk. Nor did the person who was resigning want to speak frankly with his own party bureau secretary.

The other one was a young boy who asked that a story which, as he said, he would like to forget, be not recalled. His explanation was the following: "I left because the party lacks authority. What is it contributing to the shop?"

The dictionary of philosophy explains the concept of "authority" as a generally acknowledged informal influence exerted by an individual or an organization in various areas of social life. It may be based on knowledge, moral virtues and experience, and is equated with acknowledging the need to have such an individual or organization. In other words, the organization (in our case the party organization) should contribute to social life (meaning the life of the labor collective) something which is urgently needed by the people and which no one else could contribute.

What do the people of Sormovo need today above all? What concerns them more than anything else?

During the final accountability and election party conference in Krasnoye Sormovo, N. Kovalev, the head of the ship assembly brigade, bluntly said what: "Sometimes, at the general store we cannot buy even bread, not to mention any dairy or meat products. The shelves are bare." I was present at the office of the general director,

when he was seeing people on their personal problems. The common request was, help us with housing. Embarrassed by the need to beg, an elderly worker who spoke quickly, in an effort to get it over with faster, said: "I have spent my entire life at the plant and do not have my own apartment. When I retire I would rather not live in communal housing." "We have one room and there are six of us. We live with my husband's parents. I have no strength left," a young woman said, crying. Quietly, Zharkov was promising help but, alas, not before 1 or 2 years. Oh, how difficult it is in such situations to look a person in the eyes!

"The lack of social amenities is terribly worrisome," was the first thing which Nikolay Sergeyevich said after reception time was over.

This lack of amenities, caused by the general neglect of the needs of the people in the past, was worsened by local reasons. For the entire 140 years of its operations, the plant drew its workers from Sormovo, Myshyakovka, Pochinok, Kuposovo and other surrounding villages. Gradually, a kind of plant suburb was formed. To this day, the plant personally owns 6,500 house buildings. This created the illusion that people would have housing. However, many of the homes date from Petr Zalomov's time, and their amenities are those of the turn of the century.

A great deal is being done at Krasnoye Sormovo to correct the situation. Increasingly, the plant itself is building more and more housing: 438 apartments were completed in 1986, 682 in 1987 and 828 in 1988. Recently, it added to its already substantial auxiliary farm two bankrupt kolkhozes located in Lyskovskiy Rayon, Gorkiy Oblast. Last year their agroindustrial enterprise (as it is now grandly known) issued 15 kilograms of meat and 70 kilograms of milk per plant employee. Without leaving the plant's territory one can buy a chicken, various confectionery goods and semi-finished food products. The greenhouse supplies the people with fresh vegetables.

Does the party organization participate in all this work? Unquestionably, it does. Therefore, why is it that in their talks with sociologists workers refuse to rate its activities? Why was it that all they mentioned were membership dues and not the new housing or fresh cucumbers?

Social problems are steadily discussed at party meetings and committee sessions. They were mentioned by the majority of speakers at the conference. Plans have been drawn along with lists of measures. There even is a party committee instructor in charge of supervising agriculture. However, does such "supervision" yield the necessary results? The reason for doubling the pace of house building at the plant is the following: The association created its own powerful construction subdivision. Furthermore, a shop for construction parts is being completed, thanks to which this project will unquestionably be speeded up. All of these are economic, administrative solutions. What are the party solutions?

The previous deputy general director in charge of construction badly dealt with his obligations and was dismissed, with the help of the party committee. "He was shown the door." His replacement has already repeatedly submitted reports at party committee sessions and been reprimanded without, however, being accused of anything in particular. This cannot be interpreted as party influence which, elsewhere as well, can be noticed with difficulty. In the majority of cases, even the initiative does not come from the primary party organizations. For example, the suggestion of taking on the lagging kolkhozes came from the association's council of brigade leaders.

Working conditions are an equally grave problem. Extensive plant reconstruction has been needed for some time. It was here that movie director Gleb Panfilov filmed "Forbidden People," after Gorky's novel "Mother." He found the production facilities dating from the turn of the century suitable. Thus, nothing needed changing in the rolling shop. They simply dressed the workers in peaked caps and aprons, and that became the turn of the century.

Last January the enterprise's party aktiv discussed the "Role of Social Factors in Production, in Shaping the Moral and Psychological Climate in Labor Collectives and the Tasks of the Party Organizations in Developing Them." S. Pazynin, deputy party committee secretary, sharply discussed dust and air pollution, noise in the shops, and the great amount of manual labor ("the sledgehammer helps automation"). As a result, she recommended "to the managements of departments and shops, together with party, trade union and Komsomol organizations, to formulate specific measures to improve...." Clearly, one did not have to be a seer to guess it: the formulation of steps and their implementation will go through administrative channels and follow the specific ways of the economic management. Generally speaking, why was it necessary to adopt such recommendations at a party meeting instead of at a production conference?

M. Krylov, party committee secretary at one of the shops, said that at a recent party meeting the party members decided to build a partition at the metal processing section and a shot preening system for cleaning the metal before its use.

"Who specifically was instructed with carrying out this plan?"

"Party member Kuzin, deputy shop chief in charge of production preparations."

"Mikhail Anatolyevich, but is this not one of his strictly official obligations?"

"If the party members had not raised such questions no one would have bothered. We were not the ones who drafted the list of measures. They were based on the suggestions of the sections. This concerns the people...."

The people are concerned with many problems. But is it necessary to duplicate official instructions with resolutions issued by the party committee? Is it necessary, for example, at a party meeting in the technical control department, to hear a report by managers of subdivisions "on the results of submitting fault-free items to the inspecting authorities?"

The expression ideological support has become familiar. Any decision affecting the life of the enterprise—reconstruction, updating the output and relations with related enterprises—demands, by tradition, a corresponding resolution by the party committee and "promotion" with the help of the party authority. It is thus that the ideological worker becomes the assistant of the administration and falls under its control. He becomes an executive without a specific job of his own and, sometimes, even without a professional identity or point of view. It is no accident that O. Tyukayev, the senior foreman, said that he looks at the party bureau secretary as just one more deputy chief of shop.

Such was the status, as though in the shadow cast by the administration, that most party organizations held for many long years. Under the conditions of the administrative-command system, obviously, nothing else was possible. A party committee secretary who held independent views was someone to be gotten rid of.

The situation today is different. It is the labor collective that must become the master of the enterprise. This radically changes the functions of the administration and the party committee. The party organization becomes the very area for the application of forces where nothing else will do. It is a question of involving the working people in production management, changing the attitude of the person toward his job and surmounting apathy, alienation and indifference.

It is said that the attitude toward labor can be changed best with economic instruments. The ruble, it is claimed, is the best educator. This is as may be.... In explaining the need for adding to the association the two lagging kolkhozes, the general director said: "They will not improve without our help. The people do not want to lease the land, for even without leasing they get money."

In fact, no leasing is practiced at the plant. Even the brigade contracting method has not been developed. According to that same Zharkov, not only managers but workers as well show no interest in this method. They have their own "channel" through which they earn quite well: the so-called term orders. Briefly, they are as follows: if for any reason (most frequently because of interruption of supplies) the brigade is unable to complete its volume of output on time it is assigned an additional order for which it is paid within the appointed time.

This is a system of rushing in the course of which the bosses are generous in paying more and, occasionally, even create themselves. One such case was described by A. Gorokhovskiy, the editor-in-chief of the Sormovo

local radio system. On one occasion, in a shop he came across a brigade which was peacefully taking a cigarette break.

"Are we resting, boys?"

"Waiting for complementing items."

They were short of parts and were idling. Yet on the eve, Gorokhovskiy had held a conversation with the shop chief who was supplying the complementing items to that brigade. He had said that he had shipped them out down to the last bit of iron. Aleksey Aleksandrovich repeated this to the brigade leader. The latter angrily said:

"Keep it to yourself. I still have 2 days to meet my deadline."

Meanwhile, as of last January, the association was converted to cost accounting. This should have instilled in every worker an interest in the end results of the common efforts. It should have, but did not. The growth rates of output in the first months of this year were the same as for the same period last year, under the old management method. As we can see, the attitude toward the job as well has remained virtually unchanged. As in the past, the same story is repeated frequently. The press in the hull-making shop broke down. The mechanic conscientiously tried to bring it back to life but the repair dragged on. The metal bending brigade went to see the shop chief: speed up the repairs, they said, we are idling. He suggested to the workers to help the mechanic. They refused.

There is nothing astonishing in this. As per agreement with the USSR Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, the association had chosen the first model of cost accounting, which generates minimal interest in labor results. The workers themselves were very critical of this model.

The question is the following: Why was such an unsuitable model chosen? V. Lisitsyn, deputy general director in charge of economic affairs, explained:

"The decision was made by the labor collective council."

"Did no one express doubts?"

"What doubts! There is hardly anyone here who understands cost accounting."

This means that, essentially, there was no real choice. This social self-management authority simply approved the decision of the administration, agreed upon with the ministry. The people are showing no interest in economics. They are unwilling to change their own attitude toward the job by applying the most efficient economic methods. But could it be that in Krasnoye Sormovo there is nothing that needs changing? The main item produced here is ships of various models. The range of consumers is quite limited and no particular complaints are being voiced concerning the equipment manufactured by the

Sormovo people. Could it be that life does not demand of today's shipbuilders a different attitude toward labor, for which reason the party organization is not in a hurry to solve this problem?

The point, precisely, is that it does. The new ships now being mastered by the plant workers are much more complex than their predecessors. Different skills, a different production organization and, naturally, a different attitude toward the job are needed in order to assemble them and not go bankrupt in the process. There is another reason as well. In addition to ships, the association produces washing machines. Demand for such machines is huge and the moment they are shipped out they are sold instantly. The old shop cannot maintain the necessary output and the people of Sormovo are building a small plant on their territory. The manpower for it will have to be provided by the collective itself. The new plant will require some 2,000 people, drawn from the other operating shops. Meanwhile, the basic production must not be lowered. This means that the work must become more efficient.

What could the party organization do in that case? Delegates to the 19th All-Union Party Conference said that the democratization of social life is needed in order to help the people to feel their own responsibility for the labor results of the collective and reject their apathy and alienation. It is democratization that will create the moral atmosphere in which a person will feel himself an individual and not a cog, and realize that something very real depends on him, that he is intrinsically valuable.

Some democratic principles are also appearing in the life of the Sormovo shipbuilders. Elections for economic management have already become self-evident. A labor collective council is functioning at the enterprise. As we already mentioned, there is also a brigade leaders council. Nonparty members are regularly invited to attend shop party meetings. However, we cannot fail to note that in frequent cases the democratization process bears an administrative mark. An example of this was the recent elections for chief of the galvanizing shop. They were described to me by Ye. Kopeykin, party committee secretary.

This "broth" had been cooking for several months prior to the elections themselves. The collective rebelled against the previous manager. He was removed from his position and one of the specialists was assigned to take his place. After a while, the conflicts which had abated broke out once again. Once again complaints came out of the shop, this time essentially on the part of the engineering-technical personnel.

"One could feel that something was wrong there," Yevgeniy Pavlovich recalls. "The director, the trade union committee chairman and I toured the shop and spoke with virtually every single worker. Unanimously they said: He passed the test; approve his nomination and we shall help him. We then went to see the engineers and technologists. Unanimously, they were against him. A

great many people felt hurt but it was difficult to understand the reason. We called for a vote. By majority vote the person was elected chief."

"Was there another nomination?"

"No. Why have one? The collective in the shop is small and the emotions at that point were overflowing. In such cases the people cannot be trusted to make a choice." The voice of my interlocutor expressed firm confidence in the accuracy of this view.

Nor were the people trusted.

Why does the party organization in Krasnoye Sormovo frequently, as in the past, resort to administrative methods which, as was emphasized at the April 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, weaken the party's influence as the political vanguard of society? Why does it not find its right place in the life of the labor collective and frequently simply implements the instructions of the administration, giving it ideological support? I believe that it is very important to understand what prompts this position.

The Sormovo Association is, if one may say so, a strong middle of the road enterprise. In the period of *perestroika* no particularly striking changes have taken place in it. Unlike frontranking enterprises, which sharply changed their economic activities and achieved a drastic increase in labor productivity and volume of output, here indicators are improving quite methodically. However, the financial situation of the enterprise remains firm.

As we pointed out, the shipbuilders not only work but also live side-by-side. The "Sormovich" electric car and buses leased by the enterprise transport the plant personnel after their shift along the same routes which, in the past, the people rode in horse-driven carts. A native Sormovo person who intends to go to the center of Gorkiy would say: "I am going to the city." His life is essentially centered in Sormovo.

Dynasties of hereditary steel smelters, lathe turners and blacksmiths have been employed at the enterprise generation after generation, people such as the Bokovs, Godyayevs, Vyalovs, Pankratovs, Urykovs, Gordeyevs, Lyapins, etc. Such dynasties are not simply a line in a biography or a photograph in the plant museum. "In our Martin shop we have no problem with turnover," Ye. Kopeykin said. "The dynasties are at work." Few members of the collective are randomly hired and temporary. To most of them the plant is their destiny, their entire life.

All of this combined has created an atmosphere in which, it seems to me, educational functions, ideological work and the personal persuading of people have assumed second priority in the party organization. Why prove, promote or instruct when and how to do something: order and they will do it. These are disciplined people shaped by their traditions, families and brigades.

The specific nature of the enterprise as well, which made it possible to partition areas, whether needed or not, also created a propitious situation for the use of administrative methods. G. Chesnokov, head of the department of party life of the newspaper GORKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, described to me the way he was prevented from attending the meeting of the party *aktiv* of Krasnoye Sormovo.

"Just imagine," Gennadiy Pavlovich said, indignant. "I spent an hour freezing at the gate and was forced to leave. I rang up anyone I could think of and encountered a wall everywhere: outsiders were not allowed. And that was a meeting of a party *aktiv*!"

To a certain extent, the party workers here separated themselves from the people. A. Kharitonov, the head of a welders brigade, recalls that 20 years ago it was perfectly normal to approach the party organizer and to discuss life, to seek advice or simply to express a frustration. Anatoliy Gerasimovich is not a party member but, as it happened, frequently went "to see the party secretary in his office." He no longer does it. What struck me was the following: when the party committee secretary was guiding me around the shops, describing the production process, it was primarily managers who greeted and spoke to him. Did this mean that he essentially dealt exclusively with them in his daily work? My guess was confirmed by brigade leader N. Kovalev. When I asked "what would you like to see the party committee deal with?" Nikolay Terentyevich said, after a brief pause:

"Naturally, one cannot avoid the plan. But let me tell you this: they should be in the shops more frequently and talk to the people intimately. It is one thing when I speak with the boys and another when the party committee secretary does. However, he is not doing it."

In my view, an explanation for the fact that the party workers have a liking for bureaucratic administration could be their practical experience and habits which were formed over many years. Sixty-eight of the 79 secretaries of shop party organizations at the association were formerly engineering and technical workers. They were good workers—the best foremen and senior foremen, i.e., people who had properly mastered management habits and had successfully applied them. As a rule, these people were not trained for party work and did not intend to engage in it. Furthermore, occasionally they were asked to change professions and to use power methods, so to say.

Here is an example: recently the party secretary at the copper pipes shop was replaced. The previous one, G. Korneyev, was promoted to work "on the plant level." He became the head of the association's people's controllers. Naturally, the question of his replacement arose. Georgiy Semenovich said that he had one foreman in mind. They tried to discuss the matter with him and failed. The possible candidate refused. He was pressured



to such an extent that he even wrote a letter of resignation. Eventually he was left alone.

Naturally, not everyone can display such firmness of character. Therefore, quite frequently people who dream of one thing only, and that is to return to production work as soon as possible, are made secretary. Sometimes such people do not even like social work.

As we know, there was a crime wave in Gorkiy. It was decided that public order should be maintained here with the help of worker units. During my stay the local authorities had published a leaflet which called for the creation of such units. Naturally, one way or another we discussed the topic. There were plenty of complaints but, as the shop party bureau secretaries emphasized at Krasnoye Sormovo, the people were unwilling to take turns. One could understand them: there had been cases in which even militiamen had been killed. In this case promotional efforts were not enough. Someone had to set the example. Ye. Kopeykin asked: Is there a secretary willing go on the streets wearing the armband of unit member? Alas, there was no answer.

Here is something else that must be said: the party organization was and is driven to the use of administrative methods also by the system applied by its superiors in assessing its activities. During a discussion on the course of the economic reform, an economic manager recalled the following detail of his Komsomol activities: his first instructor loved to repeat: "Remember: If the city is fulfilling its plan that means that everyone is working well, even the DOSAAF." Is it astounding that the party organization frequently undertook to procure raw and other materials, to reduce plan indicators and, together with the administration, to sponsor additional "black" Saturdays.

What has changed of late? Only the fact that social indicators have been added to the plan. Now people are concerned with the building of housing and the development of auxiliary farms. I recall a meeting at the Gorkiy CPSU Obkom and a talk with B. Shaydakov, first secretary of the Sormovskiy Party Raykom. My interlocutors, in describing the party organization at the association, started precisely with the plan, with house building, and only then moved on to discuss traditions and to recall the past. Was this accidental? Probably not. The association's party committee does not recall the last time that a member of the raykom, gorkom or obkom has spent several days running at the enterprise, although they visit it frequently. However, their visits are short: they leaf through the minutes, talk briefly with the secretaries or their deputies and, at most, tour the plant. The most widespread form of work is attendance at a project. Frequently their involvement does not reach a profound and thorough study of processes occurring within the party organization, its work methods or determining the reasons for the various moods of the people.

To be fair, let us point out that the activities of the party members at the association display entirely modern features. This involves above all concern for the needs of the people and their interests. Probably in another couple of years facing the interests of man by the party may be considered an accomplishment. All too long this has been lacking in its activities.

Today, however, this is no longer sufficient. In a short time social conditions have changed sharply. The electoral campaign and the USSR Congress of People's Deputies clearly proved that the people are unwilling to tolerate the present condition of the country's economy or the level of democratization of life. No one is satisfied with the prospect of gradual improvements: radical changes are needed.

Let us look at the truth in the eyes: not always and not every collective is ready to act under the new conditions and make accurate decisions on vitally important problems. This can be seen also in the activities of the Sormovo people. However, does this mean that they have not matured to the level of democratization and, as was done in the past, that they must be "led by the hand?" We believe that such is not the case. It is particularly inadmissible to exercise such excessive guidance by the party organization, for it is precisely it that should develop in the individual the habits of living in a democratic society, prepare the labor collective for making important decisions and help the people to understand the difficult economic and political problems. It is this that will earn it real authority.

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## INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF SOCIETY

### Presumption of Historicism. V.I. Lenin's Article 'Party Organization and Party Literature' In the Context of the New Thinking

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[Text] The article "Party Organization and Party Literature," which Lenin wrote at the peak of the 1905 Revolution and which was published in NOVAYA ZHIZN immediately after he assumed the head of this first legal and totally available bolshevik newspaper, exposed the important nerve or, more accurately, the nerve ganglion, of the entire social development.

It was a question of the interrelationship within literature and between it and the arts, on the one hand, and politics, on the other. Politics is an area which encompasses the interrelationship among classes and parties



and their struggle for influencing the masses and, in the final account, for governmental power. It has its own laws. How do they affect the condition and prospects of the development of literature and the arts? Furthermore, the freedom of artistic creativity is an organic, an inseparable component of social freedom and the freedom of the individual; this freedom, however, is distinguished from arbitrary behavior by the fact that it is based on necessity and presumes responsibility. What forms do the responsibility of the artist to society and as the specific spokesman for the ideas of social progress assume during the great historical change, on the one hand, and the what is the responsibility of the progressive social forces themselves (and, above all, of the working class and the party of scientific socialism) for the creation of the best possible conditions for the blossoming of artistic creativity and for the utilization of its results in accelerating social progress in the interest of the broad popular masses, on the other?

It is hardly necessary to explain especially the very pressing nature of these problems to the man of the 20th century in general and to the workers in culture and the arts in particular. Furthermore, these questions are among those which, at different stages and on each specific historical situation, must be reformulated. The supporters of different ideological trends and social forces give us different and, frequently, conflicting answers to them.

It is not astounding therefore that ever since it appeared, this Leninist work has always been on the cutting edge of the ideological confrontation. Whereas Lenin's supporters, the bolsheviks, adopted it as a manual for action, V. Bryusov, N. Berdyayev, N. Rusov and D. Filosofov came out in the press with objections to and criticism of its ideas. The poet N. Minskiy the "titular" editor of NOVAYA ZHIZN tried to publish his sharp "Open Letter to V. Lenin" in one of the last issues of that paper (however, he was not supported by the majority of the editors).

Subsequently as well, repeatedly, stormy debates broke out on the subject of Lenin's article. This took place not only among members of different ideological trends but also among Marxists. Interest in this most important of Lenin's works on the subject of cultural policy during the crucial periods of social development became particularly noticeable.

Today we turn to Lenin's article because of the need to make decisions consistent with the realities and requirements of our dynamic and very complex times. We do so in an entirely different spiritual atmosphere, when the bearers of new thinking see in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin not the final point of the progress of Marxist thinking toward the truth, as was frequently considered self-evident before perestroika, but as its beginning; not as a sum total of ready-made solutions to any problems but, above all, as a method which is vitally necessary for the independent creative interpretation of changing reality.

It would be unfair to either ignore or belittle the definite achievements of Soviet scientists in the historical study of this article as well as in the theoretical elaboration of the principle it formulates concerning party-mindedness in literature and the arts. However, rather than repeat the universally known, expedient and visible features, let us concentrate on that which has objectively clashed with the renovated condition of society and with the entire structure of today's unfettered, sober and critical thinking. By this I mean above all the inertia of nonhistorical (and sometimes even anti-historical) and, therefore, rather formalized and dogmatic approach to the theoretical arsenal of the classics and, specifically, to this widely known article.

The following detail is indicative: in recent decades, "Party Organization and Party Literature" has been repeatedly reprinted in various anthologies, topic collections and other similar publications. In addition to the fact that it was deleted from the circle of other works by Lenin written at that time on similar topics (the genre of primers has its conveniences and inconveniences), but also within such collections said article was frequently placed, and still continues to be, apart from any chronology, as a prologue or an expanded epigraph in terms of the remaining materials. The "head" Leninist work, it turns out, provides a historical "background," by itself. In the course of time this approach was adopted in some scientific studies, not to mention in popularizing works.

Theory and history are inseparable. If we are not as yet always able to distinguish what in a given work is strictly topical of its time and what is fundamental and, consequently, is of durable methodological significance, the fact in itself reveals the insufficient depth of our theoretical understanding of Lenin's ideas themselves. The insufficiently consistent observance (not to mention direct violation) of the principle of historicism here, as always and everywhere else, entails certain theoretical losses and costs.

A counteraction to said negative trend appeared sporadically earlier as well in our science and our press. This particularly applies to the second half of the 1950s and on the eve of and soon after the 20th CPSU Congress.

Let us recall now, for example, some public statements made by Gyorgy Lukacs at that time, pertaining to Lenin's article, statements which were then considered revisionistic; this would help us to realize that despite their staggering sharpness and one-sidedness they were a protest against the dogmatizing and vulgarizing of Lenin's esthetic ideas and against their malicious manipulation.

An interesting attempt at continuing the profound study of this article on the specific foundations of history was found in the article by Ya.M. Storchkov (VOPROSY ISTORII No 4, 1956). After analyzing Lenin's work in the context of the intraparty political struggle waged by the Russian social democrats in 1905, the author brought to light within it an entire layer of hints pertaining to not

only to the Russian but also to the international history (German in particular) of the social democratic movement. The scientists explained the paradoxical fact that in the journalistically sharp Leninist article there were no specific names by citing Lenin's political restraint and his concern for preserving the unity of action of revolutionary forces.

The debate on the target or targets of Lenin's article was actively pursued between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, not only on the strictly individual but also the general, the sociotypological level. To whom did Lenin address himself, who did he have in mind: was it the party members exclusively or a wider circle of the creative intelligentsia? The internal incentive for such a discussion also included the desire of its participants to be specific and in step with historical science. The answer, however, turned out to be not all that simple as some may have thought.

The trend of a narrow-local understanding of the target of Lenin's work, which could be noted at that time, nonetheless did not become prevalent. To this day it remains controversial and not particularly convincing. Whatever we may say, Lenin used the terms "literature," "literary worker" and "the press" taking into consideration the entire semantic nature, including meanings which pertained exclusively to fiction. In his view, the principle of party-mindedness itself could not be reduced merely to an organizational-disciplinary aspect. It included the ideological-artistic, the ideological esthetic aspect. In other words, according to Lenin the first and main criterion of the artist's party-mindedness is the objective spirit contained in his works, understood as the specific blend of idea-mindedness and art. As to the artist's party membership, given all the consequences which this fact entailed, according to Lenin it was the end result (by no means desired but also by no means within the power of everyone) of the self-expression of the creative individual, a self-expression brought to the level of the free self-determination of the artist in the struggle between the forces of progress and reaction, democracy and oligarchy, elitism and egotism. Finally, the mention along with literature of both the graphic and stage arts eloquently proves that the author did not essentially differentiate between strictly literary and general-artistic problems.

Meanwhile, however, stagnation trends were rising and gaining the upper hand. Individual and isolated attempts at nonstereotyped specific-historical study of Lenin's work were once again diluted in the prevalent trend of an abstract and as though self-sufficient hermeneutics of the text.

Today one of the most relevant tasks in the study, assimilation and practical utilization of the idea of this famous article is, it seems to me, that of ensuring the presumption of historicism.

We must profoundly study the article "Party Organization and Party Literature" as an organic part of Lenin's

entire theoretical legacy. In surmounting the elements of abstraction, formalism and dogmatism, we must "return" it to the context of the development of Marxist and global philosophical-esthetic thinking, within the "big" context of real history, both the one preceding the appearance of this article as well as the subsequent one, which takes us to the present.

In approaching Lenin's article from the positions of historicism, we must take into consideration that it was written at a time of exceptional aggravation of class contradictions, an aggravation which, actually, led to the revolutionary explosion. We should include as part of that situation also the fact that the first storming of autocracy yielded not a total but only partial success, triggering an equivocal, distorted evasive literary legality. Under these circumstances, Lenin's first concern was to separate party from nonparty literary forces within the legitimate press and to fight against manifestations of ideological inconsistency or even direct anti-party sermons by some workers in literature and the arts who were party members. On a more general level, Lenin struggled for protecting the Bolshevik Party against loss of its independence and the dilution of the promoters of the ideas of scientific socialism in the general mass of participants in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. At the same time, he warned the bolsheviks also against falling into the opposite extreme—sectarian exclusivity. Nonetheless, at that time it was the spirit of separation that was dominant.

The principle of class-mindedness and party literature and art was formulated by Lenin as a program for action, aimed at the entire presocialist, class-antagonistic period in the development of society. The emphasis precisely on these specific tasks is clearly not of a universal and mandatory nature under any circumstances developing within bourgeois society. All the proper reasons exist to presume that, under different historical circumstances and in a different specific situation, in the course of pursuing a basic similar line, the emphasis could have been and, clearly, would have been different.

This is confirmed, in particular, by two letters which Engels wrote to August Bebel, the first dated 1-2 May 1891 and the second, 19 November 1892.

In the first, Engels, who most firmly opposed the use of the principle of party-mindedness for the unseemly purposes of restricting the freedom of the press and debate by the leadership of the German Social Democratic Party, which tended toward opportunism, wrote: "What would be the great difference between you and Puttkammer (Prussian minister of internal affairs of the 1880s—author) if within your own ranks you introduce a law against the socialists? Personally, this affects me little: no party of any country could make me keep silent should I decide to speak out" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch" [Works], vol 38, p 77). He goes on to say: "You have absolutely no idea the strange impression which this tendency to take coercive measures makes here, abroad, where the people have become accustomed to

see how with no shame attached the oldest leaders of a party may be held answerable to it (such as Lord Randolph Churchill by the Tory Government). Furthermore, you must not forget that in a big party in no case could discipline be as harsh as in a small sect and that a law against the socialists... which leads to such close unity no longer exists" (ibid., p 78).

Engels also promotes the principle of party-mindedness of the press but his emphasis is consistent with the changed historical circumstances: the guarantees of socialist democracy, pluralism of opinion, and freedom of expression on the part of the individual party member.

In the second letter which was written on the hot footsteps of the Berlin Congress of the German Social Democratic Party (November 1892), so to say, Engels cautions the leadership of the German Social Democratic Party against an excessive liking of the idea of the "statification" of the press (referring to the suggestion made at the congress to purchase all the newly published social democratic newspapers and turn them into official party organs). Engels writes: "You must unquestionably have to have in the party a press which would be independent directly from the Board and even from the party congress, i.e., a press which will have the possibility within the framework of the program and the adopted tactics freely to speak out against any given step taken by the party and even, without overstepping the boundaries of party ethics, freely criticize the program and the tactics.... The party is growing beyond the framework of the rigid discipline which has existed so far; with 2 or 3 million members and a constant influx of "educated" elements, greater freedom of action is needed compared to that which had been granted so far.... The first thing which is required is an officially independent party press. Such a press is bound to appear but it would be better if you bring it to life under such circumstances so that, from the very beginning, it would find itself under your moral influence instead of rising despite and against you" (op. cit., vol 38, pp 441-442). In this connection, Engels makes the typical remark that in his view, shared by Marx, the duty of the newspaper editors who are dependent "even on a labor party" would paralyze them as it would "anyone with initiative" (ibid., p 441).

I found in the monograph by S.M. Gurevich, professor at the department of journalism of Moscow State University, the remark that Lenin relied on these views held by Marx and Engels, developing them in accordance with the new historical age and, in particular, in the article "Party Organization and Party Literature" (see S.M. Gurevich, "K. Marks i F. Engels—Osnovopolozhniki Teorii Kommunisticheskoy Zhurnalistiki" [K. Marx and F. Engels—Founders of the Theory of Communist Journalism]. Moscow State University Press, 1973, p 178). However, Gurevich does not analyze in detail in his monograph the continuity between such important historical and theoretical documents. To the best of my knowledge, nor is it analyzed in other contemporary

works. The letters we quoted are included in the works of Marx and Engels but to this day they are, if not little-known literally, in any case, rarely quoted. They are published in a very abridged form in textbooks on the theory and history of the Marxist press while the comments of specialists in such matters, which were made during the period of stagnation are, alas, full of omissions, equivocations and evasions.

Nonetheless, despite all this, the anti-authoritarian, the democratic spirit of these Marxist theoretical documents could be felt in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses at the 19th All-Union Party Conference. As we know, a variety of suggestions relative to guaranteeing the freedom of speech and the press were submitted at the conference.

This confirms the need to broaden and concretize both the historical and the theoretical context of the study of this famous Leninist article. Otherwise some of the specific views it contains, which were the result of the special conditions of the time, could be mistakenly interpreted as universal.

In rereading Lenin's article today with a new understanding we cannot avoid to answer the following question: Does the main idea of this article retain its validity under contemporary conditions: the principle of the class-mindedness and party-mindedness of literature and the arts? Until very recently considerations on this subject were considered as "undermining the foundations." Today many people have already realized that in a freely developing science anything, even that which may seem absolutely inviolable, could be subjected to reinterpretation. The class approach to the analysis of social phenomena is no exception.

In the view of the authors of some contemporary works, the class approach is essentially one-sided. While emphasizing the sociocritical aspirations of the individual, it ignores his creative-constructive capabilities. Initially fraught with the danger of simplification, according to this viewpoint the class approach does not make it possible to penetrate into the complex inner world of the individual, into the depth of the human way of life and awareness. Since literature and the arts focus their attention precisely on all of this, this approach becomes self-evident: a class approach to art is inconsistent with its nature. It is alien to it and far-fetched. Frequently a rejection of the concepts of class- and party-mindedness of art are characterized as a direct consequence of the assertion in the contemporary world of the principle of the priority of universal human interests and values over the class ones.

I respect the pluralism of opinions on this matter but, nonetheless, I would like to present my own personal viewpoint.

Let me point out, above all, that said principle of priority was also formulated and substantiated by Lenin (see "Draft Program of Our Party," which was written in 1899 and which came out in 1924, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 4). The consistency

between Lenin's views on the correlation between class and universal human aspects and the views expressed by N.G. Chernyshevskiy on a similar topic is noteworthy. "...The universal human interest stands above the advantages of the individual nation," Chernyshevskiy wrote in the work *"The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy"* (1860). "The overall interest of an entire nation stands above the interest of an individual stratum and the interest of a large stratum stands above that of a small one.... 'Pogibosha Aki Obre' are words which are reiterated in the history of each nation and stratum which have fallen into a hallucination, which is fatal to such people, about the contradiction between their own advantages and universal human interests" (N.G. Chernyshevskiy, *"Poln. Sobr. Soch."*, in 15 volumes, vol VII, Khudozhestvennaya Literatura, Moscow, 1950, pp 286, 289). This consistency proves that the Leninist principle was formulated within the general concept of progressive Russian social thinking; in any case, its link of continuity with the revolutionary-democratic form of humanism remains unquestionable.

Lenin writes that "the interests of social development are superior to those of the proletariat," etc. However, he does not simply paraphrase what Chernyshevskiy said. Lenin emphasizes that this is the case "from the viewpoint of the basic Marxist ideas" and, while pointing out the universal human significance of the overthrow of Russian absolutism, he nonetheless does not reject the class aspects either of this revolutionary act or the nature of autocracy itself (see op. cit., vol 4, p 220). In this case the principle of priority is formulated in the spirit of the dialectical unity between the class and the universal human principles and aspects.

It is precisely this solution of the problem that is typical of "classical" Marxism in general. The total elimination of the reciprocal averaging of class and universal-human features was related by its most prestigious representatives only to the prospect of the creation of a classless society.

But could it be that we speak about classes and the class aspect more out of habit, by inertia, whereas in the realities of the present they no longer play a substantial role? Even if some contemporary Marxists were to think this way, let us point out that this by no means applies to all. Reality does not confirm such extreme conclusions. Thus, A. Bovin, the noted international commentator, considers that the nature of the new historical situation is found elsewhere: in the "manifestation of an objective limit to class confrontation" (the threat of universal destruction), and the fact of global interdependence among a great variety of class forces. Hence the ever-greater priority given to universal human values and interests which unite mankind, and cooperation, paralleling the struggle, preferably civilized, of conflicting classes. "Class interests may coincide with universal human interests or may oppose the latter," A. Bovin notes. "In any case, the scientific approach calls for a consideration of both facets of the social process" (A. Bovin, *"Mirnoye Sosushchestvovaniye. Istoriya, Teoriya,*

*Politika"* [Peaceful Coexistence. History, Theory, Politics]. Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, Moscow, 1988, pp 102-103). Let me personally add a major specification: the two facets which are mentioned are, however, unequal: today, more than ever before, the universal human principle has priority.

The dissatisfaction felt by some modern Marxists with the "one-sidedness" of the class approach should be interpreted, I believe, not as the result of the approach but of the merciless vulgarizing to which Marxism was subjected for decades, maliciously or thoughtlessly, because of insufficiently high cultural standards.

However much may have been accomplished so far to eliminate vulgar sociology, particularly in the areas of esthetics and art studies, to this day it has recurrences. This is not astounding. During the period of social anomalies we greatly vulgarized the principle of class- and party-mindedness in art. Getting rid of this old disease will demand of all of us a great deal more efforts.

In this connection we find pertinent the remark by Leningrad philosopher A.I. Novikov, to the effect that "the class approach has its limits." "...By no means should all targets of scientific analysis and human assessment be considered on the basis of class-oriented positions. Many features of human awareness and the spiritual organization of man must not be subject to this approach. Furthermore, the class approach neither could nor should, like a stereotype, be identically 'applied' to the various stages of the historical life of the people" (A.I. Novikov, *"Klassovyy Podkhod i Novoye Myshleniye"* [Class Approach and New Thinking]. Lenizdat, Leningrad, 1988, pp 12, 64). This warning is, in my view, entirely appropriate.

Nonetheless, the claim by that same author, expressed in reference to G.I. Kunitsyn, is by no means unquestionable: "Despite the stereotype which has become popular, strictly speaking we should be speaking not of the class nature of art but of its class interpretation and application" (ibid., p 13). The familiar truth that "one cannot live in a society and be free from society" should in no case be described as a "stereotype" or as a "popular statement." Is this no longer consistent with reality? Actually, the activities of those who interpret the phenomena of art and use them in the struggle of ideas accept this general law; why should the writer, or the painter be the exception?

The criticism of the class approach by some contemporary authors I interpret as an appeal not to reduce everything to the class differentiation within society (correspondingly, class-mindedness and party-mindedness of art) but to encompass all relations and interactions within an integral dialectical chain: individual-social group-class-people (ethnos)-nation (nationality)-mankind.

In my view, it is entirely accurate (this is no exaggeration) for the applied class approach to serve all organic



components of the scientific methodology used in the study of contemporary social phenomena, including the arts.

Going back to the article "Party Organization and Party Literature," let me note that the ascension of the artist to socialist party-mindedness means, according to Lenin, surmounting the individualism of a bourgeois or anarchic variety, by no means for the sake of finding oneself within the narrow collectivism of a party "sect." The tie between the literary worker or the artist with the party of the working class, the party of scientific socialism, means his involvement in the struggle for the happiness of millions of working people. It is thus that Lenin defines the basis for combining the personal and class interests with the national interests, as the foundation of a socialist (class, party) contribution to the national cause and, therefore, the cause of mankind.

Incidentally, one of Lenin's former opponents—the poet Valeriy Bryusov—took this path traced by Lenin almost immediately after October 1917. This man, who had previously stated (in the article "Freedom of Speech" and, poetically and aphoristically in the poem "My People," 1905) that "in wrecking I will be with you! In building, I will not!" in 1917-1924, having revised his views, he not only actively cooperated with the Soviet system but also became a party member, making through his comprehensive activities a significant contribution to the building of the new, socialist culture.

As this shows, Lenin's article has been used at different times differently, including for the sophistic justification of dictatorship and bureaucratic administration of art. We have no right to ignore this fact. Furthermore, we are simply bound to highlight the precise type of vulgarizing, concealment and other sophistic means used to emasculate the real content of Lenin's esthetic ideas. This is necessary in order to prevent anything similar from occurring in the future.

Lenin linked his plan for the implementation of the principle of party-mindedness of literature and, on its basis, the reorganization of all literary work to certain postulates of a real-practical and methodological nature, which he considered absolutely necessary and, for which reason, obviously assumed and self-evident. However, it was precisely they which were most frequently and above all subjected in the period preceding perestroika to silence, tendentious shift of emphases and emasculation. I would single out among them the following:

Intraparty democracy. "Freedom of Thought and Freedom of Criticism Within the Party" (V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 12, p 103);

Comprehensive consideration of the specific nature of the literary part of overall party work;

An antisectarian position. Anticipation of the inevitable influx within the party of not entirely consistent literary workers and artists and the readiness to "resmelt" these not entirely "pure Marxist" elements;

The concept of the two-sidedness and twin nature of relations between scientific thinking and artistic literature, in which not only scientific socialism can efficiently influence artistic creativity but in which "free literature" can "fructify" theory;

The concept of anti-dogmatism and anti-schematism. Lenin accompanies his clear formulation and substantiation of this basic task with reminders to the effect that the ways and means of solving it in practice are varied and can be found only as a result of comprehensive and tireless creative investigations.

These Leninist principles must be restored to their full content and entire depth of significance.

Lenin highly valued socialist party-mindedness as a quality of the artist's outlook and creativity. He emphasized the advantages of the conscious choice by the artist of his place in the ideological and political struggle and his consistent service to it, applying the full power of his talent, voluntarily allied with the most active, united and conscious participants in the revolutionary movement for the interests of the toiling masses, of the people. Nonetheless, he properly realized that even such a choice does not guarantee to the artist, who is always particularly sensitive to social contradictions, not to mention an artist living in a class-antagonistic society, protection from disparities and disharmony in his world outlook and creativity. Lenin showed in an expanded form his own understanding somewhat later: in his articles on L.N. Tolstoy, and his correspondence with A.M. Gorkiy (in the reflexes, the echoes of this correspondence). Concisely, however, it can be seen already in "Party Organization and Party Literature."

Therefore, Lenin has nothing in common with some contemporary approvals of such transparent, always properly balanced and absolutely loyal to him "servants of the muses." Unfortunately, for a long time that was precisely the view of the contemporary artist which prevailed in our country within the administrative-command system, demanding that anything unusual or complex, any frighteningly complicated aspect of the spiritual world of the creators of art be either dragged down or anathemized. We must part, and the sooner the better, with this tendentiously ideologized and mythologized concept.

Some of the esthetic concepts in Lenin's article, which fit entirely the new stage in the development of art should be read and interpreted within a broader sociocultural and spiritual context.

Unquestionably, Lenin's views on the party-mindedness of literature and art and the criteria for bringing it to light in works of art were oriented above all toward realistic literature and the artistic trends at the turn of the century which, one way or another, retained the tangible-graphic principle of the arts. In particular and particularly this applied to works dealing with contemporary events.<sup>1</sup> It is also clear that it is possible to determine the party-mindedness of specific works of

literature and art through the use of criteria such as the party program, its statutes, tactical resolutions, etc., with adequate efficiency, precisely where a certain level of concreteness of artistic images makes it possible to compare them to materially similar results of conceptual thinking.

But then, there furthermore exist so-called expressive types of art in which the class-party aspect is by no means always clearly expressed and is frequently dissolved without any residue within the all-human content. Furthermore, in addition to realism, there are other artistically valuable and vital trends of creative work saturated with deformations of objects, symbolism, and so on. The share of such "nontraditional" trends and forms in contemporary art has increased substantially. Establishing the compatibility or incompatibility of such works with the principle of party-mindedness is a task of great difficulty even if it is acknowledged as having been accurately formulated and basically attainable. Its solution depends on the understanding of the "language" in which the artist is addressing us, without which we cannot penetrate into the inner world of a work, not to mention define its artistic value. Taking this into consideration, in the sphere of expressive and certain non-realistic forms of art which have rejected any tangible representation we should obviously not rigidly link the party-mindedness of the artist to his support of a given trend or style.

Otherwise, we could still fall into the errors similar to the one which was made in assessing the work of composers who are now the pride of Soviet musical art: S. Prokofyev, D. Shostakovich, A. Khachaturyan, V. Muradeli and some of their colleagues. Looking from the point of the present to the familiar VKP(b) Central Committee decree of 1948 and many other similar documents, in terms of method and conclusions, one can clearly see the tremendous harm, difficult to correct, caused by haste in judging new phenomena in art and the aspiration based on the very first and not always favorable reaction to one artistic innovation or another, to pass a harsh and final sentence over them, subordinating them to the "talk of the town" and the current situation. Time, however, has always been merciless toward such hasty accusations and verdicts. It has rejected, it has swept them off. Life and the history of society and the age-old history of artistic culture put at the proper time everything that is truly artistic and talented in its proper place. But how high are the costs of such an inevitable restoration of justice, which eventually occurs!

It is difficult for the contemporary Soviet person to ignore the feeling of sadness and shame in reading resolutions of "study" conferences of 1948, peremptory assessments of the works of composers, painters, poets and writers, and some records of meetings of creative associations of that time and of the more recent past.

Today we are realizing ever better that the phenomena of art should be treated much more cautiously and carefully, even if they clearly do not fit existing concepts of

the content or the "canonical" forms of artistic creative activities. This awareness, we believe, is a guarantee that the lessons of the past will not be wasted on us and that they will lead to proper conclusions.

One of the manifestations of abstract, formalized and dogmatized attitudes toward this article by Lenin is, in my opinion, the fact that its contemporary students do not formulate or discuss the following: Have we rejected or do we still have negative phenomena in literary affairs and artistic culture as a whole, such as those which Lenin scourged, linking them to the nature of the bourgeois system and retaining the vestiges of feudalism? An answer to this question is necessary.

The dependence of the writer and painter on the power of capital is undermined, weakens and disappears under socialism. Nonetheless, socialism of the "barracks" and administrative-command type, as we know, has its own instruments for influencing artists who are liked or disliked by the bureaucracy. It is not for nothing that today some masters of the arts themselves are raising the question of abolishing the old titles and governmental awards which do not always reward true talent and true merit.

Greed and careerism are by no means eliminated among our creative intelligentsia. It is no accident that the vocabulary of the Soviet period includes the scornful word "adapter."

Under the banner of criticizing bourgeois-democratic freedoms (which are entirely real although, in a number of cases, are truly limited, formalized and even hypocritical) a callous machine for the suppression of even the slightest dissidence was created and tuned up during the Stalinist and, subsequently, Brezhnev years. Slogans of the struggle against "renegades"-individualists frequently concealed the persecution of honest artists who were creating for the glory of socialism in its Leninist understanding.

The "semi-Oblomovist, semi-mercantile" (Lenin's words) Russian principle of relations between the artist and the public was eliminated. However, in the period before perestroika it was replaced by such a strict control over all artistic life which brings to mind the most hateful cases of a similar kind described by Plato as early as in "*The State*," and "*The Laws*."

As we can see, some vestiges of the worst bourgeois and pre-bourgeois mores in literary and artistic work were surmounted in our country while others remain and continue to exist to one extent or another. Some of the old negative phenomena have been replaced by new ones which are equally or even more dangerous. The critical spirit of Lenin's article must be used and further developed to the fullest extent in the struggle against them.

"Party Organization and Party Literature" demands of us not only the profound study and accurate application of its concepts but also independent and detailed development of the theoretical problems it earmarks.



Let us consider, for instance, Lenin's view on the free socialist literature as the intermediary link between scientific and sociopolitical thinking, on the one hand, and the practical experience of the toiling masses, on the other. It indicates not only the "two-way" tie between politics and literature (art) but also the need to correlate, to compare among artistic images and data of scientific social thinking and theory. This is no simple task. Success in solving it depends on the intensified study of methodological problems of artistic criticism and the principles of the esthetic analysis of art in general.

Whatever the results of future studies in this area may be, one thing is already clear: compared to the results of artistic-figurative thinking, scientific concepts cannot be considered as being **substantially** more accurate. It is also possible for artistic figures which conflict with existing theoretical concepts to be more truthful and to require that we correct precisely theory. According to Lenin, it is precisely literature that is closer to life, to the present, to the living experience of the masses. That is why it is literature that should rather be used as a kind of guideline in assessing the veracity or falseness of sociopolitical theories and concepts.

In the light of Lenin's article, questions pertaining to the correlation and interaction between science and art and procedures for "checking" and reciprocally correcting the results of theoretical thinking and artistic creativity, should be considered quite topical.

Without waiting to express the absolute truth, I would nonetheless express the hope that active research of the aspects of the problem I indicated would help us more profoundly to interpret the familiar Leninist article as organically linked with the course of history and the development of art, in the context of our time and spirit of new thinking.

#### Footnotes

1. Incidentally in our scientific literature we find substantiated remarks to the effect that "a close inner link" existed between Lenin's theoretical manifesto concerning the new socialist art and Gorkiy's effort at solving a similar practical problem through his novel "Mother." (A.N. Iyezuitov, "V.I. Lenin i Voprosy Realizma" [V.I. Lenin and Problems of Realism]. Nauka, Leningrad, 1980, p 128).

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## DEBATE AND DISCUSSION

### The Changing Image of Socialism

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[Article by Oleg Timofeyevich Bogomolov, academician, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System]

[Text] A wave of renovation is rising in the socialist part of the world and, although it has still not spread over a number of countries, the feeling of the irreversibility of profound revolutionary changes is increasing. It is based on the crisis of the Stalinist and neo-Stalinist model of the socialist system, which intensified in the course of many decades, before its totally unpromising nature became obvious. The growing lag behind the West in technical progress and labor productivity and in living standards, ecological disasters, inflation, chronic scarcity of many varieties of necessary goods, the noncompetitiveness of most finished goods, a declining pace of economic growth, increasing rigidity and bureaucratism of the governmental machinery and the lowered and dependent status of man in society were the most characteristic manifestations of the crisis which broke out.

Efforts at reform and renovation, repeatedly undertaken in the past in some Eastern European countries, were paralleled by negative phenomena. They were stopped by force and did not lead to radical changes. Nonetheless, they were the harbingers of the changes to come, although few were the people who could see in them their outline. In the Soviet Union, the CPSU took the initiative of developing the theoretical foundations of the new image of socialism, the most important features of which were defined at the 19th Party Conference. Perestroika in the USSR opened a new stage in broadening the transformation process. Triggered above all by the specific conditions of our country and not claiming to serve as an example to other, it nonetheless substantially improved the overall climate in the search for new ways of socialist development. Eastern Europe found itself facing difficulties quite similar to ours, for it had developed primarily on the basis of the Soviet model, either imposed upon it or else uncritically adopted in the postwar years. That is why changes in the USSR met with a response in that area, and strengthened reformist forces.

Profound changes were initiated in China as of the end of 1978, when the 3rd CPC Central Committee Plenum, 11th Convocation, passed resolutions crucial to the destinies of that country, similar to our own April 1985 plenum. Their beneficial results to the economy are unquestionable. Of late, however, major difficulties have surfaced. Inflation has increased and social differentiation and corruption have intensified. Political reform has been postponed. All of this has had grave consequences.

It is hard to ignore the fact that the renovation process did not occur in all socialist countries at the same time or in the right sequence. Today, as in the past, temporary retreats cannot be excluded. Nonetheless, the very gravity of the problem and the contradictions encountered by these countries have left no choice other than that of making a radical change in the existing social system. Objectively, such a change has become timely, regardless of what made society and the leadership aware of this. The discussion of the overall trend of change is becoming quite timely.

A growing number of factors indicate that real socialism of the Stalinist or neo-Stalinist time has become thoroughly discredited and that faith in its "advantages" has been abandoned. This is confirmed, in particular, by recent events in Hungary and Poland. However, the ideas of a social system, more advanced and just than the capitalist, are alive and continue to dominate the minds of millions of people. The desire to cleanse socialism from the elements of utopianism and to restore the rights of general democratic and humanistic values, adopt the best achievements of human civilization and return to Lenin's concept, presented in his last works, is strong. Such a desire motivates perestroika in the USSR and is present in many other socialist countries as well.

What are the new qualities which society could acquire in those countries as a result of renovation? How will such a society be different from the most progressive forms of contemporary capitalism? These questions are asked by many, for the answers to them define the content of perestroika and the new vision of socialism.

It is still too early to assume that in real life an integral and internally unified and smoothly functioning system has already developed in real life, which could justifiably be considered as a qualitatively new status of socialism, a status consistent with our ideal concepts and demands, enabling us, more rationally than under capitalism, to manage our resources, consciously and systematically to direct national economic processes, to reduce the elements of uncontrolled development to a minimum, to avoid crises, etc.

Anything new that is born follows two paths. First, scientists and practical workers jointly refine the theoretical concepts of socialism and create a new vision of the way it should function by the turn of the 21st century. Second, in a number of directions unparalleled experimentation is taking place and areas of new developments appear, which provide rich food for analysis and thoughts concerning the specific outlines of future social relations.

Let us emphasize, on the theoretical level, that socialism considers Marxist philosophy a legitimate stage in the process of development of human civilization and that it must replace capitalism, for it will ensure higher social labor productivity and living standard, and make the individual truly free and comprehensively developed. The concept of socialism (the first phase of communism) as a higher degree of civilization retains, it seems to me, its key significance in understanding the objectives and stages of the developing changes.

On the other hand, it is time definitively to eliminate the illusion that socialism cannot be born within capitalism but requires the breakdown of its institutions and that it must be built entirely from scratch. Such views are incompatible with the concept of social development as a natural historical process. They nurture political arbitrariness and ignore the facts. The latter indicate that developed capitalism is changing in the direction of the

practical implementation of many socialist principles. Increasingly, ownership is becoming public. Planning on the governmental level and within companies is strengthening; the development of democracy is contributing to the fuller and freer manifestation of the will of the people; human rights are being guaranteed and the social protection of the citizens is being broadened; the living standard of the population is rising steadily.

Does all of this not prove that within modern capitalist society we not only find increasing material prerequisites for a conversion to a qualitatively different stage of development, which we describe as socialist while the West describes as "postindustrial," but also that new social relations are appearing. However, while emphasizing the overall civilizing component of socialism, we must not forget that it must free the people from the faults and sharp contradictions inherent in contemporary capitalism even in its most advanced forms. This includes mass unemployment, the appropriation of someone else's labor, extreme social contrasts, militarism, expansionism, the basic governmental protection of the interests of the rich, the prevalence of private interest and of the individual, neocolonial forms of international economic relations, and others.

In frequent cases efforts are made to interpret the elimination of Stalinist deformations of social life and a return to general civilization values as convergence, i.e., as eroding the line separating the two social systems. Convergence, obviously, is indeed taking place but, above all, as a result of the growth of prerequisites and embryonic forms of socialist relations within contemporary Western society. As in the past, we apply to it the concept of "capitalism," although the content of this concept has greatly changed compared to the turn of this century and is inadequate in describing many present realities of life.

Artificial models of socialism, resting on abstract conclusions, should yield to concepts based on the study of current social practices. True economic and social progress should be judged on the basis of how it has been able to free man from exploitation and political oppression and to ensure the steady growth of his well-being and to guarantee the free development of the individual for the sake of the free development of all and result in the blossoming of the economy, science, technology and culture. More than anything else, progress in this direction meets the criteria of socialist development and is consistent with the new vision of socialism.

Naturally, this does not mean that we are abandoning the classical legacy of Marxist-Leninist philosophy or the ideals and values it formulated, or the method for the study of economic facts and processes. Not all Marxist concepts and projections were able to pass the test of time. However, the entire array of Marxist humanistic ideas are organically interwoven with the renovated concept of contemporary socialism and its economy.

The ideas of freedom, democracy, social justice and human unity, as the most important social values, cannot become obsolete.

The concept of the "new model" of socialism has a major shade of meaning: its purpose is, above all, to emphasize the qualitative distinction between that which we shall now try to create and the realities which preceded the reform. It is true that thinking in terms of a model—which, as a whole, is a very fruitful way of gaining knowledge—has certain shortcomings. The danger and the trap of social modeling are particularly obvious when applied to the social organism as a whole. Naturally, we should visualize the trend followed by the laws of natural history, the aim toward which we should aspire, and our direction. However, this is not to say that all the elements of the theoretical model must be refined to their smallest detail and that we should try, once and for all, to anticipate socialism in all of its details and formulate in advance strict criteria as to what is socialist, or what comes from the devil and make unruly reality fit them. If the concept of a model implies a shining crystal palace, which should stand for centuries, and toward which millions of people should march in streamlined ranks, not deviating "to the right" or "the left," the errors of the social engineers could have grave consequences and lead to profound disappointments. Therefore, if we have in mind the long-range future of social development, it would be obviously expedient to formulate, above all, its main objectives, ideals and values without engaging in unnecessary futurism. What is important is to choose the proper vector in our movement and let life itself suggest the most accurate specific solutions. It is out of the rich and varied material of life that, in the final account, the new aspects of socialism will emerge. Nothing good has ever been achieved whenever socialism has been interpreted as some kind of standard against which we must compare ourselves.

The social practices of perestroika vary a great deal among the countries which have adopted them. Unquestionably, national features and traditions, level of economic development and culture and degree of democratization and political activeness of the masses greatly embellish this process and determine its great variety of forms. Something considered justified in some cases proves to be unsuitable in other.

Despite all the stipulations relative to the specifics of a given country, the renovation process could be considered international in the triple sense of the word: first, perestroika and reform are a reaction to the same type of faults of the old administrative-command system; second, the basic, the essential trends of reorganization coincide; third, renovation encounters on its way similar obstacles and problems.

The nature of these difficulties is not only purely economic. Equal difficulties arise in the area of social awareness, ideology and the political superstructure. The lengthy domination of bookishness in political economy and in the propaganda of Marxist knowledge instilled in

the minds of the people a number of durable dogmas and prejudices, many of which are by no means socially neutral. "Encoded" in them are the ideas and real interests of certain social strata, including those of the bureaucracy. Therefore, any reform creates ideological confusion and leads to sharp debates on whether we should develop market relations and allow private ownership, whether unemployment, stock owning capital and a stock market are compatible with a socialist economy, whether we need total glasnost and truth about the past and the present, could trade union pluralism be possible, and so on. The course of renovation requires a most serious and thorough ideological-theoretical development and substantiation, so that the new vision of socialism can be convincingly based on the strictly scientific study of the social anatomy.

In the area of economics the outlines of the new vision are already becoming more or less apparent. Here as well, however, it is difficult to insist that we have the absolute, the final truth. Scientific and technical progress is generating a great deal of unexpected features. You may recall that in "*Das Kapital*" Marx wrote that factory-plant production in his time was partially automated, and that this was increasing even further the contradiction between the social nature of production and the private form of appropriation. Having interpreted some of the "children's diseases" of capitalism as old age senility, he assumed that that system had virtually exhausted the possibility of further development. Since then our concepts concerning technical and social progress have changed greatly. It is clear, however, that it is difficult for us as well to anticipate the type of surprises which science and technology could be preparing for our benefit in the course of the next 50 years.

One of the features of economic change is the effort to create the type of self-regulating system, a system which can continually self-renovate and adapt to the new circumstances. It is only that which is impossible or inefficient to handle through self-regulatory processes that should be regulated from the center; in all other cases self-regulatory processes would be the most preferable.

In the opinion of the scientists and economic workers of many CEMA countries, restoring a plan-regulated socialist market, with all of its specific institutions and mechanisms, should become the main distinguishing feature of the new economic model. If this model is not sufficiently broad but is limited merely to goods and services for the population, and if it is not based on the freedom of economic management by its participants but instead is totally regulated, it would be unable to perform its national economic functions and, in particular, determine the cost of goods and services. With a great deal of difficulty, the initial steps leading to the establishment of such a market are being taken in the USSR; Poland and Hungary have gone farther ahead. In order to eliminate economic isolation from the world market, internal convertible currency markets are being established. China, Poland and Hungary have taken

specific steps to organize a capital market in which securities—stocks and bonds—will be traded. These countries, plus Yugoslavia, no longer consider the idea of having a labor exchange seditious.

Theoreticians and practical workers have considered or, to put it more accurately, have come to accept the conclusion that the socialist economy must be based on sufficient freedom for producers and consumers; it must rest on real commodity-monetary relations, for not even the most highly developed industrial society, whatever phenomenal computer equipment it may have at its disposal, has so far developed conditions which would enable it to undertake the direct distribution of products. Hierarchical structures have become so customary and self-evident, that the concept of the freedom of the individual and the collective have found themselves emasculated and farmed out to bourgeois ideologues. The same applies to the market as well. Commodity-monetary relations, which include healthy competition, are one of the most brilliant inventions of mankind, polished and refined in the course of centuries, ever since the era of feudalism and even of slave ownership. To this day life has not provided any real alternative to such relations. The old idea, which had sunk deep roots, to the effect that the new society could reject the market and commodity-monetary relations, was utopian from the start. That is why the conversion to the new model is a correction of the errors of the past and the rejection of that which, by virtue of its illusory nature, had even in the past become inconsistent with the requirements of progress.

The socialist economy has been frequently compared to a ship which is confidently following a charted course. Unfortunately, in practice this did not always take place. However, if we are to use this metaphor, as V. Leontyev said, the government's strategy and plan is the steering wheel, while the ship is being powered by economic incentives, the interest of the people, competition, rivalry among talents and capabilities, and entrepreneurial activities which cannot properly function without the market and without a strong currency. The question of the market and money is the central problem of the radical economic reform in the USSR and other countries, and the cornerstone of the new understanding of socialism.

Yet another conclusion becomes necessary in the efforts to find an economic mechanism which would fit best the new concept of socialism. It is a question of labor as the main source of all wealth. The most radical means of healing the economy from the command-administrative syndrome is found in changing the nature of labor, converting it from semi-forced into truly free, motivated not by administrative coercions and dependence but by personal economic interests and conscious discipline. This requires a restructuring of ownership relations, eliminating the alienation of the worker from the means of production and acknowledging the equality and sovereign nature of the various forms of ownership: social,

cooperative, private, personal and mixed. Correspondingly, the question is raised of the legal codification and practical observance of the right of ownership by every worker of his own manpower, i.e., his ability to perform a certain type of work. Without accepting this type of ownership and the right to use it freely there can be no real liberation of labor, for such liberation means not only freedom from exploitation but also the guaranteed possibility of applying the manpower as dictated by the material and moral interests of the individual. There is no other method for truly emancipating and putting man in the center of all economic activities. This is one more argument in support of the fact that we need a sufficiently high degree of freedom of the individual participants in economic life, a freedom based on market interconnections and equivalent exchange (including between manpower and wages!) and a sensible but by no means comprehensive state regulation.

As collective experience and any contemporary economic system, whether capitalist or socialist, can prove, the trend toward monopolizing the production of goods and the utilization of manpower are counterindicated. Therefore, the dismantling of the monopoly structures of the command-administrative system should, most likely, be the most important component of the new vision of socialism.

In this connection, we must also refine the theoretical view on hired labor used not only by the state but, in many socialist countries, also by private entrepreneurs and cooperatives. In the view of many scientists, this is not mandatorily accompanied by exploitation or unfair appropriation of added labor. Society and the state have efficient instruments for control, a policy of taxation and social protection adequate to prevent exploitation. On the other hand, we cannot fail to see that in a number of cases private enterprise, involving the use of hired labor, proves to be more efficient than any other forms of production of commodities or services, and that it pays higher wages. If labor productivity is considered one of the most important criteria of social progress and, consequently, of a socialist system, clearly we must reject the bias against private or mixed enterprise, particularly if public ownership is dominant in the economy. What is justified is the type of ownership which is most consistent with a truly socialized production system and its level of concentration, and which provides the best combination of producer with means of production, i.e., which creates within him an interest in multiplying them and ensuring their best application. Hence, inevitably, this must lead to a variety of forms of ownership in socialist society although its aspect is determined, above all, by the public ownership of means of production. The leading status of this ownership is based on the very nature of modern large-scale production forces. However, public ownership as well is not exclusive and it would be simplistic to conceive of it as being represented only by a state, a ministry or a local authority, for it presents a great variety of facets. Practical experience confirms, for example, the expediency of having a great



many varieties of cooperative ownership, and of mixed and transitional forms between state, cooperative and private ownership.

The new model of socialism is distinguished by an essentially different correlation between centralism and democracy. Reality itself has brought the understanding that in a socialist market economy the use of noneconomic methods, such as orders, pressure "from above," and commands, should be reduced to a minimum. They must be replaced by regulatory instruments based on material interests. The state uses economic means in influencing the condition of the market which, in turn, regulates and optimizes enterprise activities. The nature of planning changes as well: from one based on directives, it gradually converts into indicative programming. This not only does not weaken the leading and guiding role of the center but, conversely, as confirmed by available examples, ensures its more successful implementation. The conviction is growing to the effect that enterprises must acquire significantly greater economic independence and be rid of ubiquitous regulations. Under the new conditions the labor collectives will display greater initiative and enterprise. They will better adapt the production process to the fast changes in equipment and technology and the circumstances on the world market. Incidentally, currently a reduction in state bureaucratic control is taking place in the West as well, where it is known as deregulation.

Many economists in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries realized the need for such economic changes as early as the second half of the 1950s and beginning of 1960s. Unfortunately, the new ideas began to penetrate the area of politics enter not only much later, in the mid-1960s (initially in the GDR, followed by the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) but also, after a while, there followed a certain retreat. The new "tide" of the reform was initiated 10 years ago in China. It was followed by Poland and, in its second round, by Hungary, the USSR and Bulgaria. Our perestroika influenced the course of events in Mongolia and Vietnam. The need for reform was officially proclaimed by the Czechoslovak leadership under its unquestionable influence. Yugoslavia, which started its own development in a separate way immediately after 1948, compared to the majority of the other socialist countries, has also of late sharply felt the need for change based on the systematic implementation of marketplace principles.

The GDR is a sort of separate position in terms of the overall reform movement. In this case, however, we must take into consideration the characteristics of economic life: whereas, let us say, Poland or Hungary are restoring their individual and cooperative sectors in crafts, petty industrial production, construction, trade and other types of services in the course of the reform, all of this has continually existed in the GDR since the war. As to large-scale state production, despite its entire apparent centralization, as early as the 1970s some corrections were made in the economic mechanism: the

autonomy of economic units was broadened and economic regulators were installed. Romania, Cuba and the Korean People's Democratic Republic are trying to solve their problems on the basis of their own views and concepts. Like us, they reject any mechanical duplication of foreign experience, although they look at the successful solutions and findings of other countries.

As we consider the features of the future renovated society, we realize that it cannot be conceived without quality changes in the economic structure, which would make it possible to be oriented to a much greater extent than in the past toward the needs of the people. Here science, technical progress and services, conceived in the broadest possible meaning of this term, will begin to play an essentially different role. All development must be subordinated to the requirement of achieving maximal economic results for it is only under such circumstances that we can surmount chronic shortages, saturate the market, ensure the fullest possible satisfaction of the needs of the people and withstand competition on world markets. The economy of the future is conceived as open to the outside world, organically included in the global economy and enjoying all the benefits of international cooperation.

A major impetus in restructuring the political system, based on the economy, is developing in accordance with Marxist theory. Changes in the base must lead to respective changes in the superstructure. The practices of the socialist countries indicate the inverse relationship as well: in frequent cases political reforms and political will become prerequisites for successful changes in the economy. The failure of the economic reforms of 1965 in the USSR and 1968 in Hungary is explained also by the fact that they were not given political support. Occasionally the fear is expressed that the dramatic development of the political process in China in June 1989 will adversely affect the course of the economic reform. The market presumes democracy, for it cannot operate normally in the absence of the economic independence of producers and consumers, the equality among various forms of ownership and the freedom of choice of buyers and sellers.

Previously it was believed that the economic base of the socialist society, with its predominant state ownership of means of production, was consistent with strict centralism in the political area. Although it was dressed in democratic clothing, in fact the power was concentrated in the hands of the upper echelons of the administrative pyramid, while the democratic institutions and procedures were turned, by the entire logic of the functioning of the administrative system, into a formality, a decorative element of the political organization of the society. In the course of time the practical experience acquired by most socialist countries unquestionably proved that such a political system hinders initiative and prevents the application of scientific and technical achievements. Of late the pace of political changes in the USSR, Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia has been intensifying.

The efficient functioning of the new economic model requires, above all, the broad democratization of the entire system of state-administrative management and the internal life of the political institutions in our society. This presumes a drastic reduction in the role played by the apparatus in management, the elimination of bureaucratic trends in its activities, the transfer of a significant number of rights to the lower levels of governmental and economic management and the extensive use of self-management elements. The political system must open the way to creativity and initiative in all of their manifestations. It must allow a variety of forms of economic, social and political activities. It must create the possibility of comparing various options of economic decisions and a competition among them so that, after some coordination, the energy of the citizens could be channeled in the direction which society requires. Such a favorable climate can be upheld only if the political system properly reflects the interests of all population strata and groups (including individuals working in the private and cooperative sectors) and, if necessary, protect them.

The development of the main productive force of socialist society—man—is today increasingly determined by his freedom, property independence and material sufficiency as well as the need for the comprehensive development of the individual and the identification of his talents and capabilities. The guaranteed exercise of all democratic human rights is both an economic and a political requirement and a mandatory prerequisite for scientific and technical and social progress.

As society advances and as the economy grows, all internal social interconnections become more complex and the variety of factors and of economic and political interests which influence development increases. Hence the variety of options available in solving most arising problems. The choice of the optimal variant becomes a very responsible matter and makes it necessary to broaden the range of various opinions and approaches and to find the type of political mechanisms which would make it possible to identify and to clearly articulate and coordinate such views. Political pluralism, manifested in forms which are most consistent with the specific conditions and historical traditions of the country, becomes an intrinsic feature of renovated socialism.

The political life of society must provide scope for the effect of the mechanisms of self-regulation and self-correction of the economy and for the unobstructed functioning of its laws. Improving the entire area of legal regulations and the consequent creation of a system in which economic managers, labor collectives, enterprises and individuals can rely on strict rules of the game and predict in advance the consequences of various economic decisions is called upon to play a tremendous role. This requirement unquestionably answers the proclaimed readiness to undertake the establishment of a rule of law state. One of its most important tasks is to

strictly regulate political interference in the economy and to define the admissible forms and limits of such interference.

The experience of a number of countries has led to the conclusion that the effectiveness of party and state decisions increasingly depends on the extent to which they rely on broad public opinion. The broadening of glasnost contributes to the politicizing of citizens and their aspiration to participate in governmental affairs through elections and referenda. Therefore, taking the frame of mind of the people and the wishes of the population into consideration becomes one of the important requirements in restructuring the political system and making it consistent with the economic and social changes in society.

There is yet another radical demand concerning the political area in the renovation of the socialist economy: the elimination of the faulty system of the choice of management cadres, replacing it with the type of selective system which would promote and encourage not the average conformists but capable and energetic people, who can think creatively. It is just as important to develop a system of responsibilities by the political leadership for decision-making and for the economic consequences of such decisions which must mandatorily be personal. They must presume the responsibility of their authors and executors, all the way to the highest power echelons; they must include the mandatory replaceability of management because of incompetent and inefficient decisions. Finally, under the new economic management conditions the need for an overall enhancement of political standards and of the political morality of party, economic and governmental cadres will be felt increasingly clearly.

Naturally, the political leadership of the economy requires the gathering of entirely new experience in the work and training of party cadres, the choice of new, competent and capable workers and the partial replacement of those who are unable to master the finer and more delicate instruments for "tuning up" economic life, market mechanisms and means of determining and coordinating the economic interests of different population strata and groups. The question of the nature of normal yet impeccably functioning mechanisms for replacing those who lack the gift of developing a broad long-range vision of socioeconomic problems and who, while possessing a "strong willpower" and a "firm hand" nonetheless lack the necessary professional knowledge and competence, remains open.

The particular difficulty of the present situation (not only in the USSR but in the other socialist countries as well) is the fact that the difficult legacy of the long domination of the administrative-command system—economic scarcity, inflation, violation of important national economic ratios, etc.—is triggering a sharp reaction on the part of the population to seemingly purely economic and even isolated problems. They are being given political features, again and again requiring



the efficient and urgent intervention of the party authorities which hold the real power, and the adoption of exceptional measures which conflict with the logic of the reform.

Clearly, radical changes in the nature of the party's leadership and the entire style of party work will require, first of all, for the party cadres to become internally reoriented and to accept their new role and future functions and, second, to realize that if the sensitive current problems continue to be solved through the old pressure-oriented noneconomic means, there will never be any progress toward new developments.

Social life in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, China, Yugoslavia and other countries and, particularly, the practice of the use of market relations, the equalizing of the rights of the various forms of ownership, including private, and accepting political pluralism and a multiple party system, the so-called constructive opposition, provide rich material for analysis and summations.

Time will prove which of the new developments will pass the test of life and which will prove to be a failed experiment. One thing is unquestionable: collective experience in the renovation of socialism is participating today in Soviet perestroika more actively than ever before.

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### **Democracy and National Security**

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[Text]

#### **I. The Cult of Violence: Consequences to Political Standards**

The involvement of the broad popular masses in the political process and the organizational shaping of social movements and initiatives give democracy a real content. Political relations become more complex and, occasionally, the solution of social management problems assumes a conflicting nature. In particular, the development of social initiatives encounters a variety of hindrances and obstacles. Increasingly, contradictions arise not only on socioeconomic but also on cultural-ideological grounds. Contemporary life has raised sharply, in our view, the question of political standards and limits of democratization of social relations, standards of democracy and ways of achieving them. Understandably, low political standards not only do not permit the use of the unquestionable merits of democracy but also frequently make the later costly. Under such circumstances a proper understanding of the correlation between democracy and national security assumes basic significance. It is precisely on the basis of such an

understanding that, in our view, an essentially new political standard will be developed, without which it would be difficult to conceive of democratic development.

**Political Standards.** The concept of political standards was introduced in scientific circulation in the 1950s and, for a while, developed beyond the range of Marxist social science, although it was precisely Marxism that had made a decisive contribution to the formulation of the methodological foundations for the study of political awareness and its ties to political action. The significance of political experience in human life was clearly expressed by Marx in the familiar formula that "the traditions of all previous generations are weighing like a nightmare on the minds of the living" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 8, p 119). In its contemporary interpretation, the most important element in political standards is the "memory" of the past, codified in laws, customs and social awareness, both of society as a whole as well as of its individual elements, classes and social groups above all.

It is from that viewpoint that increasingly frequent statements on the lack of domestic political standards appear inaccurate. The standards exist. The fact that they carry with them an antidemocratic experience, which takes us away from the legitimate path of development of civilization, is a different matter. The abundance of bad dogmas, legal casuistry and archaic political customs and the inertia of a certain orientation in public awareness and the direct and conflicting nature of political behavior are today the nightmare of which even the minds of many warm supporters of the revolutionary renovation of the country cannot be rid.

Therefore, it would be expedient to assess the existing situation not in a scornful-skeptical way, noting the lack of political standards, but dialectically, acknowledging the inertial nature of antidemocratic traditions and exposing the contradiction between existing concepts and stereotypes of behavior and the spirit of political reforms, and defining and creating means for their resolution in the course of the democratic process itself. The initiation of this process proves that we must write our new history by no means on a clean sheet of paper.

What follows from this is that political standards, related to the political system and general standards, are identical neither to the former or the latter. Nonetheless, they turn out to be an important link which links (or could link) the political reform to solving the problem of the spiritual revival of Soviet society.

The study of the political standards which have developed in the country is, in our view, the most topical task, for the nature and pace of the reform should take into consideration the need to adapt to existing political and spiritual values. Without claiming a profound analysis of our political standards, let us draw attention only to

some of their essential aspects which influence the dynamics of relations between democracy and national security.

Any spiritual standard has a more or less fragmented aspect which enables us to judge the absence of agreement among the participants in the political process concerning social and governmental structure. In accordance with classical theories, such fragments (political subcultures) reproduce in the spiritual area the class structure of the society and are most clearly oriented toward the ideology of the ruling class. The temptation arises of even simply breaking down the components within our political standards as well. However, the Marxist approach does not allow the simplistic understanding of classes as some kind of social homogeneous unit, ignoring internal class differentiations among social groups, paralleled by the political shaping of their own specific interests. In clarifying the problems of the political domination of a class we must not ignore the fact that the governmental mechanism is in the hands not of the entire class but of a clearly defined group of people. The extent of the disparity between nominal and actual political domination can be clearly seen in the Stalinist regime: Is it possible to consider that the entire power of Stalinism was a manifestation of the political standards of the ruling working class? Obviously, not. The simplistic view of a class as some kind of monolith cannot explain many aspects of the history of recent decades.

What are the features of the political standards which existed at the start of perestroika? I believe that despite differences among traditionally defined classes, they were united by much more essential features: alienation from the means of production and the power, distribution of the social wealth, the identically low level of material well-being and of political information.

Indeed, what does the working segment of society have to divide among itself on a broad political basis? Social tension, meanwhile, keeps rising. The development of the political process in the country during the period of perestroika clearly indicates that contradictions within Soviet society are most frequently not between classes but within classes, triggering bureaucratic distortions of state policy and its antidemocratic traditions. In terms of the mass of the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia, the power apparatus acted for quite some time (and to this day) as the controlling and supervising authority. Furthermore, the growing civic activeness highlights the tendency and ability of the bureaucratic power apparatus to act as a competitor to our society.

Under such political-legal conditions, the social status and material position of any given person are no longer related to his class affiliation and begin to depend above all on the nature of relations with the administrative-command system. Naturally, this is manifested in the political standards. Actually, the profound differences which, in principle, cannot appear between a talented scientist and a skillful craftsman may be found between

the concepts of socialism and social justice of a Moscow car owner and the driver of a bus in a remote rural area.

All of this allows us to single out in the existing political standards above all two essentially different parts: the state-political and the sociopolitical subcultures. In our view, this division dominates not only the socioclass but also the national-ethnic fragment. Life itself proves that social organizations in the different Union republics turn out to be more capable of engaging in constructive interaction than the administration and the party committee of an enterprise when it comes to a dialogue with their informal groups.

**The State-Political Subculture.** This subculture developed in our country as a result of and a condition for the functioning of the administrative-command system. In as much as that system was the institutionalized form of usurping political power by a specific group acting in the name of all working people, the concealment of the true situation in the country necessarily determined a stable attitude of the power apparatus concerning information and mass communication media, and ways of social and political intercourse. Hence its monopoly over information and total control over the press, radio and television. Unadorned information becomes the privilege of a narrow group of managers while the lack of information of the citizens becomes a prerequisite of vital importance to the administrative-command system for pursuing its political interests secretly. However, unjustified secrecy and the lack of normal feedback channels lead to distortions in the nature of information and, in the final account, it became clear that "we are unfamiliar with the society in which we live."

Under such circumstances we cannot rely on any rational political thinking on the part of the power apparatus. Even the beneficial processes of glasnost do not make it possible to surmount the defects of this way of thinking, which is essentially metaphysical and dogmatic, incapable of defining and resolving social contradictions, and relying on the priority of a principle (or, more accurately, of ossified stereotypes) over any insurmountable fact, and of instructions over life. Therefore, the panegyric of the administrative-command system "I cannot violate principles," and its entire spirit, aimed at ascribing nominal values to socialism, which are the direct opposite of the realities of life in the country, are entirely natural. This gives grounds for qualifying the ideological-theoretical foundations of the state-political subculture as bureaucratic irrationalism.

It is precisely bureaucratic irrationalism that triggers the concept of man as a cog in the state machinery and thus leads said subculture far from the normal dynamics of a civilization advancing toward universal humanistic ideals. It is precisely this that is at the origin of the scorn for global political experience, the denigrating view on "corrupt Western democracies" and "parliamentary

talk-shop." Our own initial steps in mastering democratic institutions indicate how difficult it is for their yesterday's critics to attain the standards of parliamentarianism.

Quite characteristic in this kind of subculture are the place and role of social sciences and of political education, to which for a long time was ascribed not a function of becoming true grounds but only of subsequently substantiating political decisions which were made without any scientific consideration. The situation which has developed in political science expresses most accurately a statement ascribed to the Prophet Mohammed: "If science echoes the Koran it is useless; if science opposes the Koran it is harmful." The total lack of conflict of political science in its relationship with practical experience and the open defense of social reality shaped the face of "ideological purity" of political knowledge, converting it essentially into a dogmatic faith. In order to cultivate political faith, the social scientists actually retrained themselves as "Marxist priests," who considered political education as a means of developing political obedience to the power system, increasingly alienated from society.

The result is that such a state-political subculture loses its ability for self-criticism and spiritual renovation, turning into some kind of formation lacking all flexibility and which could rather splinter like glass under the pressure of social changes than take a form consistent with the new political realities. The spiritual sluggishness of the administrative-command system has a clearly manifested antidemocratic trend.

All of these characteristics of the governmental-political subculture, which existed at the start of perestroika, can easily be detected in the course of the revolutionary renovation of society. They are related to the administrative-command system as its most representative integral bearer. However, this does not give reasons to identify the political standards of every individual representative of the party-state authorities with said formation. Ignoring this essential specification makes it impossible to realize the spiritual nature of the initiative of perestroika "from above," and properly to assess the role of professional politicians in shaping a democratic political standard in the course of the social changes which are taking place.

**The Sociopolitical Subculture.** This is, if one could describe it as such, the civilian reflection of the administrative-command system. The monopoly on information held by the state and the underdeveloped nature of social communications led to the establishment of the "cult of secrecy" even in areas of social life which do not affect the interests of the state. The unsatisfied hunger for information, as long as a number of people are not ready to accept information rationally, leads to the fact that the development of glasnost is paralleled not only by a fast increase in political knowledge but also by painful reactions on the part of public opinion to traumatic information and to its psychological rejection. The low

information standard of the citizens is worsened by their firm prejudice against any official announcements and a tendency toward the uncritical acceptance and fast spreading of rumors. This phenomenon, triggered by the administrative violence applied used against information processes, has the strongest possible influence on public opinion during a period of aggravated social conflicts.

The bureaucratic irrationalism of political thinking is manifested in social life through the dogmatic promotion of ideological unity of thought, which suits the administrative system. However, it naturally triggers a secret dissidence! Under conditions of lack of political freedom, dissidence assumes a confrontational aspect toward official views. However, fettered civilian thinking turns out to be as poorly adapted to an unprejudiced political dialogue as the one officially instilled. It lacks a sensible intellectual space for the dialectical combination of opposites and for the theoretical elimination of the actual contradictions in life. A mind the logic of which is based on the principle of "either-or, and all the rest comes from the devil," contains as little sense as bureaucratic irrationalism. Administratively created myths about "loyal Leninists" and "political miracle makers" are replaced by oral folk tales of "mafias," "masons," and "people's defenders," and reliance on laws which will be given to the people at a specific date by democracy and the law-governed state. The pluralism of opinion with such an intellectual pathology is frequently manifested as the possibility of peremptorily rejecting any viewpoint other than one's own, while intellectual freedom is frequently interpreted as the freedom to shut the mouths of all those with whom we disagree.

The rejection by the sociopolitical subculture of the traditions of Stalinism and their stagnant modification leads the people to seek alternate models of social organization. This search is being conducted within a broad range of historical periods and social space. However, it constantly comes across dogmatic concepts of the socialist nature of various models of societal or governmental behavior. Most frequently the opposite of social creativity is not the bureaucracy but the subculture it has produced, which is manifested as an impersonal force. The rejection of constructive ideas because of their "foreign" or "prerevolutionary" origin is paralleled by accusations of "surreptitiously introducing foreign models," and "subversive aspirations." The counter-accusations of "Stalinism" and support of "barracks socialism" give this overall healthy process of enrichment of the political standard a pathological "labeling" aspect.

The critique of "bourgeois theories" does not, naturally, lead to the creation of individual positive knowledge. As a result, even holding an electoral district meeting becomes an unbearable intellectual burden for those who are learning democracy as well as those who claim to teach it. Reality convincingly proved that the political education which a considerable number of citizens had

acquired was suitable for social demagoguery but unacceptable for making basic decisions even in simple political situations. This is one of the most essential weaknesses of the sociopolitical subculture, which prevents the knowledgeable and constructive development of many valuable social initiatives.

The practice of statification of social movements and organizations has not allowed them so far to master the use of an efficient political set of instruments. Therefore, the sociopolitical subculture is frequently manifested as improvisation, as a tendency to engage in violent actions and spontaneous social initiatives. This is clearly confirmed by the social conflicts in the period of perestroika. Many independent social movements are manifesting their organizational-political immaturity or contamination with bureaucratism, which is entirely natural for, until recently, the only models the people had were those of a bureaucratic technique and administrative technology. Despite the high organizational and procedural costs, the development of the sociopolitical subculture, however, is advancing rapidly. Substantial social forces favoring the revolutionary renovation of the country are maturing.

Despite all their faults, formal organizations, political clubs, initiative groups, self-management committees, etc., could play the role of laboratories for the development by the public of its own models of political organization and political behavior of a truly democratic nature. The growing dynamism of public awareness and the demonstration by the public of a significant democratic potential against the background of rigid official governmental agencies and organizations gave M.S. Gorbachev reasons to note at the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum that "essentially we are dealing with a healthy constructive process, with the broad politicizing of the masses and the emerging in the arena of social activities of more and more millions of people, many of whom, until recently, were quite unaffected by politics or, in general, showed no interest in and paid no attention to it."

This sketchy analysis of the governmental and social components of the political standard enables us, I believe, to draw the following conclusion: the identification and determination of the ways to solve contradictions between the governmental-political and the sociopolitical subcultures provide the ideological-theoretical grounds for the country's spiritual development on the way to its revolutionary renovation and contribute to the elimination of the most important of its current shortages: the shortage of trust between the citizens and the authorities.

Soviet society has gained bitter experience, having harvested the fruits of the abandonment of humanistic and universal human ideals, the loss of the principle of the individual in social life, social apathy and conformism and uncritical intoxication with some actual accomplishments. However, it is precisely this experience that provides some spiritual guarantees against a retreat and

directs the energy of the masses to completing the reform of the political system. Nonetheless, for the time being the majority of citizens lack a clear scientific idea of the objectives of the dynamics of society and the efficient means of achieving it. This confirms the historical need to have a social vanguard, the real pretender for the role of which today could be only the CPSU. The fact that the party itself needs democratic restructuring (a process which could be stimulated by the various social movements and initiatives) does not essentially invalidate the objective nature of said political reality. It is true that the democratic potential is related above all to the development of the sociopolitical subculture. However, something else is equally true: the arsenal of political means with which the Soviet society came to perestroika makes it possible to speak of its political standard as the democracy of emotions, which is still quite distant from the democracy of reason.

## II. Democracy: The Political Foundation of National Security

The struggle for ideological influence and the choice of social orientations, laws and organizational mechanisms for advancing toward political power give priority to the question of the vitally important interests and self-preservation of certain social forces. This leads to the need to identify the "nonperson" such as the system of ensuring national security. Whereas until recently the problem of security was related mainly to the international relations of the USSR, the tragic events in some parts of the country and the fate of some juridical new developments in matters of criminal liability for the commission of crimes against the state have reminded us of its domestic political foundations and the fact that "foreign policy begins at home."

It is entirely clear that the problem of national security is reflected and reproduced in the sociopolitical and governmental-political subcultures differently. It is entirely natural that every bearer of one type of subculture or another identifies its target precisely in terms of himself. The theoretical underdevelopment of the concept of "national security" and its juridically unprocessed nature lead to a great popularization of political emotions and block political sense in areas which require a calm dialogue and a desire for conscious compromise.

The power system is, unquestionably, an active participant in the political process and, therefore, a social force. Since politics is a dangerous matter, both the state and the power system representing it have the full right to ensure their defense and self-defense. What does the exercise of this right mean in practical terms? It means obtaining a certain degree of freedom of behavior within a specific social space. Juridically, this space can protect itself through legislative prohibitions banning others access to information, engaging in certain political actions, etc. If the state undertakes to protect its security, the practice of prohibition is extended to the society. Therefore, civil rights and freedoms and independent social activities are always accompanied by stipulations



such as "unless this is a state or military secret," "unless this can be used to the detriment of the security of the state," or "unless this violates the vitally important interests of the state." These are normal political practices.

In this manner, the institutions of state security could act as political-legal restrictions of democracy. For the time being, it is not a question of the forms such restrictions take or who should implement them. We already pointed out that the state has the right to self-protection and that no one questions this. The question is raised on the level of linking democracy with state security. This type of link is so strong that one could with full justification paraphrase the universal aphorism as follows: "Tell me about the state security system in a country and I will tell you what type of democracy it has."

In his address at the plenum of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee on 14 April 1989 in connection with the familiar tragic events in Tbilisi, E.A. Shevardnadze said that "democracy outside self-discipline means anarchy and freedom without responsibility is suicidal." He also spoke of the need for any, even the broadest possible popular movement, to have internal and external restrictions which, if violated, would threaten total destruction, like a flooded river. This was an accurate graphic presentation of the problem. However, is the propping of the shores for democracy the prerogative of the power system? No, defining and setting the outside boundaries and the internal standards of democracy and the form of exercise of statehood are the tasks of democracy itself.

**Security of the State.** Let us reemphasize that ensuring the security of the state is necessary, for without self-preservation and normal conditions for internal and external existence, the state would be unable to fulfill its social function. But what does ensuring the security of the state mean? In our view, the measure of security of the state is defined through its attitude toward the social groups and institutions which political problems trigger and express through the system of social relations.

As we know, the state is the product of a class-oriented society and is a means through which the ruling class retains its political power. The support of a system of essentially important class relations consistent with a given social structure is a mandatory prerequisite for the preservation of the social nature and the historical type of state. This allows us to single out as the most important parameter of state security the political principledness of the course which is charted and pursued.

The border is the external sign of statehood. Its inviolability is part in all definitions of the security of a state, for which reason this circumstance does not require any further clarification.

The state acts as an instrument for the solution of social contradictions and as a political compensation factor in the social struggle. By limiting or easing political clashes in society, the state is the center for its consolidation in

achieving common objectives. This is the essence of the political power exercised by the state. Without a center of political gravity for the social forces there can be no civil politically stable society. Twin power or lack of power are fatal to the state. Therefore, its existence is impossible outside the pursuit of a course toward strengthening political centralism.

In order to implement its functions, the state must have not only full political power but also the material means of influencing social relations. In other words, it must act as the owner or as the authority in charge of redistributing certain material resources for the implementation of political, military, economic and social programs. The material possibilities of the state are traditionally defined by the concept of its power, which is the most important indicator of state security.

Law and order is an imperative in the interaction between state and society, and its civilian yardstick. It cannot be achieved without the active legislative efforts of the state and without introducing laws as legal standards within the fabric of social relations. As a participant in legal relations, the state is interested in solving political problems through stable legal means. Therefore, legality as well should be considered an essential parameter of statehood.

In order for national sovereignty to be asserted, the ability of the state to extend its political power over a certain territory is a minimal requirement. Hence, naturally, the requirement of territorial integrity as an important aspect of state security.

In the final account, the preservation by the state of its qualitative specifics in class, foreign policy, power, economic, juridical and national relations predetermines its political stability as the most important integral parameter of security.

This essential consideration of the concept of "state security" leads to the conclusion that it does not encompass the vitally important prerequisites for the existence of a civilian society. Furthermore, the excessive protection of the state in its relations with its own citizens revealed not only the lack of identical interpretation of such concepts but also the fact that they were substantially conflicting.

**The Security of the Civilian Society.** Social differentiation triggers differences in the social status of the groups of citizens and in the specifics of their ownership relations, participation in state management, production and consumption of the social product and use of spiritual values. It is obvious that it is impossible to ensure total social equality among people, for this would conflict with the very nature of things. Utopian ideas cost our society dearly, for efforts to eliminate certain social groups "as classes" destroy the social organism instead of achieving the desired "social homogeneity." The dependence of man's social and material position on



his labor contribution and participation in solving collective and national problems makes it possible to single out social justice as a prerequisite for the security of society.

The sad experience of past developments put on the agenda the question of the rights of citizens and of society as a whole in their relations with the state. Frequently the concepts of law and the juridical system are considered interchangeable and the building of a law-governed state is presented as passing mandatory laws on each occasion. Legality is a necessary prerequisite but is insufficient for a truly legal organization of the life of society, for the law can demand just social relations but also juridically sanctify arbitrariness. For even the notorious "threesomes" and the execution by firing squad of children as "enemies of the people" had a proper legal foundation. Therefore, the essence of a law-governed state is found not only and exclusively in the existence of laws and their execution but in the legal right of a civilian society to express its will in a legislative form, to participate in the formulation of governmental policy and to supervise its practice. This is a guarantee for the security of society and against the arbitrariness of state authorities.

It is entirely clear that it is impossible to solve the problem of the security of civilian society with an underdeveloped or undermined material foundation for its existence. As we know, political freedom is impossible without economic freedom. This circumstance gives grounds for singling out the economic well-being of the citizens as a vitally important social interest.

The social interests must be expressed, politically shaped and raised to the level of government resolutions. Given the variety of interests, a normal social development is inconceivable without democratic pluralism.

Historical experience confirms that locking a country within a narrow national framework leads not to the preservation but to a loss of the resources of society, the degradation of its social qualities and the loss of spiritual values, which involves a loss of priority even "in the field of ballet." The deformation of social relations triggers the problem of social conflicts and the development of centrifugal trends and negative political processes. Efforts to protect a society in difficulty from "foreign influences" can only worsen the situation. Therefore, the most important prerequisite and indicator of the security of a civilian society is its openness to external contacts and the free internal interaction among citizens in solving all problems, including in the realm of "high" politics.

Society consists of citizens but it cannot be reduced to their simple sum. It is a social entity. The legal ties between people and their state are by no means fully reflected or express the integral nature of civilian society as a historical phenomenon and as a national formation. It is precisely the national definition of civilian society, with its profound historical roots, that makes it a nation

firmly linked to its fatherland through a number of social and spiritual ties. This is the source of patriotism felt for one's only homeland. Yet without mass patriotism society loses its integral nature and the national idea which rallies the people, becoming a loose formation with strong centrifugal trends.

Naturally, if we wish to formulate specific measures for ensuring the security of society, the parameters we noted should be coordinated with each other. We must define one feature with the help of another. For example, we must coordinate the legal rights of citizens with democratic pluralism, for the majority is not always right and the legislative process could conflict with democratic trends. In other words, the question of an overall approach to the problem of the security of society is of great importance.

Therefore, let the reader draw his own conclusions on the essential differences between the security of the state and that of society and the priority of relations with the state-political and sociopolitical subcultures, respectively. In their legal and organizational forms they embody the characteristic features of these subcultures.

**National Security.** Let us immediately emphasize that when we speak of nation in this segment we shall mean, in accordance with international legal tradition, the nation as a sum total of the citizens of a given country. This means that we shall not deal with national-ethnic problems of internal life of the USSR, although they cast their own shadow on the topic of this article.

What does national security in the contemporary world consist of?

The existence of nations as a unique social formation is manifested in their originality. Originality, however, is above all the ability of the nation for self-manifestation in the global community. If such is the case, we could single out self-determination as an essentially important parameter of national security.

The harmonious system of relations which, on a global scale, ensures the originality and self-determination of nations, is possible only under the conditions of their equality of rights and the exclusion of any kind of hierarchical structures in the mechanisms of international intercourse. Consequently, the most important prerequisite for eliminating the threat to coexistence among nations is national independence. This, however, does not imply in the least any national restrictions in matters of defining and supporting one's vitally important interests within the system of international relations. This makes national egotism even more counter-indicated to the family of nations. Therefore, not any kind of national independence can bring security to a country but only the one which is developing within the channel of international efforts to surmount the crisis of civilization. Outside the logic of preserving the entity within which national independence is manifested it would make no sense whatsoever to speak of national security.

Therefore, national security is a way of achieving international security, and national independence is an aspect of the general interdependence of nations in the global community. National independence is manifested not in the proud isolation of the country in the world arena, with its own "separate position," but in the art of a free choice of alternatives of international intercourse, based on knowledge of the laws governing the development of civilization and, together with the other countries, constructive participation in building an international security system.

Since the limitations of a journal article do not allow us to discuss important parameters of national security, such as national unity and national sovereignty, let us emphasize that each one of them is a complex social phenomenon. The development of the national organism is a permanent process of appearance and resolution of contradictions among various social strata and finding an acceptable way of balancing their interests. The assigning of national priorities and the incentives which effectively operate in enhancing mass creativity and eliminating social tensions cannot be understood outside the free expression and comparison among the objective requirements of social groups. The underdevelopment of the processes of coordinating socioclass interests turns into a lowering of the tone of the national organism. It does not allow us to provide a constructive outlet for the social energy. This leads to situations of conflict and crises in solving contradictions among the different social forces.

Socioclass formations are a product of natural sociohistorical development and cannot be "inserted" or "deleted." The tragedy of Soviet society is that problems such as the "elimination of the kulaks as a class" were accepted not as the systematic development of the material, spiritual and social conditions for the restructuring of corresponding social relations but as the government's task of physical annihilation or coercive "re-education" of a huge group of people. The consequences of this limited class approach to national interests, the cultivation of social hostility and putting primitively understood class morality above national traditions resulted in incalculable casualties. The "aggravation of the class struggle," which was provoked by the Stalinist regime turned into a blood bath for the working class itself, the alleged assertion of proletarian principles notwithstanding. Therefore, the normalizing of socioclass relations is possible only through national consensus, by converting from a policy of class principles to a policy of balancing the interests of all social groups on a national basis.

Should a controversy about the truth or falseness of one class principle or another appear, the historical process itself becomes the best criterion. The strength of basic political ideas and the ability to engage in historical creativity are determined not through bloody slaughter but on the basis of what the social groups in power have been truly able to accomplish to ensure the country's progress. Since relations among classes on the subject of

power and ownership are exclusively national, on the long-term level the only worthwhile thing is the power of the historical example. This is manifested in the pace and levels of national development. It is precisely this parameter that under present circumstances assumes determining significance in terms of national security.

Our study, undertaken within the framework of the definition of a nation as the total citizenry of a given country, allows us to consider national security as the dialectical unity of the security of the state and society. We emphasize dialectical and unity. It is dialectical because the interrelationship between the security of the state and that of society could run the gamut from total coincidence to opposition, showing imperceptible or very substantial differences. Unity, because national security is a condition of the integral organism, manifested in the ability for the self-preservation of the civilian society and the state which represents it.

Anticipating the question of impatient practical workers about the usefulness of the "philosophy promoted here," let us answer it immediately. Its usefulness is that by establishing the substantial difference between the phenomena of national security and state security we can unequivocally answer the question of whether we should continue to rely on the existing concept of state security while the most viable political ideas are related to national security. The effort to reduce national security to the security of the state or to present both as clever terminological traps, direct from the very start the political process toward a distorted reflection in the legal standards of actually existing patterns. This violates one of the wisest commands in Roman law: "No law can prescribe that which the nature of things does not allow." We tried. The result of replacing national security with state security, ignoring, furthermore, the security of society, is so well-known that not even a single example is necessary, for all of this is already common knowledge.

Therefore, the unity between state and civil principles of national security, revealed through the critical political processes, should lead us to a policy of their deliberate integration, to forming a system for ensuring national security in accordance with the objectively existing laws of social development. Let us particularly emphasize that it is a question of integration consistent precisely with the system-forming law.

What is this system-forming law of national security? The answer is simple, for the interaction between state and society in the course of national development is a problem developed quite extensively in Marxist-Leninist theory and which has passed the test of history. The power of the state and state coercion, as is well-known, are by no means a benefit to society but stem from its heterogeneous nature and the socioclass contradictions of a necessity which must be tolerated under the conditions of the domestic political difficulties and threat of foreign expansion. Therefore, the "victorious proletariat... will have immediately to cut off the worse aspects of this evil until a generation which has been raised in the

new, free social conditions will be able to kick out this entire statehood trash" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 22, p 201).

A powerful state is not exclusively an indicator of reliable national security but a kind of indicator of the internal and external threats to the country's existence and normal development and an instrument with which to react to such threats. The most reliable national security is the one which has become the cause of all citizens and not only the state, not to mention its specialized authorities. Society can realize quite completely and accurately its own priorities and threats to national development; it feels more sharply the problems of social justice and economic needs; it has a potential for self-organization and national consolidation in critical situations, and even more so when this society consists of a system of toiling classes and social groups. Furthermore, the end objectives of national development are within the society and not the state. At a given stage in its advancement society can solve the problems solved by the state, whereas the state is unable to take the place of civic activeness, the historical creativity of the masses and, in general, the permanent sociohistorical intrinsic value.

Therefore, national security is the dialectical unity between the security of the state and society, within which the subsystem of state security is the means while the subsystem of the security of society is the end in defining and protecting the country's vitally important interests.

What follows from this conclusion? First, the obvious: any step in the area of state security should be assessed from the viewpoint of the social objectives and interests of the citizens. This means that no single parameter of state security could be interpreted by itself, outside of its national origin and social aspirations. Thus, the political stability of the state should be considered exclusively as a measure of the stability of national development through civilian activities, generated by the inner forces of society. Any other interpretation becomes equivalent to stagnation and the accumulation of social tensions. As a result of the primitively understood and separately implemented strategy of political stability of the state, what happens in fact is the undermining of national security, the deformation of society with the threat of finding itself on the margin of global social progress, threatening cataclysms, and the lack of renovation of political institutions.

In general, any separation of the elements of the system from the system itself is an exceptionally dangerous thing. This danger becomes much greater if one such element is the state. Separating its existence and functioning from socially significant objectives, including its self-seeking reproduction of the social reasons which created it, is dangerous. The reasons for this are entirely objective and exceptionally complex and grave: class struggle and social conflicts.

Unfortunately, fragments of the alienated and exploded machine of Stalinism proved to be socioactive, and their radiation continues to trigger cancerous cells in political thinking and social awareness. Therefore, to this day we occasionally come across not a normal system for ensuring state security but its cancerous variant, if one may say so, which does not protect but kills democracy, which does not consolidate but divides society and which does not strengthen but destroys the political foundations of the country's security. Because of the alienation of the citizens from the formulation and implementation of steps to ensure the security of the state, such measures prove to be poorly fitting the social organism. Therefore, the inconsistency between the mechanisms which meet the needs of the power system and the interests of society resembles the situation in which one of Bunin's characters found himself: he acquired such powerful eyeglasses that they made him cry endlessly and, furthermore, did not justify his hope that, in time, the lenses would fit. Conversely, as our own political practice indicates, the "magnifying lenses" of political vigilance themselves corrected the social vision in the sense of creating mass reciprocal suspicion and class hostility.

The exaggerated and self-seeking strengthening of the governmental regulation of social processes leads to the conscious or subconscious strengthening of social differentiations on political grounds. Within such a system the good citizen becomes not a coordinate in economic enterprise but politically obedient. This is an exceptionally dangerous situation which was pointed out already by Antisthenes, the ancient Greek philosopher: "States perish when they are no longer able to distinguish good from bad people." The division of society according to the principle of closeness to the power system destroys social justice. This has a corrupting influence on the entire system of social relations. The natural economic foundation for social differentiation within society, which is destroyed in that case, leads to the loss of an objective class policy. Alas, such was the irrational reality which existed at the start of perestroika.

Let us note that national consensus, as a basis for the survival of the country under the conditions of developing crises, assumes the level of most important political guideline in all socialist countries undergoing a stage of revolutionary renovation. The supreme and vitally important interest of all social groups and their political responsibility to the homeland are manifested at that difficult moment in the aspiration toward the consolidation of the society. Therefore, it is the national idea that becomes dominant among all the criteria of the country's security. This idea, we believe, provides the most important trend of integration between state and social security within a given system.

### III. Need for a Scientific Approach

Therefore, the problem of the country's security is complex; its solution is possible on the basis of a single conceptual approach which enables us to find a balance

between political and social, military and economic, commercial and organizational, and technological and information-scientific areas of activities.

It may have seemed that such a view on the matter should have long been reflected in a standard scientific knowledge concerning the national security, which would include the results of basic and applied, theoretical and experimental-practical developments. The actual situation is such that this most important problem is today divided among departmental areas and local solutions to the pressing problems lack proper scientific foundation. The comprehensive program of research on matters of restructuring the regime of secrecy in the country is an exception which confirms a bad rule. The lot of the respective departmental research institutions is to defend the practices of the "customer." Consequently, "scientific substantiation" is directed toward the preservation of existing functional-structural units. It proceeds from defining and correcting the objectives of ensuring the country's security under dynamic foreign and domestic conditions. Suffice it to point out in confirmation of such a sharp assessment the absence of scientifically founded criteria for defining the vitally important national interests and the overall concept of national security, interrelated with internal and external factors. The new political thinking, although it provides the necessary theoretical foundation to this effect, does not solve the problem in its entire specific nature.

The vagueness of political, economic, military and scientific-technical objectives pursued in ensuring national security makes it possible today arbitrarily to interpret the social usefulness of the respective special measures. Let us ask ourselves the following question: Have the existing political and legal practices of ensuring national security come closer to the socialist social and universal human moral ideals? What would be the use of defending a state frequently depicted in terms of the caricature-sinister images of an external and internal enemy rather than the objective study of the actual threats to the normal development of Soviet society? Would the power of the country be strengthened as a result? Would the faith of the international community in the progressive path of development chosen by the Soviet Union be strengthened? The reader may agree that these and similar questions shift from the rhetorical to the practical category.

Perestroika involves in the reform of the political system the absolute majority of the citizens. In turn, this active and mass political process contributes to the fast development of political standards. It is very important for the integration of the security of the state with that of society, within the system of national security, to be able to formulate a comprehensive target for interaction among the state-political and sociopolitical subcultures and lay the foundation for the consolidation of Soviet society. The implementation of the idea of national consensus is a prerequisite for the organic combination among the various subcultures under a single political standard. This is a very beneficial prerequisite for the

spiritual strengthening of the democratic process and its development from the democracy of emotions to the democracy of reason.

Tremendous hopes ride on the establishment of a USSR Committee on Problems of Defense and National Security within the Supreme Soviet. Its activities should become a powerful means of developing domestic political standards and creating models of political creativity worthy of the great socialist idea.

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### **Contradictions and Their Manifestation in the National Mentality**

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[Article by Kazbek Taziyeovich Gizatov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor at the Kazan State Culture Institute]

[Text] The study of national relations in the USSR cannot avoid the admission that here, as in all other areas of social life, the laws of dialectics are at work and that contradictions exist. Unfortunately, for a long time relations among nationalities in the USSR were considered an area of "no-conflict," of virtually absolute harmony, and the study of contradictions in that area was actually a "forbidden zone." Today the first step has already been taken: we acknowledge the influence of relations among nationalities on disproportions in the economy and on the solution of sociocultural problems. The development of national communities themselves and relations among them have their own dialectics which must be known as thoroughly as possible.

The development of the processes of democratization and glasnost in the country brought to light a number of unsolved problems in inter-nationality relations, which is an indication of the large number and variety of contradictions in this area. It would be proper to undertake their study by applying the classification developed in the theory of dialectics in terms of areas of social life and degree of maturity: as differences, contradictions and conflicts which, under specific conditions, convert from one to another. We must also distinguish between contradictions which operate in relations among national communities or in contacts among their individual members; it would be difficult, in the study of these aspects, to overestimate the role of sociological research. This approach would enable us to reject the common truths which were of essentially promotional value.

For some 30 years the following formula has dominated our scientific and propaganda publications dealing with the condition of relations among nationalities and their development trends: "What is taking place in the USSR is, on the one hand, the blossoming of all nations and, on

the other, the rapprochement among them." This formula, which was heard for the first time at the 22nd CPSU Congress, in the speech "On the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," assumed an official-legal nature. The artificial simplification of the cause and effect relations between these processes ("the blossoming of nations leads to their rapprochement and the rapprochement ensures their further blossoming") impoverished the study of the essence of real processes. The contradictory and disparate effects of such trends were simply ignored.

Yet in terms of multinational formations, one could speak, as an aspect of relations among nationalities, of the existence of both centripetal and centrifugal forces and their relative resultant force and the possibility of the disruption of this force. We must remember that under socialism as well, although in a different manner, the two historical trends in the national problem, as indicated by V.I. Lenin, operate: "The first is the awakening of national life and national movements, the struggle against any national oppression and the creation of national states. The second is the development and increased frequency of all types of relations among nations, the breakdown of national barriers, the creation of an international unity of capital, economic life in general, politics, science, etc." (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 24, p 124). The process of the formation of nations in our country by no means ended by the time of the revolution and to this day one could hardly claim that this process has been totally completed. Consequently, the contradictions inherent in the stage of the formation and establishment of nations (and other national communities) exist under socialism as well. The trends of "awakening national life," "creation of national states" and "development and increased frequency of all relations among nations" not only reciprocally determine each other but also pursue largely different trends. In any case, their content is not the same for all.

It is important to take into consideration both trends and to study each one of them as fully, objectively and specifically as possible. Unfortunately, for a long time the studies made by our scientists on problems of national relations essentially emphasized a substantiation of the rapprochement among nations and their cultures (this author was no exception); however, what was ignored was the other side: the aspiration of the national communities to preserve, to develop their original features. Naturally, the internationalization of social life is an objective trend of the historical progress of our time. However, which of these two objective trends has a dominant role at any given time depends, in each specific case, on a number of factors, both objective and subjective.

As a social system, socialism contains the objective foundations for the development of both trends. However, errors in the management of national processes could disrupt the mechanism of such relations, distort each of these trends and ensure the prevalence of one at

the expense of the other, which is inevitably reflected in reciprocal national relations.

Also contradictory is the national awareness, which is a reflection of the national features of social life and the "storehouse" of the vestiges of the past with all of its virtues and faults.

The conflicting nature of the processes and the existence of different trends in relations among nationalities are facts of real life, rooted in the objective existence of national differences and the features which are manifested through language, culture, historically developed way of life, national traditions, etc. Feelings of precisely belonging to a given socioethnic community and not to another are "innate" in the people. Hence the aspiration to protect the national features and a jealous attitude toward the merits and distinguishing features and characteristics of their own community. This is particularly clearly manifested in the spiritual culture of a nation.

Since national communities cannot be isolated from each other, the opposite trend is becoming increasingly felt: the aspiration of the nations toward intercourse and cooperation. Attention to and respect for the distinguishing features of other ethnic groups and the exchange of values and, consequently, a rapprochement among them are shaped on the basis of a material (in a certain sense) foundation of practical interest in the achievements of other nations. This is the moral and psychological foundation for the normal coexistence among nations.

National feelings play a special role in national awareness. This is a complex psychological phenomenon, which is difficult to study and control, for it contains both stable elements as well as emotions related to the current situation.

National feelings are distinguished above all by their trend of development.

A feeling that a subject belongs to one national community or another is manifested also in connection with the successes and achievements of said community (or of its individual members), as well as in connection with its failures and shortcomings. In the first case a feeling of satisfaction and even pride for **one's own** community develops; in the second, conversely, feelings of sadness, sympathy, regret, and so on, appear. In both cases, however, the feelings are aimed at the same target: one's national community, one's social and natural environment. The manifestation of such feelings is typically expressed by the Armenian writer R. Ovanesyan: "There is little of everything in Armenia: there is little water, land, minerals, forests, fauna, and even air and sky. However, one thing in Armenia is truly inexhaustible: the love felt by the Armenian people for their harsh land and history of great suffering. It is this love that mandates the generations of Armenians to hold on their rocks and ravines."



National feelings may have another trend as well. They may be directed toward **other** national communities. Depending on the specific reasons, including some of old historical origins, in some cases they imply feelings of respect and fraternal friendship toward one nation or another; in a different situation, something of an opposite nature appears: feelings of mistrust, dislike and even hostility toward other peoples. The durability of such feelings is determined by psychological concepts inherited from previous generations.

The national feelings of the people may be also "misadressed." We are familiar with a number of examples of recent years in which unfair actions committed against small nations in the past are today interpreted by some people as "oppression" on the part of the "great-power" Russian nation, although it is a question of violations of the principles of Leninist national policy by some former leaders, who brought a great deal of hardship to the Russian nation as well.

Changes in the intensity of feelings depend on real life situations in the course of which they acquire a dynamic and rapidly changing nature: hence the increased emotionality of responsive reactions to the changing situation. An emotion which appears on the basis of information superimposes itself on national feelings, endowing them with a special, an impulsive nature, reflecting the breakdown of the old and the difficulty of establishing new dynamic stereotypes. Understandably, the richer and more unexpected the new information obtained by the subject from the outside is, the more intensive emotional manifestations become.

These features of the national mentality appear in relations among nationalities as well. The emotional perception of unusual information could have a certain impact on the behavior and actions of the people, ascribing to them (depending on the degree of emotionality and exultation) lack of control and irresponsibility. When national feelings of a negative nature, "supported" by a special emotional energy, are aimed at other ethnic groups, they become socially dangerous. Spontaneous actions with unpredictable consequences involve large masses of people, as confirmed by the 1988 events in Azerbaijan and Armenia, and not only there alone. The power of the emotional factor in relations among nationalities is used by the opponents of unity among the fraternal peoples of the USSR, by those who are against perestroika. They deliberately disseminate rumors hostile to the friendship among our peoples and provoke nationalist and antiperestroika actions. It is noteworthy that the more "heuristic" and unexpected to the masses one or another type of information may be (including false information such as, for instance, the "discovery" of some "act," allegedly aimed against their national community), the more successful are efforts to excite the masses and to lead their actions along the false, nationalistic and antiperestroika path.

As a whole, the manifestation of national feelings by the people, whether in assessing significant social phenomena or relations among people in daily life, is both natural and understandable. It is natural for the people to be proud of the achievements and historical path of their nation. One can understand Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks, and Tajiks who are proud to belong to an ancient culture, the origins of which may be traced by universally famous names such as Shota Rustaveli, Nizami Gyandzhevi, Alisher Navoi and Abulkasim Firdousi. The other peoples of the USSR as well have their own national giants of the past. Ancient people's epics play an important role in the national cultures, such as "David Sasunskiy" in Armenian culture, "Tale of the Host of Igor" for the Russians, "Manas" for the Kirghiz, "Idegey" for the Tatar, "Dgzangar" for the Kalmyk, etc. This feeling of pride in the achievements of national culture is entirely natural and justified as long as it is not combined with belittling the dignity of other nations.

The national feelings of the people can be hurt easily. They could be hurt by people of other nationalities even without any deliberate intent, as V.I. Lenin pointed out, simply by carelessness or as a joke. Most frequently, however, the result is the same as in the case of a deliberate insult. For example, when people say the "Uzbek case" (referring to the crimes committed by Rashidov, Adylov and others) they hardly think of the mental associations which this combination of words may trigger in many members of the Uzbek nationality. They may think as follows as well: when Medunov, Churbanov and others were exposed, no one said the "Russian case" (the unfairness of this is obvious); therefore, why is it possible to say this about the Uzbeks? ...It is very important in this case to put oneself in the position of a member of the nationality whose feelings (frequently because of carelessness) could be hurt.

National feelings may also have an unhealthy, an exaggerated nature. During the period of stagnation, for example, the aspiration of the heads of some republics to earn fame for imaginary successes of their nation was a frequent phenomenon, such as for crops which were not grown, goods which were not produced, and so on. With the help of figure padding and by misleading the state, these leaders promoted a false feeling of national pride.

National egotism, which is manifested through exaggerated national feelings, appears in a variety of forms such as, for example, the aspiration of some leaders to extract from the common pocket of the state more funds and facilities for their own republic, ignoring the needs of the other republics in the country. The aspiration of some "fighters for sovereignty" to violate the rights of citizens of nonnational origin, as though this is a manifestation of true sovereignty, is far from the principles of unity and friendship among the Soviet peoples....

Chauvinism and nationalism, which express the ideas of exclusivity and superiority of some nations over other, and the aspiration of their bearers to aggrandize their nations by humiliating other nations and ethnic groups,

and which promote dislike of them, are the worst manifestations of exaggerated national feelings. Nationalism does not fall down from the sky. It grows on a specific ground when conflicts among nationalities are not settled promptly, and where scope is provided for the development of national egotism.

Unhealthy "demands" formulated concerning problems of a national nature could also lead to the artificial pitting of some nations against other. It may seem as though a proper assessment of any type of idealistic or metaphysical theories of nations and national character has already been provided. However, echoes of such unscientific concepts are occasionally heard as well. One hears, for instance, views about "ethnic purity," "the biological determination of national character," enumerations of basic features which allegedly characterize a specific nation only, etc. Some authors ascribe to the Russian national character features, such as "fatal tendency toward patience," "submission to a yoke," and so on; we believe that this is insulting to the Russian people. Others raise the question of the "unraveled" nature of the national Russian character, interpreting it, apparently, as some kind of mysterious unrecognizable substance.

The national character of a nation deserves a close study. However, this should be done not for the sake of admiring the features which, according to some authors, are the "essence of the nation" (which inevitably leads to pitting one nation against another), but for the sake of supporting and shaping features which can serve the revolutionary renovation of our society.

Today there is increasing talk of the need for creating a **new concept of national relations**. What is meant by this? I believe, it means above all the elimination of metaphysical and dogmatic views on national relations in the USSR and of a glossed-over approach to their interpretation, influenced by the circumstances; furthermore, it means assessing relations among nationalities in our country as a complex and internally conflicting system which deserves a comprehensive and profound development and paying tireless attention to practical requirements, and the sober, flexible and efficient solution to the problems; it also means the full and systematic restoration of the Leninist principles of national policy and ensuring the full equality among all nations, nationalities and ethnic groups in the country. Clearly, these problems can be successfully solved only in the course of the democratization of our society.

The unity and friendship among the peoples of the USSR have always been considered a powerful factor in the strength of our multinational socialist state. Today, in the course of the struggle for a restructuring of all aspects of social life, the need arises to harmonize existing objective trends in national relations. Each one of them, as it reflects the characteristics of the unified system of relations among nationalities in the USSR, carries within itself accretions, deformations and violations of the correlation between centrifugal and centripetal

forces, which arose in the past. The contradiction between objective need for qualitative changes in relations among nationalities, on the one hand, and their contemporary condition, on the other, is obvious. Its study and finding ways of its resolution will contribute to the development and advancement of this area of our social relations. The subjective factor, including the initiative and will of the broad popular masses, plays a tremendous role in the resolution of this contradiction.

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## PUBLIC OPINION

### The Enhancement of Man

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[Letter by Valentin Konstantinovich Chebanov, rural raykom secretary]

[Text] From the editors: This letter was sent to the editors by the raykom first secretary in Kursavka Village, Andropovskiy Rayon, Stavropol Kray. It was already included in this issue when we found out that Valentin Konstantinovich Chebanov had been appointed deputy chairman of the kray agroindustrial committee.

These are complex times, marked by a universal interest in social life, the variety of views and certain successes as well as the still entirely inadequate pace of advance, the lack of basic breakthroughs, tension and, in a number of cases, the growth of interest into concern, of search into confusion and of criticism into euphoric self-excitement or customary skepticism and apathy.

One can and should speak of the extent of deformation, lagging and deadening of many aspects of life and of inertia and dogmatism of the mind; however, one must not ignore the loss of pace and the resulting development of nihilism. It is important more quickly to understand the origin of the forces which would clearly like to move perestroyka ahead but are unable to find a field for their application and those who try, with conviction, to preserve the existing situation, thus contributing to destabilization and to unstable development.

Our unquestionable successes in the international arena mean that in this area we have found proper approaches, criteria and guidelines, and that here practical politics is based on a realized and balanced set of interests of people the world over.... However, talking with the population in many of our villages in our Andropovskiy Rayon, particularly with mature people, whose fate is already determined, one develops a complex feeling in which, on the one hand, there is hurt, bitterness, feelings of guilt and involvement with injustice and, on the other, hope and the aspiration to work more and more in order to make the change as quickly as possible.

It is not merely a question that in villages such as Ternovyy, Nizhnyaya Kolonka, Nikolayevskiy, Kunakovskiy, Ovrazhnyy and many others there are no roads, natural gas, running water, public baths, schools and clubs, although all of these lacks combined throw us back by 50 years, and all that existing in the center of Stavropol Kray! Obviously, the question is much more serious. When we think of the fact that our mechanizers, livestock breeders and milkmaids work daily and throughout their lifetime as much as an American farmer or a member of a cooperative in the GDR yet their output is lower by a factor of 5-8, one feels twice as bad. We, party members, must look at the truth in the eyes, however bitter it may be. We have only one life and every hour and minute are irrecoverable and unique. Yet it so happens that most of the life of our people is wasted and the existing conditions enable them only minimally to realize their potential and, in my view, no more than 10 to 15 percent of the possibilities offered by our time. Furthermore, there is social uncertainty which affects the children and their future, which reduces the scarce free time of the adults only to doing the household chores and watching television, and to infrequent holidays....

Who is to be blamed for this lagging of our culture—in the comprehensive meaning of this term? Is it the planning authorities, which send to the countryside combines, 50 percent of which are not needed (yet they involve metal, and labor, which is so short when it comes to the production of road building, loading and other machinery)? Is it the workers who manufacture expensive and extremely unreliable equipment and do not obtain in exchange milk and meat? Is it designers and engineers who design the equipment of yesterday or the day before? Is it scientists, who are programming for the end of the century to develop breeds of cattle and plant strains with a productivity and yields which the Netherlands, let us say, had already achieved in 1960? Who should put an end to all this?

Obviously, the essence of the matter is that it is time for all of us to be aware of our personal responsibility for the senseless waste of human life and to understand the national importance of our lag in technology and organization and, finally, in the way of life. I am confident that the effect of our actions will depend, to a decisive extent, on the extent to which we shall be able not simply to improve production relations but also radically to restructure them for the sake of man, who is the main component and the binding link of production forces, the base and the superstructure.

Having acknowledged and repeatedly stated now that our objective is man we, unfortunately, stopped there. I believe that, above all, we must try, on the basis of the critical analysis of age-old human experience, to realize the basic material roots of human interests (despite their entire variety) and that immediate material requirements (to eat, drink, have a house and a family, etc.) act on a certain level as life support systems and, after that, bring to light the true essence of man and express the interests of self-development as such. To find the power

fields which combine our interests and direct them one way or another, to determine the position of the sun toward which mankind aspires, means to take yet another step on the path of converting the object into a subject on an entirely objective basis.

I believe that from this viewpoint, as refracted through man, it is important, above all, to mention freedom. A person who is not free is no longer a person. Obviously, the degree of freedom depends on a realization of possibilities concerning the level which is determined by our time, the achievements of global civilization and scientific and technical progress or, in the final account, the level of labor productivity, the extent to which it is addressed toward the satisfaction of needs. The foundation of freedom is the development of the capabilities of man and his skill, knowledge, morality and, finally, material and information possibilities. The determining dominant feature in the exercise of the right of freedom is economic freedom, combined with social justice. What are our chances in that area?

With a lower labor productivity and lesser opportunities, nonetheless, most of the newly created value is extracted through noneconomic means. It is thus that economic freedom is reduced to a critically low point and decisively influences the interest in labor as the main means of man's self-realization. The situation is further worsened by the fact that frequently an even higher percentage of the value the best of us have created is extracted. Roughly, in essential terms, we are removing the material foundation for relations and then trying, on the basis of bare consciousness, to speak of feelings of ownership, growth of creative and social activeness and increased responsibility.

Instead of determining the steady and accurate contribution of every person, labor collective, sector, region or republic to the cause of the entire society, we are manipulating the national income without noticing that by this same token we are manipulating the consciousness. As we know, true competition consists of the correlation between consumer forces and production forces, if we speak of the main motive contradiction in a reasonable human society. We must create a situation in which "there is no labor without its owner," in the same way that under capitalism there is no profit without an owner. We must find a way not to solve the appearance of contradictions between what is private and what is public but a way to intensify and increase the motive forces of the main contradiction within each cell of our society and a way to meet the overall social interest. We must find it not for the sake of 10 or 15 percent of the active population, as we are doing now with the help of cooperatives and individual activities, having concentrated our attention on these, but for the entire population of the Union. If we were to take from an individual engaged in individual labor or a member of a cooperative (through taxes) as much as 80 percent of the newly created value, the way it is taken from the workers in some factories, I am confident that few people would be willing to continue to practice their occupation (which,

incidentally, was clearly confirmed by the story of the Law on the Taxation of Members of Cooperatives). Turning this around would be legitimate: What if we were to change the ratio and give to the worker in that same factory not 20, as we do now, but 80 percent of the newly created value? Would he, in that case, develop greater respect for his labor, a feeling of ownership, and so on? Would his attitude toward his job and his collective change?

I believe that the main thing here is even not the need to provide an absolutely positive answer to these questions. What matters most is that in this case we would see sharply and quite tangibly, on all levels, a difference in labor productivity and its quality, and the activities of the people would increase explosively. Indeed, today differences in the wages of frontranking workers in an efficiently operating enterprise and of careless ones in a losing enterprise are not all that great. Yet differences should be substantial, much higher. That is the essence of the matter. In our efforts comprehensively to apply the leasing system and to create cooperatives in various sectors, generally speaking, we are following that same direction: to give more to those who produce more. Democracy will be truly socialist if it is given a real material content, if everyone in our country were to become the master of his labor to its fullest extent (except for rentals and strictly demarcated quantitatively centralized requirements). The victory of socialism as a system should be achieved by the enhancement of man and not by curtailing his needs and possibilities. Unquestionably, a clever opponent would immediately object: What kind of socialism is this, with such substantial inequality? We should probably (as I understand it) emphasize, again and again, that no law can stand above the material foundations of society and the level of labor productivity it has reached. Material equality under the conditions of scarcity always lead to "barracks communism" (on one level or another), with irrecoverable losses to the development of what is human in man.

Both global and domestic practical experience indicates that the people develop a truly active interest when their share of the product they have created is no lesser than 55-60 percent. If this share goes to the upper levels, the funds are wasted indifferently and yield no positive results.

In 1981 a small study was made by the Stavropol Party Kraykom, where I worked: with the help of a computer the resource possibilities and work results of 50 of the best and 50 of the worst farms were analyzed. The results were staggering. With virtually identical growth rates of resources per hectare of arable land, in 15 years the best had increased their output by a factor of 2.5, compared with the worst, which had increased it by only 5 percent. This provided a decisive impetus in formulating the question of converting to self-financing.

In Andropovskiy Rayon, in particular, which is one of the most backward in the kray, between 1979 and 1987 132 million rubles were "provided from above," while

the volumes of output of grain, meat and other products here declined. Twenty-nine out of a total of 42 settlements remained, nine of which on the verge of disappearance; social amenities are even not worth mentioning. Such funds, which were not earned but given by superior authorities, were simply wasted while the people remained indifferent.

The new membership of the bureau of the Andropovskiy CPSU Raykom began by organizing on the rayon's territory a wide discussion of the problem of the lagging. Jointly a social program was formulated. It was decided that, to begin with, it will be carried out with the forces of the rayon and, second, that its implementation would necessitate an increase in the volume of output by no less than one-third. This approach yielded good results. Last year, for example, greater progress in supplying natural gas was made compared to the entire 11th 5-year period; the pace of building roads and housing units nearly doubled. The construction of three hospitals, two schools, a rayon polyclinic, a dairy plant, a sausage shop and a number of other projects was undertaken. Characteristically, compared with the average annual level reached during the 11th 5-year period, the volume of the gross output increased by 21 percent; labor productivity rose by 25 percent and profitability exceeded 40 percent. The people began to believe in the changes and the population began to increase: it rose by 946 people in 1 year.

Freedom, however, means not only possibility. It equally means ability and active desire. It is here that we find our main advantage which Lenin pointed out when he noted on the subject of the second draft of the RSDWP program, suggested by Plekhanov, that "the end of this paragraph is inadequate, for it says 'the planned organization of the public production process for satisfying the needs of the entire society and of its individual members.' This is not enough. Even the trusts will provide this kind of organization." (As was confirmed.) He also said: "It would have been more definite to say 'at the expense of the **entire** society' (for this includes planning and indicates the direction of planning), not only for the satisfaction of the needs of the members but for the satisfaction of the **full** well-being and free and **comprehensive** development of **all** members of society" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 6, p 232).

Although we repeat Lenin's words, I believe that we do not always attain the level of his most profound dialectics.

I always look with a feeling of shame and sadness (caused by the impossibility to do something immediately) at the children of the shepherds—there are some 3,000 shepherds in our area—who live in hostels, who poorly know not a foreign language but even Russian, who do not obtain even a minimal knowledge of artistic-musical and computer education; more than one-half of them, when drafted for army service, are unable to meet GTO standards. When they reach the 8th grade or, most frequently, the 6th or the 7th, their parents pull them out



of school (which is 15 to 20 kilometers away), for they must graze the sheep. Yet such shepherd families number more than 260,000 in the country, or about 1 million children. How can we speak in this case of the possibility of realizing one's capabilities if they have not been developed to begin with? Yet we are familiar with the problem of the irretrievable loss of capabilities and, at the same time, we realize the demand of our time: the Japanese, for example, are already undertaking a conversion to universal higher education....

My feelings were equally bitter at the meeting of the club of milkmaids who had reached the 3,000 kilogram milk level (there are 34 of them in the rayon). During the concert and listening to comedians on the stage, two-thirds of the milkmaids covered their mouths with their hands swollen at the joints. They covered their mouths ashamed of the fact that they had no teeth. What kind of opportunity to have the freedom of self-development could there be a question of in this case, if they have been deprived not only of the ability to chew their food (and, therefore, to be healthy) but even to laugh without constraints.

In my view, there should be only a single type of competition on the basis of the result of which the people could judge of the work of the party, the soviets and the trade unions: competition in the way and type of life, a component of which, unquestionably, is its material standard. I.e., in precisely that about which in some cases we do not even have true information, limiting ourselves to timid and one-sided comparisons with foreign countries. Yet, it was precisely about this that Lenin wrote the following: "Which commune, district in a big city, factory or village... has done more to upgrade labor productivity? To build new good homes for the poor or place them in the homes of the rich? To ensure proper delivery of a bottle of milk for each child of poor families? These are the questions on the basis of which the communes, municipalities, consumer-producer societies and cooperatives must develop their **competition**" (op. cit., vol 35, p 204).

In terms of present-day conditions, this applies to social protection, concern for women and the very old, an efficient system for the education of young people, availability of housing, the level and quality of nutrition, the development of culture and sports, and the availability of goods and services, i.e., the conditions for the expanded reproduction of human existence. The feeling of ownership and conscious discipline are inherent in the person if he cares for his family, friends, job, village or city, for his customs and for his entire way of life. It is important for a person to have something to care for and something to be proud of.

Lenin spoke of the law of enhanced requirements. Have we developed this Leninist concept by raising the slogan of "everything for the sake of man, everything for the good of man?" In my view, in some areas we have even gone back to the utopian and idealistic views on the problem. Characteristically, writers and painters are

turning today to religion which, on the basis of thousands of years of experience in observing the development of man, has selected and canonized many humanistic principles which truly ennoble man.

In that sense, the party must lead. Its task is to find a way to shape needs which enhance man as such. This includes, above all, the need to work as the main way of self-expression, self-realization and self-development.

The road passing through enhanced requirements can become most fruitful in asserting the activities of our people. The collective of the kolkhoz Vpered has repeatedly gathered to discuss what type of village should their Kiankyz Village become (translated, it means "beautiful girl") in 7 to 10 years, and what should they start by doing. They decided that first would be a school, a consumer service building, a sports complex, the supply of natural gas to the village, the laying of two new streets, roads and sidewalks. In order to fulfill this plan, the kolkhoz had to triple its profits. A search of ways to accomplish this was undertaken. They turned to the rayon executive committee with the suggestion of letting the farm take over as much as 1,000 hectares of poorly used land. The people estimated that within 3 to 5 years they would be able to double their milk and meat production and increase their wool production by a factor of 1.5. In the first year the increase exceeded 30 percent. They are building a new livestock farm and several centers for shepherds. All shepherd collectives have converted to the leasing system. Auxiliary shops were set up which last year yielded a profit of some 200,000 rubles. The people, feeling themselves as the owners, seek ways of organizing their lives and making them consistent with our time.

In order for this to be attainable, we need uniform principles which, for the time being, we are either unwilling or unable to formulate properly, both scientifically and comprehensively; we need conditions the creation of which we are undertaking now essentially with declarations. Without trying to predetermine the nature of all the principles and conditions, I would like to express my view on the extreme need for two of them.

We cannot speak of real democracy as a step toward freedom without creating prerequisites for the free and comprehensive development of all children as individuals. It is important to realize and, in my view, the sooner the better, that school students must learn a skill. They must earn money and participate in social life. Otherwise we shall be unable to involve the entire population in the efficient production process. We shall not succeed to make labor the main means of self-expression for every person.

We will create in our rayon an association for public education and for the upbringing of young people. It will have its own associations operating on a cost accounting basis, highly equipped, dealing with the computer, artistic-esthetic and physical training of the children. This would not void the need for corresponding work in the



schools but would radically add to it, raising it to a qualitatively new standard and creating a firm material foundation, interest and conditions for purposeful work with the children. For the time being we cannot achieve this in each school and we see no practical way of achieving this in the future. The first association is already in its second year of work. Here the children are trained in 17 skills. Within its cooperatives bases for productive labor by school students are being created.

We are also trying to enhance the status of the teachers, above all by maximally freeing them from numerous daily concerns.

Second: in speaking of solving crisis situations, Lenin emphasized the following: "It is known that in practice such contradictions are solved by breaking out of this vicious circle, turning around the feelings of the masses, and the heroic initiative of individual groups which, against the background of such a change frequently play a decisive role" (op. cit., vol 39, p 21). Essentially, the role of the party in our society is determined by one prerequisite from which all others stem. It is the tempestuously growing production power of the awareness not only as a force which structures programmatically material life and even not only as a direct productive force (in the guise of science and qualification) but, above all, as a force which develops within man his human essence.

A basic prerequisite for the efficient activities of the party today is the modern way of thinking of all its members, giving them the moral right to lead. I believe that it would be logical to face the party, in the same way that Lenin raised the question, with the requirement of getting rid of people who are indifferent, clumsy and incompetent, of anyone who cannot confirm "through special efforts or merits his absolute reliability, loyalty and capability of being a party member." Given such a formulation of the question, labor and living conditions of the people will not only radically change but we would add to this a radical turn in the awareness. The party will be able to lead the working people through changes in the way of life and the enhancement of man.

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### Commentaries, Responses, Editorial Mail

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[Text]

### Topical Question With Comments by Specialists

#### L. Gulova, Zaporozhye: Once Again on the Deficit

A great deal is being said today about the deficit. I heard on the radio that it is due above all to the fact that the population has a great deal of money. But such money did not accumulate in the past 6 months alone. Even half a year ago there was plenty of soap and detergent, for

example. It is being said that currently sales of soap and detergents have just about quadrupled. But where are they? One newspaper says that several plants engaged in the production of such goods have been closed down; another one writes that the reason is the reduced allocation of soda. I and all my friends and acquaintances believe that all of this is being done simply for the sake of making the people indignant and hindering perestroika.

I have a family of seven, three of them children. Therefore I have plenty of things to wash. What am I to do? There are occasional soap or detergent allocations, but try to get it, try to wait for it and then you get one package, sufficient for a single wash, while I wash four times monthly....

#### N. Stennikov, Kharkov Oblast, Gotvaldovskiy Rayon, Komsomolskiy Settlement:

The people of my generation recall the way the moment synthetic fabrics appeared, sales of cotton fabrics dropped, which called for all sorts of advertising. Subsequently, however, this disappeared somewhere and even bedding vanished while in the press a great deal of all sorts of explanations appeared. Then, all of a sudden, once again sheeting reappeared and then disappeared, and we were not told anything. In my view, to this day it is difficult for a person to find his way in this entire conflicting situation with shortages.

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These are excerpts of letters, a large number of which are now being received by the editors, discussing shortages. The question of soap and detergent is predominant. The lack of these items in trade motivates the readers to draw quite serious conclusions. The editors asked specialists for an explanation.

Following is the opinion of V. Prokhina, candidate of economic sciences, head of the sector for marketing consumer and household goods, All-Union Scientific Research Institute for the Study of Population Demand for Consumer Goods and the Trade Situation:

The press has already analyzed the situation in detail and examples and figures have been quoted. Practical experience indicates, however, that, as a rule, in this case rational arguments are unconvincing. The only thing that could convince and calm the people down is the possibility of buying freely and peacefully anything they need, as much as they need and just when they need it.

Why have breakdowns appeared? Many are those who tend to blame for everything the Gosplan, which is "poorly planning," ministries which are "producing little," and the trade system which is "hiding stuff under the counter." However, that which is being sold from the shelves is part of the figures of the statistical reports on commodity stocks in trade. And they, in the case of washing goods, have been reduced by nearly two-thirds. The specialists know that a reduction of commodity stocks by even 5 percent leads to an explosive increase in

demand. In other words, if for some reason a commodity would disappear in one store you may rest assured that quite soon it will be bought out everywhere else. To seek the reasons and the consequences in such a situation is senseless: we are dealing essentially with sociopsychological rather than economic factors.

The appearance of this stir about soaps was signaled by the fact that the time for increasing commodity stocks was delayed. Between 1983 and 1985 both soap and detergents were indeed plentiful. The average annual rates of their sale remained practically unchanged. An illusion of total well-being and stability of the market was created. In 1986, however, the situation began to change. Customer demand began to increase and commercial stocks began to drop. The market asked for increased deliveries as early as 1986. However, this was done with a 1-year delay. Within that time the mechanism of the stirred demand began to rev up. Families began to hoard "for a time of need." According to our estimates, 10 to 12 percent of the detergents which were sold between 1986 and 1988 went to supplement such stocks. Let me emphasize that these are average figures. This means that some families acquired soap and detergent in excess while others were left with nothing.

The general instability of the market, breakdowns in trade, lines, and people buying "by the bagful" everything "available," is the main but not the only reason for the present difficulties. Objective factors exist as well. According to the USSR State Committee for Statistics, the existing production capacities have not been used to capacity year after year. In the 1986-1988 period the respective enterprises within the Gosagroprom system fell short of delivering to the trade system 36,000 tons of toilet soap and 7,700 tons of laundry soap; the Ministry of Chemical Industry failed to deliver 85,000 tons of synthetic detergents. Breakdowns in trade worsened not only because of the failure to deliver planned amounts but also because of unrhythmical deliveries. Meanwhile, customer demand increased. In 1981 sales of such items totaled 960,000 tons; they totaled 890,000 in 1985 (although there were no trade breakdowns), 900,000 in 1986 and more than 1 million in 1988. However, even this amount was no longer sufficient.

One could and should regularly increase the production of soaps. However, there is more to it. We must also develop the production process. For example, the socialist countries produced less powder detergents and more paste goods and, which is important, items which are reciprocally complementary and not interchangeable. In our country the same powder detergent is used to clean coffee pots, wash automobiles and wash children's clothing, for specialized items precisely for such purposes are either not sold or are too expensive, making powders preferable. For many long years the availability of household washing machines has not changed—70 per 100 families—and demand for such machines is not being met.

All of this must be borne in mind when we think of increasing the production of washing detergents. However, these steps, which could yield some benefits at best in 2 to 3 years are not directly linked to the elimination of the stir. The introduction of rationing points in this case would be equally useless. Rationing the sale of goods, the normal demand for which the commercial network is essentially capable of satisfying, such as detergents or, let us say, bedding, is inefficient both from the sociopsychological and economic viewpoints. For if a person is given a rationing card, in any case, whether he needs the stipulated amount or not, he would go and buy the entire amount. To a certain extent this is already happening with sugar.

Does this mean that we are either unable or unwilling to reduce this feverish demand by regulating the sale of some commodities? Such experience is available. A classical example, if you wish, was the stir about bedding a few years back. Administrative measures (concentrating the sale of bedding in the large stores, supervised by the public, and the BKhSS, frequently with the help of mounted militia) only excited the people and increased the division of the customers between those who could take their place in line on the previous evening and buy as much as was allowed, and the rest of the public. It was only the accumulation of commodity stocks and ensuring their sale comprehensively, with no limitations, that solved the problem.

Breakdowns in trade with laundry soap and washing powders already appeared in 1979-1980. At that time the situation was normalized by significantly increasing procurements, including through imports. Imports have been increased now as well. This year some 200,000 tons of powder detergents were bought abroad. All indications are that by the second half of the year the excitement about it should substantially drop. Given the existing economic mechanism, the situation is more difficult concerning the production of inexpensive varieties of toilet soap. Here as well, however, by the year 1990 one could expect that the situation on the consumer market will be normalized.

View of **B. Bogachev**, doctor of economic sciences, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics:

Your reader L. Gulova is right: the amount of money has increased but not over the past 6 months. Symptoms of the disruption of our monetary circulation were clearly detected in the second half of the 1960s. The scarcity ranged from automobiles and cooperative apartments to furniture, carpets and crystals, initially not affecting items in daily demand or even clothing. The situation worsened subsequently. Despite the foreign currency earned from oil the overall trend was one of systematic expansion of the area of scarcity.

These processes began sharply to accelerate starting with 1986. The reasons were external and could be eliminated: reducing the import of consumer goods and the

anti-alcohol campaign (which meant blocking a traditional broad channel for money flowing into the State Bank from the population). However, there also were reasons caused by errors in the use of the new economic mechanism, which led to the avalanche-type growth of monetary income.

The sociocultural funds and, with a certain amount of inventiveness (such as the existence of a cooperative middleman) the production development funds eliminated the barriers which separated cashless from cash circulation. Now monetary income is shaped not only within the "wage" item. However, wages as well do not stand still. The second and the leasing "cost accounting models" open here a variety of loopholes which are not blocked by the directive on the link between wages and labor productivity. The directive merely intensifies the aspiration of the enterprises to eliminate from their programs inexpensive varieties, i.e., once again it aggravates the scarcity.

I believe that there is no point here in pitting sociopsychological against economic factors. The broadening of the area of shortages (economics?) intensifies requirements toward higher wages (social mentality?); paying increasingly higher salaries aggravates the scarcity. Consumer behavior is also part of the social mentality. If the scarcity is increasing, what follows? Naturally, the prices of items which are still sold freely increase. Incidentally, the stir which broke out on the subject of salt and matches was an ugly harbinger of the total breakdown of the consumer market.

Our economy has no task more urgent (something which did not occur either in 1986 or 1987) than that of streamlining the credit-monetary system. The root of the evil is found precisely in the credit system which keeps collecting surplus funds and supplies them, among others, to the state budget. I described the technical aspect of this matter in KOMMUNIST No 3 for 1989; however, this has its sociopolitical aspect as well.

The dam has broken. It cannot be patched with wet clay or gravel. Decrees and stricter standards are ineffective. All of us wish and try to have (except for the "extreme" strata—children and the retired) higher income in order to protect themselves from increases in living costs. The more desperately we fight inflation alone (or through the labor collectives), the more we assist it. The more we become interested in the procedures for division and redistribution, the lesser becomes the amount of what is available. Society has disintegrated and every person and collective, department and republic is seeking its happiness relying on its own forces, inventiveness and luck. For that reason, a strict and restrictive monetary policy, which is absolutely needed by the country, is unpopular. Governmental thinking and political will are ignored. They find no support in clearly manifested and institutionally shaped nationwide interests.

Concern for the financial situation of the country and a disrupted monetary circulation, as well as complaints

about rising prices and emptied shelves were heard in just about every speech of the deputies of the past congress. Pay attention to the logic of party, soviet and economic managers and workers who discussed the essentials of this topic: we must firmly reduce budget appropriation but in no case at the expense of our republic, oblast or sector. The mass pressure exerted by sectors, departments and local authorities is, naturally, influencing the position of the Council of Ministers and its readiness to engage in firm actions. Any further emission of money without a backing, although less than in 1988 could not be painless: we shall either have to raise prices or introduce general rationing, a point system.

Had I been a deputy and been given the floor, I would have called upon the congress to pass a resolution on reforming our banking system. Today it can only print money and inflate cashless trade. Meanwhile, the situation demands a so to say "negative emission" or, to use the scientific word, thesaurization.

The problem is solved by establishing a system for cash reserves which the banks serving the economy **must** keep in the central bank. The reserve rate (the share of mandatory available cash in the overall sum of assets) must change by decision of the central bank. The system of mandatory cash reserves (in addition to other mechanisms) makes it possible to vary the amount of money in circulation not only by increasing but also reducing it.

The suggestion of establishing a central bank independent of the Council of Ministers (not to mention the Ministry of Finance) but reporting directly to the Supreme Soviet and being responsible for the state of monetary circulation was included in the speeches delivered at the congress. I would add to this description of the functions of the central bank an explanation of the mechanisms for controlling the paper money supply.

I would also point out that "draconic measures" in the credit-monetary area, as any other action of strong economic and social policy, presume a certain amount of national consensus, a readiness to seek an agreement and concessions for the sake of unity. In my view, this is a necessary political prerequisite for an active economic system.

### **The Reader Considers, Disputes, Suggests**

**S. Kuttykadamov, candidate of technical sciences and deputy secretary of the party bureau of the Arkalyk Pedagogical Institute imeni I. Altynsarin, Kazakh SSR: Toward a democratic dialogue.**

After long years of silence, the intelligentsia has begun to raise its voice. This voice is not always even. There is no total agreement of opinions (which is both impossible and unnecessary). The unquestionable fact is that the people begin to realize the role of the intelligentsia in their lives, as was clearly seen in the results of the last elections. It is true that it may seem to some that the intelligentsia is quite refractory and its members are

being accused of lack of restraint, demagoguery or provoking among workers mistrust in the intelligentsia as a whole. I do not understand who could profit from this.

I link the renovation of society and the cleansing of the party to the strengthened role of the intelligentsia. I believe that the party's intellectual potential would enable it to be worthy of the position to which it has been enhanced by our time. That is why I look to the future with confidence.

My sympathies are on the side of the radical deputies and I understand their impatience. However, was it worth it for the participants in the heated debates at the congress so lightly to label one another with value judgments? Our democracy does not end with this congress (although it made a number of things clear). Actually, it is our most recent history begins with it. Therefore, let us learn how to defend our positions and struggle for our ideas without lowering the dignity of others, but by displaying realism, flexibility, the art of compromise and of persuasion, i.e., precisely that which is an intrinsic feature of democracy.

The deputies are the representatives of our people, largely reflecting the true variety, the polyphonic nature of social interests. All of us together must walk the difficult path of renovation and make sensible use of the potential at our disposal.

**A. Tkachenko, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent, department of scientific communism, Kharkov Polytechnical Institute imeni V.I. Lenin: How to Approach the Audience?**

I conduct a seminar for propagandists at the party raykom, teach at the evening Marxism-Leninism University and deliver lectures sponsored by the Znaniye Society. In the past our senior colleagues always emphasized that I (both as a teacher and party member) must not depart from formulations and definitions found in the party documents, in addressing a broad audience, whether this applies to the evaluation of the stages of development of Soviet society or the situation in other socialist countries and in the world at large. This requirement at that time seemed entirely reasonable for, when we join the party all of us state that we accept the CPSU program and statutes and pledge to observe them.

Today the party speaks of the need for the creative interpretation of the theoretical legacy of the classics of Marxism and of the path covered by Soviet society and the tasks we face. It is at this point that the following question arises for me and my colleagues: How to address the audience? For example, in my view, contemporary scientific data do not support the precise breakdown of historical periods in our country as stipulated in the CPSU program. The disparity may not be fundamental but still... (I shall not quote arguments on this point, for this is a separate topic). In presenting a lecture I present my views to the students. In the course of the discussion of the lecture at the meeting of the department, the views of the colleagues differed. Some found

the lecture interesting and essentially supported me, suggesting only that I provide stronger arguments. Others agreed in essence but expressed themselves in the sense that one should not discuss this topic with the students, for they may "misunderstand." Others again criticized me because my conclusions did not entirely coincide with the formulations of the basic party documents.

I am being told that I have the right and obligation to turn to the respective party authorities and raise the question of revising various concepts. This is true. But what to do today? Do I have to, as a party member, proceed in my lectures from assessments of the inaccuracy of which I am convinced? Or else should I present my view of the problems, thus conflicting with the views expressed in the party documents but remain true to myself and to my students?

In my view, this question is of an essential nature and applies to a broad circle of the propaganda activity. As it were, in our collective we were unable to reach a joint conclusion on this matter.

**S. Karapetyan, candidate of economic sciences, Moscow: The Calendar and Economics**

We know that so far no mechanism has been invented which would make it possible for "unplanned" scientific and technical ideas to fit the annual or the 5-year plans. A technology which is developed "outside of its time," but which promises benefits ranging in the hundreds of thousands of rubles, may appear but no available money for an unexpected idea can be found. At best, such an idea would be dealt with during the next 5-year period.

I anticipate the objection: What is then the purpose of sectorial reserves, both financial and material? As practical experience indicates, the reserve capacities and resources of ministries cannot give a green light to an innovation which has been born in the middle of the 5-year period, even if such an innovation would shape the future of sectorial technical policy.

But how to restructure (and not improve the efficiency, as is currently the case) of our economic management in connection with change in consumer demand if we put economic laws in noneconomic calendar boundaries, whether of 1 or 5 year duration?

The need for various types of goods and new scientific and technical possibilities appear, change and disappear by no means according to an astronomical calendar. The 5-year plan is not a target but a means of developing scientific and technical, economic and organizational measures to ensure the proportional and balanced growth of the economy. From the economic viewpoint, the 5-year plan should reflect the interested and responsible work on all management levels. It would be expedient for the plan to define the socioeconomic objectives and resources for achieving them. The pulse beat of economic life should be controlled on their basis and should efficiently regulate the financial "circulation of



the blood" in accordance with the forecasts and priorities included in the medium-range plan.

The attentive reader would ask: Does this pertain to the remaining period of the current 5-year plan? I am convinced that it does. This is because cost accounting enterprises would be unlikely to start to work efficiently and to steadily lower production outlays during this period, for long-term economic indicators (starting with 1991 and for the duration of the 13th 5-Year Plan) will be formulated on the basis of the present 5-year plan and, particularly, the results obtained in 1990. Today it is economically inexpedient to have the enterprises "work hard," for in that case it would be difficult to ensure a 3 to 5 percent annual growth during the next 5-year period.

The solution seems to lie in developing leasing. Initially the economic rates for leasing were set for short periods of time (8-15 years). The ukase "On Leasing and Leasing Relations in the USSR," having eliminated the question of the length of the leasing (currently a contract may be signed for 5, 50 or more years) has eliminated the people's fear of what will happen to them in the future. This is an initial step toward the conversion of the 5-year plan from mandatory to forecast estimates. Leasing, as a norm-free model of cost accounting, would make it possible, if necessary, to correct the 5-year plan without disrupting the stimulating force of full cost accounting and production self-management.

But why is it that even under the conditions of full cost accounting the enterprises should be bound by the date of the first day of each month, and thus engage in rushing as a result of which they come out with losses instead of profits? The main thing is not the volume of scientific and technical work and the goods produced over a specific calendar period but the precise implementation of each order within the deadlines stipulated in the contract.

**I. Potapnev, director of the Minsk Experimental Plan of the Scientific Research Institute of Casting in the Automotive Industry, candidate of technical sciences: The Collective and Creative Work; Director's Viewpoint**

Today all of us are concerned with how to eliminate stagnation phenomena in the economy faster. Heated arguments are taking place on this topic in the press and in labor collectives. I would like to express my own viewpoint and share my own thoughts on this matter, although I anticipate that by no means will everyone agree with my understanding of the problem.

Of late my colleagues—directors of other plants—and I have witnessed the following phenomenon: a growing aspiration among workers and engineering and technical personnel to earn more but work less. Before starting the workday, sometimes an exhausting bargaining session breaks out, as a result of which the people agree to perform only the operations which they find profitable. Such confrontation (which is actually a microstrike) increases the psychological load of foremen and other managers and, above all, harms the work.

The brigade forms of labor organization do not always lead to increased productivity (particularly at enterprises with a complex type of output and where steady efforts are being made to improve the produced goods). The point is that in frequent cases the brigade members begin to be gravitate toward the "average workers," or even to drop to the level of the laggards. In a number of collectives the situation develops in such a way that not the best and frontranking workers but those who work without zeal, the least skilled workers, who have difficulty mastering new technological operations, become the informal leaders.

Incidentally, on the subject of skills. Today young workers willingly engage in manual labor-intensive processes, motivated by high earnings and other benefits. In the majority of cases, earnings for such operations are higher than the wages of turners, grinders, engineers and economists. The reason for this situation is the still functioning outlay mechanism in price setting, which makes it unprofitable to engage in mechanization and automation.

This situation demands a thorough study. Are we not taking the simplest way out by involving people, the young in particular, in unskilled work? Are we not doing them a disservice by placing them essentially in the condition of technical invalids? This means a waste of the most productive creative years. Eventually, a given manual operation disappears (after it has finally been mechanized!) while the person is no longer capable of doing anything else.

Through our joint efforts we have created in industry a situation which does not contribute to the growth of labor productivity or skill improvements. This situation is further supported by a silent competition among enterprises in raising wages. For example, if a plant in the city pays between 400 and 500 rubles to a drilling worker or lathe turner, this becomes quickly known at other enterprises where workers with the same skill earn, for example, 300 rubles. At that point the latter begin to drop their output. The administration becomes accused of all sorts of sins, of lack of concern, etc. Psychologically, the people develop the feeling that they can earn their 300 rubles always and anywhere. This becomes the main reason for cadre turnover and the breakdown of the production process at plants where wages are not raised without economic substantiation. In such a situation the only solution for the management is to "show concern" by resorting to the salutary "gross output." Naturally, in that case there is no acceleration whatsoever. An impasse develops.

Such a situation, unquestionably, does not contribute to the appearance of what any collective needs the most: a creative atmosphere. Instead, it leads to constant conflicts. I do not wish to imply in the least that management is always right. Some managers are unable to suggest anything other than the need to look for the culprit, regardless of the situation. We also know of another category of directors who are totally unable to think creatively but who honor mediocrity. They are no more than "reliable soldiers" for the implementation of

instructions and are simply unable to work otherwise. It is probably natural that in numerous cases such chiefs easily find a common language with the most careless workers and engineering and technical personnel. Obviously, this is due to the fact that the level of thinking in both is roughly the same. Through joint effort they create a "vacuum" around people who are truly talented, initiative-minded and creative.

Where do I see the solution? We would hardly correct the situation simply by replacing managers. If an engineer does not submit rationalization suggestions or if he lacks authorship certificates and contemporary developments, he should let more talented specialists engage in the implementation of ideas. If a worker or a member of the engineering and technical personnel has been unable to display his capabilities in his job, the conditions themselves should force him to undergo retraining and, if necessary, change professions or, perhaps, move to another enterprise. Furthermore, in my view, we must review the attitude toward an evaluation indicator, such as job seniority. Occasionally people who, after many long years at work have done nothing or suggested anything, enjoy a labor seniority which is impeccable and unquestionable. Such seniority determines all benefits: wages, housing, pension, travel vouchers, etc.

The approach I suggest would contribute to helping a person, after retraining or transferring him to another enterprise, to find his proper place in society and become a highly skilled specialist. At that point it would become unnecessary to order the workers to attend technical training classes. Conversely, every person would want to learn. He would be interested in new developments and display initiative. In the creation of such a creative atmosphere on a national scale, the main burden, if we were to look at the Swedish experience, for instance, would fall on the trade unions. A person who is unable to find his place in the collective should be offered a job he can do by himself. He should be helped by an experienced psychologist specializing in vocational guidance. In my view, the layoff of a worker should not be considered a tragedy, as is currently the situation. In the final account, the trade unions should really assume concern for the retraining and vocational guidance of the people and see to it that they receive aid during their period of retraining.

All of this would make it possible to enhance the authority of the people who have truly become masters of their work and would clearly contribute to the struggle against drunkenness and other negative phenomena. This would be an indication of true concern for the people and their future.

**K. Vazyakov, casting shop foreman, ChEAZ, Cheboksary:  
A Moot Point**

Who could be classified today as member of the working class? We discussed this question in our shop but failed to reach a unanimous conclusion. One of the electricians, for example, said that it is only collectives which can make independent decisions and defend their interests

that should be classified as belonging to the working class. Another worker believes that plant engineers, foremen, shop chiefs and managers are not members of the working class, for they are management. Yet another said that everything depends on the origin. Views were expressed to the effect that the affiliation of a person with this class is determined by the level of his economic and moral development. If the only thing that a person worships is his salary what kind of worker is he?!

In turn, I tried to prove that it is the truly working people who are members of the working class. They could be peasants, lessees, painters or poets who live with the interests and concerns of the working people, actors (who also work!), foremen, deputies elected by the people themselves, and so on.

Everyone clearly realizes that the working class today is considerably different from what it was by the turn of the century, shall we say. Nonetheless, who belongs to it? I would like to read in *KOMMUNIST* the view of scientists on this subject.

**From the editors.** This question is legitimate and topical. One of the prime topics which will be discussed in *KOMMUNIST* includes contemporary approaches to the study of the social structure of our society.

**V. Semenikhin, workshop teacher, Moscow Secondary School No 805: Are We Following the Right Way?**

I was motivated to write by concern caused by the fact that shortcomings in the present school will remain for quite some time, for so far nothing has been done to eliminate the reasons which cause them. We know that the main among them is the tremendous overloading of secondary school students. Hence excessive fatigue, hypodynamia, and various diseases. We are ignoring a guideline for the educator, such as the comprehensive consideration of the possibilities and needs of the students, based on their age group. Yet they must not be reduced to satisfying curiosity and nothing else!

Parents and physicians are particularly concerned by the enrollment of 6-year old children, who can be trained faster. However, this step requires a special system for work and recreation, organized dormitories, playrooms and nutrition. Our present educational system is unable to accomplish this. The country is short of school buildings, not to mention the failure in meeting hygiene standards; more than 22 percent of all students go to school in the second shift and several tens of thousands, even the third.

What is the solution suggested by the USSR State Committee for Public Education? "...To start school at the age of 6 or 7, depending on the level of development and the natural capabilities of the child, bringing the children together, with no additional conditions." On the surface this seems quite sensible. However, we need a criterion in determining if the child is mature enough to go to school and the ability to apply such criteria. Yet

we lack both. Furthermore, practical experience indicates that a 6-year old is not equal to a 7-year old in everything and that the difference between them will remain huge. The suggestion is to teach them together, without any additional conditions, i.e., without organizing a special system for the 6-year old.

It is obvious that this decision is consistent with the old logic: once again we are ready to sacrifice the health of the children. Yet a solution was found a long time ago: we must take into consideration the ability to learn and the habits of self-training. Contemporary society offers tremendous opportunities for the independent use of various sources of information, including computers. Structuring education on the basis of this principle will save time, particularly in the senior classes, and will raise the question of the justification of an 11-year stay in school and highlight the real ways of solving pressing problems.

### Following the Press

Those who follow our issues will probably recall that the last issue of *KOMMUNIST* for 1988 was unusual. Its theme was suggested by the readers themselves: it was an attempt to depict the daily and comprehensive dynamics of social thinking. The issue consisted of articles and other materials published in a great variety of publications, from plant newspapers to academic journals with a relatively small circulation. How did our readers welcome this idea? Judging by the letters to the editors, with a great deal of approval. "Thank you for the unexpected and original gift of No 18" (V. Sutyagin, Obninsk, Kaluga Oblast). "This is good, for a wide range of readers are thus given the opportunity to learn about the situation elsewhere. I believe that such practices should be continued" (V. Darmayev, Ulan-Ude). "In my view, this helps to renovate the journal. The local press, under such close attention, would become more militant and freer" (A. Struk, Volgograd Oblast).

Characteristically, for example, the article by Novosibirsk scientist S. Goldin "The Perestroyka of Science and the Science of Perestroyka" triggered the response of colleagues from Moscow (A. Gorbachev, candidate of technical sciences), Rostov-na-Donu (V. Sviridov, candidate of geological and mineralogical sciences), Kaliningrad (B. Lagosha, doctor of economic sciences) and others. Doctor of Medical Sciences O. Bokser from Ivanovo notes with particular satisfaction that "such an article dealing with such a difficult topic was written not in Moscow or Leningrad but by a scientist working in Siberia."

It appears that this issue of *KOMMUNIST* enabled some readers to familiarize themselves with various articles published in their own local press. "Your correspondent Comrade Dzyuba writes that..." is the way T. Rudenko (Voroshilovgrad) begins his letter discussing the article by that Ukrainian author, "Do We Consider National Culture in Its Integral Aspect?"

It would be strange to expect 100 percent unanimity in the assessments given by the readers. The letters vary in terms of content and topic. Some of them show categorical support: "I fully agree with the author of that article and believe that we must get to work. Uzbek agriculture can supply quality products not only to the republic's population but to many other parts of our country," writes Ye. Tadzhiyev (Tashkent) on the article by I. Bogdanov "Learn the Truth." Yet K. Bedrintsev, K. Lapkin and E. Yusupov, also from Uzbekistan, consider this article to be "extremely tendentious, with negative views... in interpreting the republic's socioeconomic life." The same applies to the article by M. Gefter "Russia and Marx," in which the gamut of responses ranges from unconditional approval (V. Kozubovich, Vitebsk) to an equally sharp rejection (L. Fedorova, Novocherkassk). Yu. Matyushin (Moscow) does not like the fact that the article by M. Gefter and the "extremely liberal note by V.I. Vernadskiy... are presented by the journal as they are, as though not requiring any profound and comprehensive study." A similar accusation is voiced by M. Stolyar (Naberezhnyye Chelny) in commenting on the article by V. Spirin "Management Paradoxes:" "The author asks the readers to provide an answer. Why should they worry about it? Had Comrade Spirin presented his own program...."

The materials in that issue triggered in many readers the desire to share their own thoughts. For example, in responding to the article by V. Keshelava "Trapped by Postdogmatism," engineer B. Izmalkov describes his own view of democratization and the difficult and complex processes of the organization of our social system. D. Kozlenko from Odessa is interested in the mechanism for protecting the citizens from violations of the law by the state authorities. His letter is a response to materials on the roundtable sponsored by *KOMMUNIST* ESTONII on the problems of creating a law-governed state.

The readers' approval of the very concept of this issue was active and interested. They have sent us, with a request to print in *KOMMUNIST*, cuttings from those same newspapers and issues of journals which we here, in Moscow, do not always have the opportunity to look at (including the local newspaper NEFT PRIOBYA or the interscholastic newspaper NATISK, published in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk). This proves that the interpretation of topical problems and the search for new solutions are increasingly becoming a vital need in all parts of the country and on all social levels.

We intend to continue to publish materials which appeared in the local and generally inaccessible publications, which are of important social interest. In the search for such materials we are relying on the help and advice of our readers. In this connection, we look with particularly great attention at republic journals similar to ours. In this issue we are offering excerpts from articles published in *KOMMUNIST AZERBAIDZHANA* No 4

for 1989. What attracted us in this case was the choice of a topic and the very formulation of the topic of discussion.

**I. Mamed-Zade, candidate of philosophical sciences, head of the department of ethics and esthetics, Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and Law, and N. Safarov, candidate of philosophical sciences, senior scientific associate at the same institute: Faith and the Moral Renovation of Society**

A certain range of research topics has been established in philosophical-ethical literature and so have approaches to their consideration. The topic of faith is not included. We are not referring to the phenomenon of religious faith and its role in the moral shaping of mankind but of nonreligious forms and, in particular, of moral faith, although usually the word "faith" is associated with religion.

Currently a process is taking place of rejection of the old dogma that faith can be only fanatical and blind. Even if we were to allow that in some cases religious faith could be fanatical, we also know of cases of believers who have created brilliant. This was accomplished not only with the help of both talent and faith. Here as well the most important indicator is not religion but something inherent in man himself, his "inner strength," and ability to display his own "I," the wealth of this "I." In order to explain our concept let us emphasize the following: fanatical faith in God actually coexists not with the faith of a genius but, for example, with the collective faith of the people in Stalin, in the 1930s and 1940s. This comparison enables us to note that what matters most in faith is what to believe and who to believe and not who the believer is. We must acknowledge that all monotheistic religions have had a well-developed apparatus for individual and collective influence. It was this, in the final account, that led to the fact that Western Christianity in the 20th century granted excessive trust to the individual in choosing his form of influence. An individual with a clearly expressed personal position began to accept religious maxims only as they applied to his own "I," and faith became a profoundly intimate matter, a matter of conscience. It was essentially thus that it began to contribute to the more profound shaping of the personality and, perhaps, to a certain extent stopped being Christian and became the personal faith of that same individual.

The possible "withering away" of religious faith does not mean that man does not need any faith, which was, incidentally, what we thought. At best, it was conceived that faith would become nonreligious: faith in communism, in a better future. For a long time we proceeded from the fact that faith can be replaced with and absorbed by conviction. Therefore, the presumed hypothesis was the following: in order for the convictions of the individual to be effective and not of short duration and not depend on the latest "leader," they should be based on a personal moral faith. Convictions are an alloy of knowledge with faith but a special, an inner faith, a

faith in one's "uniqueness," (may this neologism of ours be forgiven), faith in personal dignity and the possibility to display all this. Publications on ethics include a number of studies on problems of convictions but they discuss very little the fact that our moral convictions have undergone serious erosion and no mention in general is made of faith. Actually, there has been substantially less "faith" in our theoretical use of concepts. However, does this mean that this is the way the situation should be or else are we ignoring some processes in society which dogmatic ethics, with its initial knowledge of what is good (instruction "from above") and what is evil, was simply unable to explain? The obvious spiritual stagnation peremptorily confirms the former, that "such is the way it should be," and, therefore, that the discussion should deal with the nonreligious forms of faith and the need within society of a personal faith.

Perestroyka processes are taking place in the country. It is true that they are proceeding with difficulty. This is not astounding, for during the periods of the cult of personality, arbitrariness and stagnation, the masses largely lost their faith in the ability of many members of the superior power echelons to reflect the interests of the people. Today, when the party leadership is trying to intensify perestroyka, it is encountering a certain moral and psychological obstruction: mistrust. Today many are those who theoretically substantiate "by the nature of their jobs" perestroyka and publicly support it but in their trusted circle they speak of its groundlessness. Is this not one of the sore spots in the moral life of society and the individual?

It is difficult to say why to this day the question of faith is looked upon with a great deal of skepticism and irony. Any philosopher would be ready to discuss as much as one likes religious faith but, for some reason, researchers remain silent on the subject that without a personal moral belief there can be no convictions. One can only assume that one of the reasons for such silence is vulgar sociologism, indifference to man and his inner world and mental features, and his right to make a personal choice. In other words, it is not a question of guiding instructions issued by superiors and the right to one's own opinion but also the fact that there is a certain inner mechanism in society which opposes this right and its individual characteristics.

Unfortunately, the science of ethics is still only trying to verbalize the truth, to "issue" standards and categories regardless of the real life of the people and their interrelationships. We dare to suggest that the weakening of our convictions is largely due to the fact that they have not affected the inner world of the individual and his interests. That is precisely why we ignore the role of faith which today, as always, has been related to the inner, the private world. Naturally, the viewpoint that convictions prevail over faith triggers at least the following questions: a. Is the psychological role of faith denied? b. Will there be a further increase in the future of the scorn for this concept? c. Are true convictions always based on social experience?



The development of such questions implies the answer concerning the psychological role of faith, which has been of the greatest possible significance in the historical destinies of any society. This applies to faith as a strictly "human" phenomenon which strengthens the will and supports the moral firmness of the individual and the fact that convictions themselves without all this inevitably become dogmatic and lose their link with reality. It is not excluded that faith could be blind and fanatical ("Stalin is the greatest leader of all times and nations"). The fact that more than enough has already been written and said on this subject is a different matter. Our faith (naturally, this may be a paradox but generations of people had faith in convictions which could not be considered theirs in the full meaning of the term, for they had been "issued" from above) was based on a foundation of knowledge. It was precisely based and we literally forgot that knowledge could be false and may not coincide with the objective course of the historical process.

The pitting of convictions as the area of the rational against faith as an emotional phenomenon is unjustified. "The role of convictions in the life of a person is stronger the closer they are to the complex range of moral feelings" (L.M. Arkhangelskiy, *"Marksistskaya Etika"* [Marxist Ethics]. Moscow, 1985, p 83). At least on the purely theoretical level there are no sufficient grounds to pit the predominance of either concept over the other. What happens on the level of mass awareness?

Despite the theoretical elaborations of philosophers, faith is a mental and emotional phenomenon, organically inherent in the world of man and man is unlikely to abandon it. Without it, would he remain man at all? Many of our contradictions, which involve various forms of deviations from behavioral standards, alcoholism, drug addiction, depreciation of morality, sociopathological moods, i.e., anything which could be described as a decline of mores, could entirely be the result of the undermining and loss of moral faith. The most painful turned out to be the loss of faith in one's own forces, in the possibility of changing anything in society with the help of one's own mind and feelings. In our view, a great deal here depended on the fact that socialism appeared in a country with an average capitalist development, in which individual areas, relatively well-developed industrially, were mixed with huge areas which were totally unfamiliar not only with capitalist but even with earlier social relations. Socialism began to be built on the principles of mass development, equality for all, and the need to abandon one's interests and features. Essentially, at that time for the majority it was a question of replacing faith in God with faith in communism. However, this faith as well proved to be extremely abstract and, in turn, was replaced by faith in Stalin.

Despite the fact that political and economic relations were directed toward denying the personal features of man and converting him into a cog in the state machinery, it was impossible to stop the development of such processes. The fact that an enthusiasm for various sects, drug addictions, and so on, surreptitiously

appeared, is a different matter. In his time E. Fromm wrote: "...If the economic, social and political conditions on which the entire process of human individualization depends failed to lay a foundation for the self-expression of man's individuality... and if, at the same time, people have broken their initial ties which gave them their inner stability, in such a case freedom becomes an unbearable burden.... The people do everything possible to abandon this kind of freedom and go into a world of subordination or any other type of relations with man and the world which promise freedom from uncertainty, even by depriving the individual of his freedom."

The loss of faith in a sensible organization of social life, directed at man, is reality. Loss of faith could be equated with the spiritual tragedy of man. It was no accident that J.-P. Sartre said: "However profound faith may be, it is never complete. It must be constantly supported or, in any case, we must prevent its destruction" (J.-P. Sartre: *"Words."* Moscow, 1966, p 145).

There are substantial reasons to believe that the destruction of faith is the direct path leading to the type of relations in life such as moral nihilism. In practice, lack of faith leads to the loss of clear moral guidelines and a perspective in life, as well as a feeling of uselessness of one's own existence and of one's surroundings. Moral nihilism is manifested most frequently in the form of the rejection of moral values and locking oneself tight within one's own little world.

It would be erroneous to speak of moral nihilism only in a negative light, for it is a quite well-known fact that under certain circumstances this is a means of preserving personal freedom and nonparticipation in an imposed system of interrelationships among people. Such was the case, for example, of those who during the period of stagnation had chosen the least possible evil: to abandon involvement with what was taking place and with existing "views," and even less so to defend them. Under such circumstances, the individual breaks his ties with the prevailing social morality and the development of society is conceived by him as something outside his self-development. Nonetheless, moral nihilism is the philosophy of those who have lost their faith. Nihilism, with its revision of old values, means skepticism and egocentric arbitrary behavior and desperate individualistic willfulness. The fact that some individuals are able, with this type of stance, to acquire a relatively inner freedom does not in itself mean that such freedom can be gained by all. As practical experience of the period of stagnation proved, moral nihilism can distort the spiritual development of the individual. It led to the exaggeration of personal interests, social apathy, the dulling of moral feelings and the lack of true ideals and thus to a rejection of inner freedom and responsibility for one's own destiny. No one denies that in moral nihilism, as a way of making personal choice one should "blame" above all specific social relations and imperfections in moral life. The fact that such relations blossomed for quite some time in our country, however, indicates the "culpability" of individual nihilisms.

It can be said that in recent years, a type of personality has developed in society essentially motivated by conformism and a low standard of spiritual demands and, conversely, excessive and unjustified material requirements (i.e., not based on labor results and independent of the latter). There has been a deformation, a serious confusion within the "capability-need" system. All of this not only shows a clear danger, and not only for the individual, but also adversely affects the "appearance" and development of morality, for any moral system developed by people exists in the activities of the people for it is from the stance of every person that, perhaps albeit to an insignificant extent, the standard of morality depends.

The process of perestroika and its pace also depend on how soon all of us will reject nihilism and restore faith in ourselves and within ourselves. In frequent cases a reassessment of values is a painful process. It may lead to the popularization of philistinism, conspicuous consumption and hedonism, with the classical stipulation that "that which brings pleasure and leads to pleasure is good." At the present time, however, ethics must either abandon the bare criticism of such an attitude toward the world or else, along with criticism, undertake to study social relations which reproduce such a personal viewpoint.

Regaining what we have lost (meaning faith) does not mean in the least promoting some kind of imaginary wisdom on the part of the people "whose feelings and thoughts," according to Lenin, "are based on the social environment," which is the material, the object of the spiritual life of the individual, reflected in such "thoughts and feelings" positively or negatively (see "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works, vol 1, p 423]). We need faith in man and his capabilities, in his "I." Since morality is oriented toward interpreting the world from the positions of "good and evil," lack of faith becomes evil, for in frequent cases it leads to the dehumanizing and depersonalizing of man. We do not exaggerate in the least by considering it a serious problem in the solution of which not the last role is played by ethics or the entire system of ideological work and the need to renovate the instruments for shaping a spiritually developed personality.

### After Publication in KOMMUNIST

Our journal has repeatedly addressed itself in its publications to the plan for developing petroleum and natural gas-chemical complexes in Tyumen Oblast (KOMMUNIST Nos 2, 5 and 8, 1989). As instructed by the government, the USSR Academy of Sciences Economics Department Bureau considered the question of the expediency of such construction.

The resolution which was passed on the basis of the reports submitted by the commissions of the Department of Economics and the USSR Academy of Sciences Siberian Department, notes, among others, that the level of output of plastics in our country, including construction plastics, is considerably short of the needs of the national economy. The fixed assets in the chemical industry require accelerated updating. Every year we are spending 1.3 billion

rubles in foreign currency to import synthetic chemicals. The solution to this situation is seen both in the reconstruction of existing capacities as well as in building new enterprises. Taking into consideration the high material-intensiveness of such production, the resolution stipulates, giving priority to the building of new production capacities in petroleum and natural gas extraction areas appears substantiated. However, even under such circumstances a one-sided orientation toward the accelerated building of five huge petroleum and gas-chemical complexes in Tyumen Oblast would seem unjustified. This project is unrealistic from both the economic and the social viewpoints. Its implementation is assessed at 41 billion rubles. However, even this amount, which has been substantially lowered, means a scale of diverting investment resources and an increase in foreign indebtedness which would significantly exceed the country's real possibilities. The implementation of this project would lead to a slowing down and, subsequently, total interruption of the process of replacing obsolete equipment at functioning petroleum and gas-chemical enterprises, the economic standard and working conditions in which are sources of growing social tension. Furthermore, the extreme load placed on the regional investment complex would block other opportunities for reducing losses of hydrocarbon raw materials in Tyumen Oblast, the implementation of which could be undertaken immediately.

The document draws attention to the fact that the scientists from the USSR Academy of Sciences Department of Economics were not asked to participate in drafting the resolutions on the Tyumen complexes. In the case of projects of a similar scale this cannot be considered normal. The Department of Economics received technical and economic substantiations (TEO) only for the Tobolsk and Surgut areas and even they applied only to the first parts of the construction project. This creates the appearance of a reduction in costs compared to the amounts planned in the government's resolution. Considering such partial information there could not even be a question of any substantiated decisions. Work on all parts of the construction project is necessary.

Also questionable are the suggestions submitted by foreign participants in the project, the resolution notes. According to information supplied by the USSR Foreign Economics Bank, their contribution to the capitalization during the period of building the Tobolsk and Surgut complexes would be \$120 million, or less than 1.5 percent of outlays for the creation of the first sections. The procedure for supplying the remaining funds of the overall contribution reported by the consortium—\$540 million—has not been specified so far. The building of the complexes presumes obtaining substantial foreign loans with Soviet government guarantees. The overall volume of foreign exchange loans given to the Soviet Union would total \$4.7 billion. Even with the strictest possible observance of the construction schedule and commodity procurements, the foreign exchange debt for the two complexes would be \$4.4 billion by 1995. Total repayment (including interest) would amount to \$6.9

billion, including \$2.2 billion in interest. Furthermore, the consortium is demanding a 30 percent share of all profits. The production of high-grade plastics, which are particularly needed by the country, has been postponed for the subsequent part of the construction, which should be financed out of foreign exchange earned from exports. This means that we could hope for any actual foreign exchange returns only after the year 2000-2005. Even this, however, is no more than an assumption, for the projected price dynamics for exported goods has been developed superficially and the possibility that the complexes will convert to full foreign exchange self-support triggers serious doubts.

Let us also note, the resolution stipulates, that the completion of the Tobolsk and Surgut complexes will be hindered because of the lack of available power capacities. By 1995, even without the building of the petroleum and gas-chemical complexes, the electric power balance of the Tyumen power system will be stressed. According to Minenergo, by then a shortage of capacities totaling 1.3 million kilowatts is expected here.

The resolution also emphasizes that whereas the Tobolsk site does not trigger objections as the place for building the joint enterprise, providing that currency-financial, technical, varietal, ecological and other questions have been solved, the building in Surgut will involve drastic cost increases. This area is characterized by significant disproportions between industrial and social developments. For example, 17,200 of the 60,000 petroleum workers working here are waiting for housing. In accordance with the "Housing-2000" Program, during the 13th 5-year period a total of 1,695,000 square meters of housing should be completed in Surgutskiy Rayon for people employed in the petroleum industry. Because of the Surgut Complex this construction volume will be reduced to 1 million square meters. The capacities of the Surgutneftepromstroy, Surgutgazstroy and Surgutneftegazstroyindustriya have already been excluded from the social programs. The technical and economic specifications of the Surgut Complex do not adequately reflect the problems of outside transportation facilities and the prompt creation of local construction facilities to meet industrial needs and ensure the development of the social infrastructure, which makes the timely completion of the complex problematical. Meanwhile, the very first year after completing the construction of the Tobolsk and Surgut complexes, payments on loans would total \$518 million. Also worrisome are the ecological assessments cited in the TEO for the Surgut Complex. They clearly ignore the present ecological load in the area, the adverse effect of production facilities and the specific emissions of the complex itself. The question of armatures, metal structures and pipes suitable for work in a northern climate, without which the efficient and safe work of the enterprises is simply impossible, has been totally ignored. One of the consequences of the building of the complex is the threat to the implementation of the plan by the fuel and energy sectors. Competition for construction capacities will increase and so will cadre turnover, triggered by the impossibility of providing equal labor conditions in the chemical and petroleum-gas industries.

Taking all of this into consideration, the USSR Academy of Sciences Department of Economics Bureau considers the simultaneous building of five extremely large petroleum and gas-chemical complexes in Tyumen Oblast as exceeding the fiscal possibilities of the country, unsecured with investment resources, and deems that the USSR Council of Ministers resolution should be annulled. Nonetheless, the work of the commissions on the problem of developing petroleum and gas-chemical complexes in Tyumen Oblast should continue, paying particular attention to the search for alternate choices for reducing losses in hydrocarbon raw materials, and finding efficient ways of meeting the needs of the domestic market with high-grade plastics and a stricter evaluation of the conditions and forms of foreign economic cooperation.

### Correspondence With Readers

Frequently in letters to the editors the readers call for improving the aspect of the journal and, in particular, making its cover more attractive. We fully agree with this formulation of the question. But here is what we were recently told by Izdatelstvo Pravda: "As reported by the USSR Minlesprom Main Production Administration, and by resolution of the supervisory authorities, because of the difficult ecological situation which has developed in Penza, starting with 1 January 1990 the Mayak Revolyutsii Paper Mill, which is the only domestic manufacturer of colored jacket paper, has been forbidden to use dyes. For that reason, the factory will accept orders from publishing houses for 1990 for white cover paper exclusively."

A great deal was said at the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet about the catastrophic situation in the printing and paper industries. This applies to all types of publications, regardless of departmental affiliation. We must apologize to the readers for the fact that because of circumstances independent of the editors, we shall be unable to meet their wishes next year.

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## SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

### This Unyielding School

18020017j Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 11, Jul 89 (signed to press 17 Jul 89) pp 78-88

[Article by Valentin Vasilyevich Kumarin, doctor of pedagogical sciences]

[Text] Last March UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA summed up the results of its extensive survey. Answers were received from 2,882 people, aged 14 to 86. They noticed no changes in the school: it is what it was.

Why is it that despite all efforts a cure for school troubles cannot be found? Many people believe that it is a matter of poor material condition of schools and teachers and

the opposition to the new and to innovations on the part of convinced supporters of the administrative-command style. Success would be guaranteed if we could provide the necessary material standard and smoke out the bureaucrats. Yes, such problems must be solved. However, what is ignored is the question of restructuring the training and education process. The fact that this is the main problem for the educators is realized today by many people. One of the essential conclusions reached by the authors of said survey, based on the summation of the answers, is that it is necessary to formulate a clear pedagogical view, a kind of pedagogical philosophy of training and education.

Could it be, the reader will ask, that in 5 years of reform they have been unable to determine what to restructure and how to do it? What were the educators doing at their professional congress? The answer lies in the words of the chairman of the All-Union Council for Public Education, V.A. Karakovskiy, who was elected at the congress: "...Perhaps the most amazing and paradoxical has been that problems of training and education were discussed the least at the congress."

Before trying to understand the direction which must be taken in the structure of the training and education process in secondary schools, let us take a short trip into the history of education.

### The Disabled Bird

I had the opportunity to attend the lecture by Georgiy Vasilyevich Gasilov, our oldest practicing educator and a major theoretician and innovator in the true meaning of the term. In particular, he described the way in 1935 A.S. Bubnov, who had replaced A.V. Lunacharskiy as people's commissar of education, assigned him to spend 3 months with Makarenko in Kharkov.

"Andrey Sergeyevich had read '*Pedagogical Poem*,' and declared to the collegium of the RSFSR People's Commissariat of Education: 'We are looking for the theory of communist education—here it is!' and he pointed at this book, which is now familiar to the entire world. 'I am assigning Gasilov to Kharkov. Let him look at everything, study everything and report as though in the confessional'."

Georgiy Vasilyevich recalls the way Makarenko, who was very unemotional, even laughed with pleasure when, in answer to the question of how, in Gasilov's opinion, the school was different from the commune, he heard the following: "The commune is a normal healthy bird with two wings. One wing is training and the other education. So, the bird can fly. So far, our school has only one wing—training. It cannot fly. All it can do is drag itself."

The inventor of this disabled bird was well-known: the German philosopher and educator Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841). At the very turn of the 19th century he published his fundamental work "*General Pedagogy Based On the Objective of Education*." In this work he formulated and comprehensively substantiated

a concept which was described as "educational training." According to this concept, the main concern of the educator is the "range of thoughts" of his students, "for it is from thoughts that feelings come and from them come principles and actions." Herbart considered books the source of thinking: "Therefore, the true nucleus of our spiritual life cannot be confidently developed either by practical experience or by contacts with people. Naturally, teaching enters more profoundly the workshop of convictions."

Supported by the Prussian officialdom, which could not fail to be seduced by the simple and inexpensive prescription for the solution of complex educational problems, the Herbart movement rapidly spread in Germany and, soon afterwards, entered the other countries of Europe and Russia, and sunk roots on the American continent.

For several decades "educational training" dominated almost without a challenge the school policies of many countries. Emulating the German models had become the standard of social life. It was in the German style that military institutions were created; German stereotypes were used to redo national education and the schools. In France, for example, university professors proclaimed the following: "Give the sixth graders good Latin themes and you will see how our country will rise again." However, years passed and the miracle awaited so impatiently by all did not occur. Furthermore, not only in other countries but also in Germany itself voices of discontent began to be heard with increasing frequency. It was said that the expansion of curriculums coincided with a weakening of knowledge and with an alarming worsening of test results. Educators and parents complained that the students were overloaded and that the children's health was deteriorating.

Here is a curious historical fact: the first to note the faultiness of the Herbart system was K.D. Ushinskiy. He had lived in Switzerland from 1862 to 1867, from where he had traveled to other European countries to study education theories and school practices. Education, monopolized by Herbart's numerous followers, triggered a drastically negative reaction in Ushinskiy. Noting that education through training excessively emphasized the mental development of school students, while the importance of physical development was only stated, he bitterly complained that in the Russian schools, influenced by Herbart, matters were even worse: "...No education can so terribly destroy the balance of the organism of the child and no single such system irritates the nervous system of children so gravely as our own in Russia. In our country the entire attention is focused exclusively on studies and the best children spend their entire time only in reading in order to learn, and learning to read, without testing and exercising their forces and their will in any kind of independent activity, even in clearly and intelligibly describing, albeit in words alone, that which they had learned or read; from an early age they turn into some kind of dreaming passive beings which keep intending to live but who never live, always preparing for



activities but forever remaining dreamers.... The development of the mind and the total helplessness of character and the ability to understand everything and dream about everything (I cannot even use the word think) and the inability to do anything are the result of such an upbringing."

The reliance of the Herbart supporters on the educational power of training was openly mocked by Ushinskiy: neither knowledge of botany and zoology nor familiarity with the works of Focht and Molechotte would have helped Gogol's town governor to turn into an honest official and even if instructed in all the secrets of organic chemistry or political economy, Pavel Ivanovich Chichikov would have remained an intriguer, very harmful to society. According to Ushinskiy, there are three determining forces which interact within man: the mind, the feelings and practical activities. He considered such a classification entirely scientific and appealed that all philippics, raised against him by Herbart's followers, be ignored. Hence the natural conclusion that in shaping the moral aspect of a person these forces must mandatorily participate, each one in its own way. None of them can replace the other. Therefore, "educational training," as some kind of synthesizing means of influencing school students, was an obvious stupidity.

The very first documents of the Soviet system on problems of building the new school proclaimed a total break with obsolete theoretical concepts. In particular, the "Fundamental Principles of the Unified Labor School" clearly indicated the inadmissibility of reducing educational work to training: "Progressive education calls for paying particular attention to the educational functions of the school which, of late, have been sacrificed to training. The mind was given priority and developing a character and will-power were ignored." Elsewhere they said: "Nonetheless, since in training a high role must be assigned to the individualized methods, in education the most splendid task is that of creating a school collective...."

Very regretfully, the concept of the socialist school, developed by A.V. Lunacharskiy and N.K. Krupskaya, which was approved by V.I. Lenin, was not implemented. The school was taken back to the track of the old high school and, therefore, of "educational training," which it has followed to this day.

### Will the Bird Take Off?

Naturally, it will, it is bound to. However, we must act in such a way that finally the second wing of our school bird is healed. Above all, we must strictly determine what it is that distinguishes education from training and what are both the theoretical and practical conclusions in terms of the schools, that stem from such distinction.

It is common knowledge that the essence of training consists of imparting and mastering knowledge, including conceptual, moral, ideological-political, legal and esthetic. Taking into consideration the essence of training naturally presumes that the training process in the Soviet school should advance toward systematic

individualization, and that the lesson should be freed from anything which hinders the solution of its main problem. To train (not educate!) a person is not only much easier but also more productive. And although we cannot achieve the ideal, we shall never have one, not to mention several, teachers per student, for the very logic of upgrading the efficiency of training is quite clear. The more profound becomes individualization, which is secured by setting up classes based on the level of the capacity to learn and giving the right to the student to choose his subjects, the more controlled will be the training process and the fuller and more durable will be the acquired knowledge.

The organization of the learning process becomes the decisive factor in achieving education objectives, such as shaping within every school student a positive attitude toward school work, developing his capabilities and strengthening his belief in his own forces.

Education is a different matter. The main thing here is shaping the character and developing convictions and the habits of socially worthy behavior.

From the viewpoint of Marxist-Leninist theory, the process of shaping convictions must mandatorily include a stage of actual life practice. Knowledge, conceptual, ideological-political and moral knowledge above all, must be comprehensively supported by practical experience, the practice of relations in society and work for the good of society. If this stage is assigned a secondary role and if the main role is assigned to books and words in the course of the educational process, there cannot even be a question of developing true convictions.

"We tortured our young people with sermons," M.S. Gorbachev said at the 20th Komsomol Congress. "Yet it is only by participating in the political process, and in all matters pertaining to life and society, that one could become a true fighter for Lenin's cause, for socialism, and grow up both as a human being and politically. I do not deny that lectures and instruction are a necessary stage in life, particularly for the young person. However, it is not they which, in the final account, shape the personality."

As a rule, the formulation of the question of differences in the essential parts of training and education are those which trigger the greatest possible opposition. Here is one of the most frequently encountered objections: "In 'Anti-Duhring,' Engels describes basic materialistic views. Yet we, teachers, in teaching this material in class, should not shape materialistic views. Is this not an educational process? How then should teachers of biology and chemistry and, finally, history and the social sciences work?" Many people may find this objection just. They would fail to notice that here and in similar cases the concept is changed: instruction is equated with education while knowledge, fully consistent with the logic of "educational training" is equated with views and convictions.

Like all components of dialectical unity, neither training nor education can exist in their absolutely pure aspect.

Training always involves elements of education and education, elements of training.

Let us imagine the following picture: lesson in the first grade. The teacher asks and the children answer.

"You, Ivanov, why do you not raise your hand? Once again, have you not been listening? Look at the way the others work. Oksana has already solved three problems while you are still working on the first."

Ivanov shudders. A great feeling of shame makes this frail figure hug the hateful desk.

"What makes her decide that I was not listening," Ivanov thinks sadly yet hatefully. "I listened, I listened all the time, but I could not understand."

Meanwhile, the lesson goes on. Having given the class its assignment, the teacher steps toward Ivanov. There is lots of scribbling on the page of the notebook: the child has obviously tried. The teacher sighs. In addition to Ivanov there are four other such students in the class. They too scribble on their notebooks something senseless and their eyes beg not for a praise, which is so generously distributed among others, but perhaps for tolerance.

But what can this teacher, who sees and understands everything, do? Should she be broken hearted as she looks at those begging eyes? Should she punish herself for her helplessness in changing anything in the life of those children? She has already tried to help them individually, both in class and after class. It is not enough. In class there is no time to work with individual students and after class, as it were, the children fall asleep from fatigue.

It is thus that the first months of school pass. It is now clear to everyone that Ivanov and four others are unable to march in step with the rest of the class. The laggards themselves realize this. Difficulty at home is added to difficulty in class: for the time being they have received no failing grade but alarming notes are being sent by the teacher and the innumerable corrections of errors in the notebooks do not foretell anything good.

By the end of the school year it becomes clear that the five first graders had vainly hoped for a miracle. Their knowledge has remained zero. According to the instruction of the former USSR Ministry of Education, they will not be allowed to repeat the first grade. They will move on to the second, even without such knowledge. But what happens then? A person cannot live without joy and, finally, without hope for happiness. But if there is no happiness in school it means that it should be sought somewhere else. They seek eagerly, escaping the sadness, the killing loneliness and lack of understanding. The moment they have found it, it is virtually certain that by then they already have a file in the children's department of the militia. It is thus that the circle is closed and a base for faulty education created. It is thus that a social problem develops from a school problem.

An experiment was made in Donetsk Oblast, between 1975 and 1980. Students who had fallen behind after their first year of school were put together in separate classrooms. Ninety percent of the group attending the new classes consisted of boys! This is clearly not unusual, particularly if we bear in mind that according to court statistics, the almost identical percentage of criminals are male and 80 percent of them are school dropouts after 5-6 or a maximum 7 years of "covering the curriculum."

In setting up special classes for slower children, the experimenters were not governed by malice. They were governed by the instruction clearly formulated in the "Fundamental Principles of the Uniform Labor School:" "The institution of separate classes for failing students is mandatory in any properly organized school."

The process of the rehabilitation of the children was difficult and, in some cases, painfully slow. The notes in the diary of Vera Stepanovna Tikhonenko, teacher at School No 34 in Mariupol reads as follows: 20 September. In class Yura B. does not work. His only answer to my questions is: I do not want to, I will not. 11 October. Today Yura wrote two sentences. What will happen next? He loves to look at pictures and figures. If he is given the opportunity to do so, he begins to talk to himself with pleasure and begins to smile. 22 December. Yura worked at the blackboard. I praised him in front of the class in the presence of the school's head of education and the head of the rayon department of education. The boy returned to his desk with unusually firm steps. For the rest of the lesson he kept looking at me and at the students on the blackboard. At home he said that he had been given a four, although I had not graded him. An hour later, breathing heavily from her haste and emotion, Yura's grandmother showed up at the school. Was it true that her grandson was given a good grade? I decided to keep up with the legend. The grandmother did not know how to thank me, she begged me "not to let Yura out of my hands." 6 May. He was the first to complete an independent work in arithmetic. Not a single error! In our school such successes are noted with a small red flag which the child can wear alongside his Octobrist Star. Now I can already consider that the main thing has been done: the child has developed faith in himself. 18 May. Yura passed a controlled test in mathematics with grade 5. The old problems have been solved. Henceforth Yura will be facing the same requirements as children in an ordinary class. He will not be rated an excellent student but nor will he be among the laggards.

The forecast of the teacher turned accurate. In the third quarter of the third school year, Yura had passing grades in all subjects and had a five in mathematics. The situation with the other children was the same or similar. All of them regained their joy of learning, the joy of life.

In order to determine who are the friends of the children of these "special" classes, and what was the reason for such friendships, a survey was made. In addition to good

relations within the classroom itself, everyone had friends at home, some of whom were excellent students. It never occurred to anyone that one of them may be attending an unusual class. Friendship was friendship. As is the case with children, it was selfless and occasionally uneven.

The main advantage of experimental classes is the relative homogeneity of the students. By working exclusively with weak students, the educator can maintain the same pace, i.e., he can work with all students individually. Feedback with the entire class is continuous: if one student has not understood, this means, as a rule, that not one of them has. Conversely, if one understands, it means that they all have. Here is another feature: in a class with a mixed type of students the teacher is forced to do more work with the strong students, which is what he does, fearing that he may fall behind the curriculum or else wishing to make a good impression on those who check on him. In a class with a homogeneous structure there is no such temptation which, for understandable reasons, is of tremendous importance in motivating weak students.

At the time when such classes were only being organized, and it was only the virtually hopeless children that were sent to them, unanimously the educators sought excuses: "What will set them straight? The father is a drunk, the mother is a loose woman. What about the street! They are bound to stumble...."

In the years which have passed since the start of this experiment, neither the family nor the street have changed. Yet, the children are unrecognizable. Spiritually stronger and purposeful, industrious, by catching up they have already seen the future which, in the past, was visible only to the better students.

In December 1988 the USSR State Committee for Public Education issued the following order: students from the seventh to the ninth grades can now be moved to the next level of training even if they have three failing grades, and instead of a grade in such subjects, their diploma should read: "Attended." The decision was substantiated by the reasoning that it would contribute to the humanizing of the schools and become a means of taking into consideration the individual capabilities of the students and eliminate the problem of stress situations, prevent the development of an inferiority complex and, in the final account, make it possible to eliminate whitewashing. Alas! The student is sitting behind his desk and getting his daily failing grade. This is in front of the entire class. Then he is being told calmly and respectfully: "Do not be sad, Grisha. Who is to blame that you have no ability for mathematics (physics, chemistry, biology)? Sit here peacefully and do not disturb the others. In any case, we shall pass you."

Tell me, is it possible to live without any stress if you think of yourself as second-rate or simply stupid? Could one fail to be despairing seeing the way others are being passed by merit while you are being passed by "charity?"

This is a rather peculiar way of asserting humaneness and preventing an inferiority complex. The solution stipulated in the "Fundamental Principles of the Uniform Labor School" is different. Let us consider it: "Concern for those who fall behind is the first concern of the democratic school.... Perhaps it is better not to be able to implement steps immediately in favor of those who are particularly successful but, in any case, the laggards should not be left without the special concern of the school."

Assurances notwithstanding, this will not eliminate whitewashing. To begin with, the order applies only starting with the seventh grade. Second, what does passing a student with failing grades mean? Yes, he goes to school. He sits behind a desk. He seems to be in order but what happens in reality? Everyone thinks that a person goes to school to gain knowledge, whereas he is simply sitting it out. Furthermore, this is sanctioned by law! Actually, it is unlikely that the failing student will also sit it out "within the law."

Therefore, instruction can be successful only if it is organized within a logical framework of unrestricted and consistent individualization (let us note that it is a question not only of helping the slower students but also of purposeful efforts to identify and develop capabilities). Currently such a system is being implemented in the distorted system of private tutorship at home, turning the parents into hostages to the school department and depriving them of the right to man's main wealth: leisure time. Individualized training, developed along a normal channel, will greatly increase the productivity of instruction and lift from our children the monstrous burden of overloading and thus return to them the happiness of a healthy way of life. It would radically ease the work of the educator as well.

However, the pedagogical process has yet another facet: education. This is the other wing of the school bird. The main thing here is not knowledge but conviction and without relying on life, on real facts, and on relationships such convictions cannot be shaped. The faultiness of Herbart's system lies precisely in the fact that it lacks the most important link: practice. Herbart's formula is from knowledge to convictions; the Marxist formula is from knowledge to practical experience and through it to convictions.

Replacing experience, real human relations and moral behavior with words which allegedly converts knowledge into convictions is one of the greatest methodological errors. However, it was precisely this that for decades traveled from one education textbook to another as an assertion that the main form of the training-education process in school is the classroom lesson. This means that, in studying chemistry, physics, biology, history, literature, or the social sciences, at the same time the students should acquire ideological maturity, respect for the laws, truthfulness, honesty, daring, principled-mindedness, etc. Hence the recommendation to the teachers not only to organize reading of educationally

suitable works but also to carry out their study and discussion in an emotionally intelligible form. Hence also the efforts to find an educational effect in the content of the individual subjects.

The 8th All-Union Pedagogical Readings (1988) were on the topic of "Upgrading the Efficiency of the Lesson as the Basic Form of Organization of the Training-Education Process." Following are the titles of some of the reports: "The Possibility of a Lesson in Mathematics in Solving the Educational Tasks of Training;" "Ideological-Political, Patriotic and International Upbringing of the Students in Physics Lessons in Secondary General Education and Vocational Schools;" "Shaping the Harmonious Personality of the School Student Through the Content of the Individual Subjects," etc. As many examples of "solving the educational aspect of the lesson" as one wishes could be found.

In cautioning against the danger of a verbal education, A.S. Makarenko wrote, as early as the 1930s, the following: "It is our profound conviction that the verbal education which is extensively applied in our country, i.e., an endless blabbering about various good things, without any accompanying exercise in behavior, is most criminal sabotage. An awareness which is not based on practical experience, although it is expressed in a variety of verbal forms is, above all, weak in practical terms; second, by itself it is unable to lead to any practice. That is the greatest danger to our society."

By creating the illusion of solving the main education problems in class, the concept of "educating instruction" led not simply to underestimating the collective, without which education in Soviet schools is inconceivable, but also actually eliminated it from the process of molding the personality. All of us would like for our young people to come out of school as collectivists. Yet this problem can be solved 100 percent only within the collective, within the system of relations included in it. But what is the school collective, how is it created, and how does it function?

The type of pedagogy which is currently studied by students in education VUZs has no answer to such questions. To be guided by its concepts of the collective is the same as not to know where one is going or what to look for. That is only the beginning of the endless list within which, even with Ariadne's thread, one can find neither the entry nor the exit: the class collective or the collectives of Octobrists, Pioneers, the Komsomol, the trade union, the party, the military, the team at play, the backyard, the temporary, the permanent, the school, the family, the labor, the musical, the puppet, or the theater.... Instead of concepts with a specific meaning, they become embellishments which could be added to whatever group or community one may wish. In the 1930s, A.S. Makarenko pointed out that "in pursuing an apparent systematic order and the possibility of providing any kind of classification, the authors virtually neglect the living collective with its most typical features. The collective which we see in the pages of books is

supremely inexpressive, loose and passive." Three pages down, after a close scientific study, he reaches the conclusion: "In our view, the collective is a contact unit based on the socialist principle of cohesion."

What does contact mean? The members of the collective must know one another. They must have their own personal opinion of each other and rely on it in the struggle against any and all manifestations of prejudice. This feature is determined not least by the number of members of a given group. Empirically, it has been established both through the experience of Makarenko himself and that of many other observing educators: 500 to 600 people. Naturally, there also is a certain tolerance but if a school has more than 1,000 students, at that point it becomes senseless to raise the question of developing a collective. It becomes equally senseless to raise the question of true education.

What about the socialist principle of cohesion? Maximal democracy, automatic guarantee of the rights of every member of the collective, and giving common interests preference, without which personal interests become fiction, either assume forms hostile to society and the individual and to legality, developed into a tradition and the strict limitation of the power of an individual and glasnost, in which no information whatsoever can be concealed. This includes concern for other people, respect and reciprocal exigency. It also includes full freedom but combined with sensible order and strict discipline. It is self-evident that this involves real labor including cost accounting, wages and withholdings for the fund of the collective.

Metaphorically speaking without, however, being unscientific, the true collective lives according to the laws of a perfect socialist society.

A scientific classification, which is needed for practical purposes, is possible only on the basis of the stages of development of the collective and the degree of maturity of internal collective relations. The first stage is the one at which there is actually no collective. At this point all kinds of negative phenomena are possible: the arbitrary behavior of the strong, subservience and helplessness of the weak, reciprocal guarantees, boorishness, informing, tattling, and the absence of even superficial order. Both children and educators are in a great deal of trouble if the school management has been unable to control the situation on time and taken the collective out of its first stage of development and if the collective has become frozen and "canned," without the ability to develop.

A collective which has moved from the first to the second stage is characterized by the fact that the efforts of the school management meet with the understanding and support of the aktiv. A certain percentage of students begin to act openly and jointly with the educators. "I hurried at this point," Makarenko said. "I ignored the fact that these little boys or girls also showed many shortcomings. I tried as soon as possible to rally the type of group of activists which would support my demands



with their own and would express within their group, at general meetings, their own views."

The quantitative changes which slowly develop in the collective, during the first and second stages in its development, given the normal course of the educational process, convert into qualitative changes. The collective turns into an integral social organism with a clearly established self-regulatory system.

In the third stage the problem of the collective is solved: that of developing the personality. This is an exceptionally important result. Possibly, it may even be the most important one, for what is the mentality of a collectivist? It is a most difficult ability to practice behavioral dialectics: I deliberately give preference to the interests of society but, as I act thus, I defend my own interests in the best possible way.

Nonetheless, how to structure a collective, and how to create within it a system of relations which would be consistent with the standard of humanism and would allow the educational process to "take off?"

Organizational structure is the material bearer of dependencies and relations within the collective. Its skeleton consists of the primary collectives. It is precisely they that are the base of the leading, the crucial relations.

The idea of having school classes was born in Ya.A. Komenskiy's brilliant mind as a way of reducing the cost of education and making it accessible to all. Three hundred years later, another pedagogical genius, A.S. Makarenko, invented the primary collective as the missing link in the system of socialization of the individual, as the bearing structure in the method of "parallel pedagogical effect" and, in the final account, as a means for giving education an entirely new and previously inaccessible quality.

The ideal primary collective must have unity, cohesion and strength and, at the same time, be distinguished from a group of friends. The detachment of children of different ages was the practical embodiment of these requirements. "In my experience," A.S. Makarenko said, "I reached the adoption of an organization in which the primary collective did not encompass classroom or school interests, but was the type of cell within which both school and production interests came from different groups. That is why of late I have adopted the detachment, which includes school students from different grades and workers in different production brigades." Anton Semenovitch classified as the virtues of the detachment structure of the collective closer interaction among age groups, and the ability for steadily gaining experience and sharing this experience with younger members. He ascribed to it the best possible prerequisite for cultivating in older students concern for the younger ones and for developing qualities, such as being attentive to others, generosity and exigency, qualities which are demanded of the future parent, and many other. For the

younger students, membership in a detachment consisting of different age groups develops respect for elders and the ability to take their views and instructions into consideration.

As was the case with the Commune imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, the primary collectives in contemporary schools, which are successfully applying Makarenko's technology, include children of different age groups. The appointed or elected leader is the one who is superior to the others in terms of practical experience, standards, knowledge and political maturity. As a rule, this would be a senior grade student, a member of the Komsomol or a senior Pioneer. The authority of such leaders does not have to be created artificially: the teacher is given the possibility of implementing his educational policy by relying on this powerful pedagogical instrument. Incidentally, the influence of the legendary council of commanders in Makarenko's establishments was precisely secured by the fact that this unusual self-management authority was created on the basis of representatives of detachments involving different age groups and, for understandable reasons, consisted almost entirely of the most senior students, those who were truly able to manage and could be held answerable for their work.

The educational activities of commanders of non-coeval detachments substantially facilitate the work of educators. Priority in their relations with the working people is given to personal example, knowledge of the work, erudition and ability to communicate.

In the schools applying Makarenko's technology curious solutions to typical conflicts may be noted. In an English study class, in the sixth grade, a boy talks with the teacher provocatively. In the past the teacher could have asked for this hooligan to leave the class. This would have inevitably entailed new violations of the discipline, to the amusement of the rest of the class, and would be yet another nervous stress for the teacher. Now everything is solved simply and quickly. The teacher opens in her journal the page listing the names of commanders of primary collectives and their classrooms. Without raising her voice, not to mention without losing her temper, the teacher turns to the violator:

"Kolya, which is your detachment?"

"What of it? The 17th."

"Very well. At the end of the class I will go to 10th A and ask Volodya Gulev to have a talk with you."

The violator surrenders immediately. The last thing he wants is the prospect of a talk with the 10th grader who, furthermore, is also his neighbor at home. Making a 180 degree turn, Kolya quietly requests:

"Forgive me, Olga Nikolayevna. I will stop. Please do not tell Gulev."

Here is an example of an entirely different kind. During intermission a boy, ignoring the rules, is running up the

staircase to the third floor, where the classrooms of the senior grades are located. Naturally, the student on duty is at his post:

"What is the hurry? Do you want me to report you to the principal?"

"Let me go... Please. I earned a five in mathematics. I promised the commander that I would. Here, look. I want to show it to Commander Oleg Ivanov. He will be pleased!"

And endless number of such examples could be cited. These alone, however, suffice to prove the workings of a mechanism of relations within the collective, structured according to Makarenko's "chart."

Parent committees are also set up on the basis of representatives of primary collectives. It is thus that a single educational front which includes the school and the parents appears, solving the problem of the unity among school, family and society. It is thus that the school becomes the center for education on the territory of its microrayon.

In addition to permanent primary collectives of non-coeval detachments in the schools applying Makarenko's technology, consolidated detachments are also extensively used, the significance of which in improving the system of internal collective relations and dependencies, would be difficult to overestimate. They are set up for a short period of time and disbanded immediately after the assignment has been completed (collect scrap metal and paper, tidying-up the area, provide sponsorship aid...). Here the commanders of the primary collective become ordinary members and obey usually anyone of the members of their non-coeval detachment. This makes the system of relations more complex. Now even the "strong personality" cannot rise above the collective. On the one hand, you may be the commander. On the other, you are also subordinate to your own subordinate. It is thus that conditions develop in which everyone must coordinate his individual aspirations with the objectives of the entire collective and the primary collective.

The consistent materialistic and Leninist approach to understanding the nature of convictions and the method of shaping them is the distinguishing feature of the Makarenko educational system. Colonists and communards entered life as profoundly convinced people, as builders of the new society. This result was achieved strictly thanks to the fact that training and education functioned as equal partners and that neither one replaced the other. In their school training, Makarenko's students did not postpone real life for the future. They already lived a full and intensive life: they worked at serious jobs, they were responsible for the farm, they participated in self-management. They educated one another, uniting within a single and exigent collective for this purpose. There was no alienation of school from life or any kind of bookishness or scholastic learning whatsoever. What the colonists and the communards learned

in class then came alive in their daily experience and in the widespread system of internal collective relations.

This means that if training interacts with education on a parity basis unity between the two aspects of the pedagogical process, the process of molding the personality, develops.

The scientific solution of the problem of the unity between training and education is, unquestionably, the first prerequisite for taking school practices out of their stagnation. As in the past, however, this condition is manifested in the low quality of knowledge of graduates, fear of school, the physical exhaustion of the children, increased delinquency, enhancement of antisocial groups of minors who wage war on one-another for spheres of influence, and the spreading of alcoholism and drug addiction and use. Under the pressure of circumstances, a network of institutions for juvenile drug addicts is being developed in the country. An administration for affairs of minors and youth has been set up as part of the USSR Prosecutor's General Office along with a preventive service of the USSR MVD. Complaints voiced by the personnel of law enforcement authorities to the effect that teachers and public education departments are indifferent to delinquencies, drunkenness, the use by students of stupefying substances or, at best, that they limit themselves to strictly educational work, have become commonplace. Such complaints are just. This is because the school (the PTU) is merely teaching. But, you may insist, it should also educate, and if you would refer to the materials of the February 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, you would be told that education is taking place in the course of the training process. "Many of my colleagues who went into teaching in the past 15 to 20 years," writes O. Shapovalov, people's teacher of the USSR, "became accustomed to believe that their job is to provide knowledge and that they should not be asked what the boy or girl will turn out to be. The school, they say, is not a boarding school for good manners. It is such an immoral distortion in our minds that must be now eliminated."

We must urgently "break down and eliminate" this distortion. We must equip the teachers with an understanding of the specific nature of pedagogical tasks in the training and education areas and means of solving them, so that, finally, our school bird may fly.

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## PAGES FROM HISTORY

### The Great Revolution Viewed From the Vantage of 200 Years

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[Article by Voleslav Nikolayevich Sedykh, APN political commentator, member of the All-Union Organizational Committee for the Celebration of the 200th Anniversary of the French Revolution]

[Text] During the recent state visit to France by M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet chairman, the topic of the French Revolution, the 200th anniversary of which is celebrated this July, was raised repeatedly. In emphasizing the similarity between the freedom loving traditions of the peoples of France and the Soviet Union, which made the two biggest revolutions of universal significance, the one at the end of the 18th century and the one of October 1917, as well as the importance of the radical restructuring in our country, the Soviet leader spoke at the reception in the Elysee Palace: "We now take a different look at the legacy of the French Revolution. We differently interpret many of its turns and slogans. We are drawing lessons for the present from its experience and tragedies."

### "1789: If We Had to Do it All Over Again..."

In this light, how does this anniversary of the French Revolution appear? It is triggering increased interest, as is being eloquently proved by scientific colloquiums and conferences taking place everywhere, and the numerous books timed for the anniversary, which are coming out both in France and in other countries, including the Soviet Union.

One of the most significant works, in my view, is the collective work written by a group of scientists headed by Michel Vovel, "*The French State During the Revolution (1789-1799)*." M. Vovel, who is one of the most outstanding specialists in this area, successfully develops what I consider the most fruitful trend in the study of the French Revolution, a trend which has included or includes Jean Jaures, Albert Matiez, Georges Lefebvre, Albert Soboul, Fernand Brodel, Claude Masorik and many other authoritative scientists. Despite all differences, nuances and original approaches to the interpretation of specific problems, these historians are united by a common understanding of the revolution as an entirely necessary and legitimate historical stage which enabled France to break with feudalism and convert to the capitalist or, as is sometimes being said in the West, the "liberal" society of the 19th century.

The three-volume work by Georges Soriat "*The Unabridged History of the French Revolution*," is written in the same spirit. This is the latest creative success of this noted writer, scientist and social figure who produced a similar history of the Paris Commune in 1971.

One could also describe as splendid the extremely voluminous encyclopedic dictionary "*Chronicle of the Revolution*," published by the prestigious Larousse, and the less substantial yet noteworthy reprints of the books by Jean Massin on Marat and Robespierre, the work by Pierre Miquel "*The Great Revolution*," and many works on the women of the revolution.

I saw in the bookstores in Paris new works by the noted historian Francois Fure "*The French Revolution of 1789-1889*," and "*A Critical Dictionary of the Revolution*" (co-authored with Mona Ousouf). Let me point out that

Francois Fure, Denis Richet and many other scientists belong to the so-called "revisionist" trend in the science of history, which has made quite a name for itself in recent decades. The members of this school believe that the revolution was by no means necessary and that it even "prevented" Louis XVI from implementing the reforms he planned and the peaceful agreement between the then existing estates: the nobility and the clergy, on the one hand, and the third estate, which included the bourgeoisie, the peasantry, the artisans, the workers and other representatives of the urban plebe, on the other.

Although acknowledging the familiar achievements of the revolution, above all the Declaration of the Rights of the Individual and the Citizen, F. Fure and his colleagues strictly refuse to give any credit to Robespierre and his supporters. This triggers basic objections on the part of another school of historians.

Could it be that in this case it is merely a question of professional and academic disputes among supporters of different scientific trends? Or else, in the words of W. Doyle, in his book "*The Origins of the French Revolution*," "the revolution not only destroys its own children, it also divides its historians?" No, matters are much more serious than that. Scientific arguments are a reflection of the profound sociopolitical and ideological contradictions which exist within present French society.

This is confirmed, in particular, by surveys of the French people, related to the anniversary of the revolution. The results of one such survey were published in the Paris weekly NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR under the significant title "1789: If We Had to Do It Again..." "Today, when people talk with the French about the revolution, what names, words, dates and figures come to mind?" the journal asked. "How many of them would have liked to participate in the 1789 events? And if so, on which side?"

The problems are indeed interesting but, to begin with, let us cite the answer to what I consider a basic question: "Was the revolution necessary?" According to 66 percent of the respondents, the revolution was a necessary stage in changing French society; 23 percent believe that the revolution was a useless trial, for in any case, even without it, French society would have changed. Eleven percent did not express an opinion.

Curiously enough, a significant number of French people, even 2 centuries after the revolution, believe that it was unnecessary, accepting the version of the possibility of an evolutionary change of medieval France from a feudal to a bourgeois society through royal reforms. Naturally, such a viewpoint does not appear particularly convincing, perhaps for the fact alone that the 1789 Revolution was a great reality, while speculations on the possibilities involving the king are only hypothetical. Nonetheless, let us try to recall some of the events which, in my view, may help us to answer the questions raised today.

Historically, it is accepted that the fall of the Bastille, stormed by the mutinied people on 14 July 1789, marks the beginning of the revolution. Some uneducated people have the idea that the uprising was spontaneous and accidental. Yet a number of other events preceded it and to some extent prepared the fall of the royal fortress-prison and the further development of the revolutionary process. Some of them took place in Versailles.

### **"We Are Here by the Will of the People"**

And so, Versailles. This French Peterhoff is located at a short distance from Paris, 20 kilometers to the southwest of the city. During the lovely summer days this former country residence of the kings has its usual invasion of visitors, both French and foreign tourists from different countries, attracted here by the world fame of this preserve, which is forever part of the chronicles of France.

Exactly 2 centuries ago, here one could note a similar but unusual gathering of people. It was for the first time since 1614 that the meeting of the General Estates opened in one of the palaces, on 5 May.

Let us try to imagine the circumstances which brought about the convening of this supreme assembly of the three estates of France. In the final decades of the 18th century, the previously inviolable French monarchy had been gradually declining. The country was shaken up by an extremely grave socioeconomic crisis, which led to the division of the society into different estates. The path of social progress was blocked by the absolutism of the king, the parasitism of the nobility and the obscurantism of the clergy. The monarchy, both Louis XV and Louis XVI, who replaced him in 1774, and the privileged classes, restricted in all possible ways the freedom of action of the third estate which thirsted for radical change. Heated appeals for such change even before the revolution were sounded in the works of Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, Mably, D'Alambert and other progressive minds of the "Age of Enlightenment."

Let us give the nobility of that day its due: it had contributed quite successfully to the implementation of the familiar slogan ascribed to Louis XV: "After me, the deluge!" It is true that things did not get to the point of a "deluge." However, the powerful flood of popular discontent was clearly beginning to overflow. To use a classical Marxist definition, one could say that the new powerful production forces which had matured within the feudal-absolutist system, were trying to break out of a rather narrow swampy boggy bed of obsolete production relations.

Naturally, Louis XVI could not fail to be unaware of the dangerous moods of the third estate, which accounted for approximately 98 percent of the nation (nearly 25 million producers of the national wealth). Initially the king was inclined to make some reforms as suggested by Turgot, comptroller general of finance (minister), succeeded by his colleague Necker. However, does this mean that the monarch truly wanted to become a

"reformer" and that he would have made the necessary changes had the 14 July uprising not "unexpectedly" broken out?

"Even the halfway measures recommended by his knowledgeable ministers met with such an active rejection on the part of the nobility that Louis XVI hastened to dismiss Necker as he had dismissed his predecessor," Edgar Faure, the former French prime minister wrote in his very informative book *"Turgot's Disgrace."* According to the author of this book, who is a very experienced politician, the obstructionism of the nobility, who were unwilling to surrender even a minute part of their privileges, led to the abandoning of most of the reforms and the failure of the assembly of the nobility, convened by the monarch in 1787. Yet, these members of the nobility had been selected by Louis XVI himself!

An even fiercer clash occurred between the king and the nobility, on the one hand, and the third estate, on the other, in the spring and summer of 1789, while the Estates General were in session. Gathered in the small pavilion of the Palace of Versailles, the envoys of the third estate proclaimed themselves the National Assembly, thus becoming the actual legislative and representative authority of the entire nation. When the king "reformer" ordered that the gates to the palace be closed and even that guards be put, the deputies moved to another hall which was usually used for ball games, and swore to remain there until a constitution had been drafted. It was precisely there, in that hall, that Mirabeau made his famous statement: "...We are here by the will of the people and shall remain here yielding only to the power of the bayonets." In the final account, the monarch was forced to acknowledge the legitimacy of the National Assembly, which then proclaimed itself to be the Constituent Assembly.

### **From the Hall of the Bastille to the Collapse of the Gironde**

Let us now leave the palaces, gardens and fountains of Versailles and return to Paris, where 2 centuries ago the main revolutionary events took place. On the eve of the present anniversary, the French capital was particularly beautified, as though rejuvenated. Let us give the French their due: they can harmoniously combine the most valuable monuments of "antiquity" with the latest architectural achievements. Thus, the unique ensemble of the medieval Louvre is embellished by contemporary transparent pyramids which make it possible to look at the lower level of the famous palace-museum from the outside, as though it is from our own age that we look into ages past. On Place de la Bastille, a new building for opera and ballet has been erected, as though embodying the joyous legacy of the fighters of the French Revolution: after destroying the prison fortress, they put on the wreckage little signs which read: "Here we dance!"

However, at the start of July 1789, the Parisians did not feel like dancing: military units loyal to the throne were



hastily marching on the capital and Versailles; the king once again dismissed the excessively liberal Necker and appointed as minister of war General De Broglie, who was notorious for his cruelty. Everything seems to indicate that Louis XVI intended to seek revenge for his forced concessions made to the National Assembly and the third estate.

The decisive moment of a long ripening revolution was approaching, a revolution for which "it is usually insufficient for the 'lower strata to be unwilling,' but also requires for the 'upper strata to be unable' to live as in the past" (V.I. Lenin, "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 26, p 218). As to the "lower strata," which, in this case, included the bourgeoisie, they rushed to battle. On 12 July there were repeated clashes between demonstrators and the king's dragoons on the streets of the capital. On the next day the voters, i.e., the Parisians, who were electing representatives to the Estates General, set up in city hall a permanent commission which, essentially, became the municipal government—the Paris Commune. It immediately raised a national militia or guard, headed by the famous veteran for the War of Independence of the North American Colonies from British rule, Marquis de Lafayette. In the Dome of Invalids, encountering no resistance, the Parisians confiscated 28,000 rifles and 5 small canons. The other major arsenal was the Bastille where, as it was believed, a great many gunpowder barrels were being kept....

The tourists who visit today Place de la Bastille are shown, first of all, the outlines of the former fortress, marked in white stone against gray blocks. Looking closely, one can distinguish the outlines of eight towers which once rose menacingly over the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, inhabited at that time by furniture makers and other artisans. As early as April 1789, prior to the convening of the Estates General, a mutiny had broken out here among the working people, cruelly suppressed by the royal troops: there were more than 500 killed and wounded! One could imagine the feeling of anger which spread among the population of the suburb and other popular districts in Paris, when the rumor spread that military reinforcements were advancing toward the Bastille. In the eyes of many Parisians this fortress-prison was both a symbol of the king's despotism and a dangerous fort, the guns of which were always aimed at the popular districts. Nonetheless, the large crowd which surrounded the Bastille on 14 July, initially hoped for a peaceful solution to the talks with its commander de Lonet, as had been the case on the eve of that day at the Dome of Invalids. However, the moment the parliamentarian left the fortress carrying de Lonet's evasive promises not to resort to weapons, a volley was fired from its walls, which only "warmed up" the crowd. The storming of the Bastille cost the people of Paris hundreds of dead, not to mention wounded.

The bourgeoisie headed the revolution. Its main moving force was the city's plebeian population—the artisans, workers and other members of the third estate. After the

capital, the revolutionary wave spread to other cities in the country, sweeping off the old authorities which, in the course of a few months, were replaced by newly elected authorities, the municipalities. In turn, learning of the fall of the Bastille in Paris, peasants attacked the provincial "bastilles," the castles and possessions of the nobles, instilling "great fear" in the nobility.

As to today's French people, if we are to trust said survey, 60 percent believe that the most important event in the revolution was the fall of the Bastille; 32 percent, the work of the Estates General; and 40 percent, the night of 4 August. Let me point out that, starting with that "night of miracles" and until 11 August 1789, the Constituent Assembly passed a number of important decrees aimed at the destruction of the feudal regime.

On 26 August the assembly approved the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which proclaimed the main principles of the new society. "The people are born and remain free and equal in rights," read, for example, the first of the 17 articles. The declaration proclaimed as sacred and inalienable the rights of man and the citizen: freedom of the individual, speech and conscience, safety and resistance to oppression.

Later these concepts were repeated or used, in one way or another, in the main laws of many countries and in many international documents. "All people are born free and equal in their dignity and rights," reads the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations. Similar ideas, in their contemporary expression, are found in the Helsinki Final Act and in the recent Vienna agreements of countries members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The tremendous importance of these principles was also emphasized in the report submitted by M.S. Gorbachev, USSR Supreme Soviet chairman, at the Congress of People's Deputies: "The need to renovate our legislation on the question of human rights is also defined by the fact that the Soviet Union is a signatory to the Vienna Accords, and the legal norms in our country must be consistent with the international pact."

Article 17 of the declaration, according to which the right to private property was proclaimed sacred and inviolable, has triggered and continues to trigger a great deal of diverging opinions. It is entirely obvious that with the help of this article the bourgeoisie not only legitimized and strengthened its status but also created the necessary legal prerequisites for the development of the capitalist production method. By codifying property inequality, this article was also aimed against the arbitrary feudal rule which encroached on bourgeois and peasant property. Let us note in this connection that the arbitrary and dogmatic interpretation of the right of ownership, separated from specific historical conditions and realities, is not, in my view, all that harmless. For example, what could be the result, today, of a senseless repetition of the once popular and sharp formulas such as Prudhon's "Ownership is Theft?"

Be that as it may, the declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen remains, to this day, the most important symbol of the French Revolution. In the view of 47 percent of surveyed French people, this document best reflects the revolution; 46 percent prefer the noble slogan of "Liberty-Equality-Fraternity;" 35 percent consider the "Marseillaise," which was initially the song of the revolutionaries and, subsequently, in 1795, became the French national anthem.

But let us go back to the France of August-September 1789. What was the king's reaction to the declaration and the other legislative acts passed by the Constituent Assembly? "I shall never agree to the plunder of my clergy and my nobility," arrogantly said he on the subject of the declaration, and simply refused to sign the historical documents, once again appearing in the eyes of his contemporaries (but for some reason by no means in the works of some scientists today) as the head of the reactionary forces opposing the radical renovation of society.

It was only under the pressure of the angered Parisians, who literally besieged his suburban residence on 5 and 6 October, that Louis XVI was forced to ratify the documents adopted by the Constituent Assembly, and to move from Versailles to the Tuilleries, which was the king's palace in the capital. Two weeks later, the Constituent Assembly settled in the neighboring and spacious hall of the Manège.

The initial victories of the revolution and its progressive legislation gave a powerful impetus to the democratization of society. The freedom of the press, proclaimed by the Constituent Assembly, was of particular importance. "Freedom of the press or death!" demanded the irrepressible Georges Danton. "What separates the republic from the monarchy?" Camille Desmoulins echoed his words. "One thing only: the freedom to speak and write. If there would be freedom of the press in Moscow, tomorrow Moscow would become a republic."

As early as September 1789 the first issue of the newspaper published by the inflexible Jean-Paul Marat, *FRIEND OF THE PEOPLE*, came out which, 20 days later, daringly called upon the Parisians to march on Versailles. The popularity of this newspaper increased at a headlong pace and it was only the knife of a fanatical supporter of Girondins, Charlotte Corday, that stopped forever, on the eve of the 4th anniversary of the revolution, this inspired pen and warm heart of the *FRIEND OF THE PEOPLE*. It was a knife against the pen, against the freedom of thought!

To this day, the buildings related to the activities of the various clubs which appeared during the years of the revolution, and which had a tremendous impact on political life, have been preserved in Paris. As early as the days of the proceedings of the Estates General in Versailles, a group of deputies from Brittany created the Breton Club. Later moved to Paris, it took the name Jacobin, after the library of the Jacobin monks, where its

meetings took place. Here a common language was found initially by even such different characters as Mirabeau, who subsequently entered into a secret conspiracy with the king, and Robespierre; later, as the revolution developed and intensified, there were divisions and disputes within the club. In 1790 its members Mirabeau, Bailly, the mayor of Paris, and other right-wing leaders created the "Society of 1789." Subsequently, the Jacobin Club, which was also known as the "Club of Friends of the Constitution," was frequently subjected to major changes, turning recent allies into enemies, seeing differently the further tasks and prospects of the revolution.

Similar processes could be noted also within the "Society of the Friends of the Rights of Man and the Citizen," most frequently known as the "Cordelier Club," for it was located in a monastery with the same name. Its most popular and influential members were Danton, Desmoulins and Hebert.

The revolution brought to life other societies, such as the "Universal Federation of Friends of the Truth" or the "Social Circle." In the course of 3 or 4 active years, they too experienced striking transformations, reflecting in their own ways the fast changes in public opinion and the regrouping of political forces, above all among the third estate.

Whereas at the start of the revolution this estate acted in a united (or almost united) front against the feudal-absolutist system, the situation began to change drastically quite soon afterwards. The big bourgeoisie, which had achieved its desired freedom of action, gradually became the new privileged stratum, depriving of the deserved results of the victory over feudalism not only the artisans, the workers and the peasants but also, to a certain extent, the small and middle bourgeoisie. The views of the big bourgeoisie were expressed by the Feuillant Club, which had broken with the Jacobins and was headed by Lafayette, Bailly, Lamette and many other former leaders of the "1789 Society." In addressing the Constituent Assembly in July 1791 Antoine Barnave, who was one of them, frankly called for "a halt to the revolution."

Two days after that appeal, troops under Lafayette's command opened fire on a peaceful demonstration by Parisians, on the Champ de Mars, where, 1 year prior to that the Federation Holiday had been celebrated. The Parisians were demonstrating against the king for his attempt to flee Paris and join the camp of the enemies of the revolution.

However, even after such alarming events, under the pressure of the Feuillant, the Constituent Assembly adopted the 1791 Constitution, which the king had signed. By establishing a constitutional monarchy in France, the new fundamental law of the country was, naturally, a step forward, compared to the situation in other European countries. However, it was an unmistakable retreat from the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.

Today's "attorneys" for Louis XVI do not like to be reminded of the stubborn efforts on the part of the king's group (even after it was caught in Varennes, a small border area) to weave the network of a conspiracy against the revolution, increasingly involving Lafayette and a number of other Feuillants and, indirectly, Verniot, Brisseau, Inard and other leaders of the Gironde, which was the right-wing of the Jacobins. For the sake of preserving and strengthening their positions, the king's group, the Feuillants and the Girondists tried, although for different reasons, to provoke and, subsequently, to support the war launched by monarchic Europe against revolutionary France. However, the enemy intervention, one of the symbols of which was the provocative ultimatum issued by the Duke of Braunschweig, who threatened to punish rebellious Paris, only accelerated the demise of the monarchy. On 10 August 1792, the Parisians took the Tuilleries Palace by storm, locked the royal couple in the fortress and, at the same time, rejected the Feuillant rule.

To this day this odd period of twin power which developed after the 10 August uprising is the subject of a number of disputes and contradictory assessments. On the one hand, the king and the Feuillants were replaced by the Girondists, who represented the interests of the commercial-industrial and landowning bourgeoisie. They were particularly strong in the Legislative Assembly. On the other hand, the real power was concentrated in the hands of the Paris Commune. Most of its members were representatives of the Montagnards, headed by Robespierre, Marat, Danton and other revolutionary Jacobins.

On several occasions we saw in Paris shows based on topics of the French Revolution. Twenty years ago I had seen at the Theatre du Soleil the performance of "1793," and several days later, the monumental production by the famous director Robert Osseyn "Danton and Robespierre" at the Palace of Congresses. This year I saw "Freedom or Death" staged by the same director and on that same huge stage.

With few exceptions, the topics pertain to the same period: from the August storming of the Tuilleries by the people to the counterrevolutionary coup of 27 July 1794. The audience not simply watches but somehow participates in the stormy events occurring on the stage. Who is right? Is it the Girondists who, having gained power and privileges, are increasingly suppressing the revolutionary process? Or is it the Montagnards, who favor the continuation of the revolution, for which many democratic social strata are still thirsting? The answer is not all that simple as it may appear at first, for one can already feel a fatigue from the endless fierce struggle and the growing difficulties in daily life. Add to it the difficult division of the land among the peasants as a result of the 1792 agrarian reform and the dramatic situation at the front: the interventionist forces were marching on Paris.

Let us recall the subsequent events. On 20 September 1792, inspired by the Jacobins, the revolutionary forces

won their first victory over the interventionists in the battle of Valmy. On the next day the newly elected National Convention, which had proclaimed the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a republican system in France, began its work. Meanwhile, the Convention was shaken up by the struggle between the Girondists and the Montagnards, which was aggravated by the odd position taken by the representatives of the "swamp," which preferred to support the group which emerged as the strongest at a given time. This struggle became particularly violent in deciding the fate of the king: the Montagnards demanded his execution whereas the Girondists opposed it strenuously. On 21 January 1793 the former monarch, who had entered into a conspiracy with the interventionists, was guillotined. Four months later, a popular uprising, which took place from 31 May to 2 June, under the leadership of the Paris Commune, overthrew the power of the Girondists. The period of the Jacobin revolutionary-democratic dictatorship began.

### Greatness and Tragedy of the Jacobins

In analyzing this relatively short time, rich in events, many historians, writers and journalists have tried and are still trying to answer the painful question: Was revolutionary terror justified? This topic, sharp like the scalpel of a surgeon, goes through novels, such as "93," by Victor Hugo and "The Gods Are Thirsty" by Anatole France, or the plays "Danton" and "Robespierre" by Romain Rolland. The main characters in Hugo's work—a republican and a monarchist—die because they themselves preach violence. In the works of France and Rolland it is Robespierre and the other leaders of the Montagnards who are guillotined, victims of a violence which they themselves considered a forced step.

How do the French people of today judge the terror during the period of the revolution? According to public opinion surveys, 64 percent of them believe that the terror was a tragedy which besmirched the revolution; 22 percent believe that this was a forced period of transition from the old regime to the republic, while 14 percent preferred not to answer.

The answers to the question of the attitude toward the execution of the royal couple may appear surprising. Respectively, 59 and 67 percent of the respondents said that, considering the circumstances of the times, they would have opposed the execution of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, despite the fact that both the king and, particularly, his wife had done everything possible to facilitate the invasion of interventionist forces in France and had tried to suppress the revolutionary people and restore the monarchy by the sword and blood!

It is possible, naturally, to understand the humane feelings of those who would have liked to see the king above all as an individual and not as a traitor to the homeland. Nonetheless, it is difficult to ignore the impression that the 200 years which separate us from

that time have had a noticeable influence on the objectiveness of some of our contemporaries (and not only French) in their assessment of one of the most complex periods in French history.

Let us recall perhaps the basic events of the less than 14 months of Jacobin rule. After the initial victories over the intervention forces, which were won in the autumn of 1792, once again revolutionary France suffered one defeat after another: the advancing armies of monarchic Europe was pressing it on all sides, as though in a hot iron vise. Mutinies broke out by royalists and other counterrevolutionaries in Vendee and, subsequently, in 60 out of 83 departments, like a fire in a dry forest. "We can no longer retreat, the devil take it! The revolution must be carried on and even a single step back would kill the republic," Jacques-Rene Hebert wrote in PERE DUCHENE.

In those seemingly hopeless circumstances the Convention, headed by the Jacobins, took daring and decisive steps: within a short time it drafted and passed a series of decrees which totally eliminated feudal rights and essentially met the demands of the peasantry. On 24 June 1793, only 3 weeks after the Girondists had been brought down, it ratified the new constitution which established a republican system in France. "The purpose of the society is universal happiness," its first article stipulated. The new law of the First Republic made extensive use of the ideas of the new Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, drafted by Robespierre. The constitution was approved by overwhelming majority in a popular plebiscite.

In July the Convention relieved Danton from the leadership of the Committee for Public Salvation, because of his inordinately passive attitude, and included in the committee Saint-Juste, Couton and, subsequently, Robespierre. Soon afterwards, on the initiative of the renovated committee, which was the actual revolutionary government, the Convention proclaimed a general mobilization and implemented other important steps. As a result, after a number of successful battles, republican France was able to win by the end of the summer of 1794 decisive victories over the armies of the European monarchs.

Unfortunately, however, successes at the foreign fronts were not paralleled by a greatly needed stabilization of the situation within the country. In addition to the fierce and irreconcilable struggle against the royalists and the Girondists, the revolutionary government had to defend itself against attacks from the left, from the "enraged" headed by Jacques Rous, who represented the interests of the lower popular strata. Having crushed the resistance of the "enraged" (Jacques Rous committed suicide in prison), the leaders of the Jacobins, having already thus weakened their social base, clashed with the Fronde of Hebert, Chomette and other "leftists" in their own camp. At the same time, within the revolutionary government pressure was applied from the right on Danton, Desmoulins and their friends, who expressed the feelings

of the bourgeois strata and the prosperous segment of the peasantry who preferred to "overthrow" the revolution, after they had already gained their "place in the sun" thanks to it.

Under such extremely difficult conditions, how did Robespierre and his closest supporters act? Although firm and decisive, they were never sufficiently consistent, engaging in repressive measures also against their yesterday's friends and supporters who had begun to "fall behind" the revolution, and against the lower strata of the people, tortured by privations and hunger, who were objecting to the growing privileges granted to the "new rich." But was it necessary to guillotine all of them? This tragic fate befell Hebert, Chomette, Danton, Desmoulins and many other very popular Jacobins. The famous people's poet Pierre-Jean Deranger, who had watched the storming of the Bastille as a 9-year old boy, and who subsequently praised this "solemn day," described, in his old age, the following event: on one occasion his aunt took the young Pierre-Jean to the prison where her friends were locked up. "My child," she said, "we shall see now honest people, good citizens, deprived of freedom as a result of slanderous accusations: I want you to know the persecution to which virtue is subjected during times of political disturbances."

Alas, such tragedies did not occur in France alone. However, is it accurate, as is done by some historians and journalists, to compare Jacobin dictatorship with Stalinist crimes? Let us not forget the fact that the unjustified repressions shook up our society in a period of peaceful building, as well as 20 and 30 years after the Great October Revolution and the Civil War, when the counterrevolutionary forces had long been defeated. As was made clear subsequently, furthermore, the repressions affected communists and other Soviet people loyal to their homeland and to the ideals of socialism. This distorted the humane aspect of socialism.

As to Robespierre and his friends, they acted during the stormy years of the Civil War and foreign intervention, when both the revolution and the republic were in mortal danger and when they were forced, for reasons of self-defense, to answer with terror the armed terror of the counterrevolutionaries. "Citizens, do you want a revolution without a revolution?" Robespierre challenged the hesitant deputies in the Legislative Assembly. "Those who make the revolution half-way dig their own graves," Saint-Juste cautioned the Convention deputies.

In that connection, it would be worth it, it seems to me, to look at the archival documents published in the journal IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS (No 5, 1989). Thus, on 6 September 1918, several days after the attempt on V.I. Lenin's life and Uritskiy's assassination, a number of noted party and Soviet officials spoke in all Moscow rayons on the topic of "White and Red Terror." A brief newspaper report, for example, stated that N.I. Bukharin had compared "the situation of Russia with that of revolutionary France: foreign enemies, their alliance with the domestic reaction, the betrayal of the command



personnel, the kulak uprisings, the secession of a number of districts and the forming of independent reactionary governments, defeats at the front, hunger and dislocation were the same type of troubles that exist in our country."

We believe that despite the entirely conventional nature of historical analogies, we can understand in this light (although not always justify) the Jacobin terror aimed against the irreconcilable enemies of the revolution (particularly during the most difficult year 1793). In my view, however, it would be difficult to accept the legitimacy of the terror in 1794, when under the conditions of decisive victories won over the interventionists and the domestic counterrevolution, Robespierre and his supporters fiercely struck at the Montagnards who had dared to have their own view of the further tasks of the revolution and the future of the country. Under such circumstances terror not only did not contribute to strengthening the positions of Robespierre but, conversely, only set against the leadership the Montagnards, their yesterday's friends and fellow workers and, above all, the people's masses. Unfortunately, Robespierre and his supporters, because of the errors they had made and by virtue of specific historical circumstances, were unable to prevent the ripening coup of 9 Thermidor 1794, which beheaded both the leaders of the Montagnards and the revolution itself.

Subsequently, as though in a kaleidoscope, with changing shapes and colors, France was ruled by the Directoire, the Consulat and the Empire, with Napoleon's aggressive wars, or else by the "restored" Bourbons. Despite the constant pressure and conspiracies by reactionary forces, however, nothing could destroy the progressive changes of universal significance, changes which had been made in just the first short 5 revolutionary years. It was precisely this feature that V.I. Lenin emphasized in noting that "the entire development of all civilized humanity throughout the 19th century had its origins in the Great French Revolution, to which it owed everything" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*) [Complete Collected Works], vol 37, p 447).

It is not for nothing that even 200 years later, approximately one-half of the surveyed French believe that they would have actively participated in the revolution, had they lived during that time. This view was expressed by 79 percent of voters belonging to the French Communist Party, 57 percent of voters for the Socialist Party and, respectively, between 37 and 40 percent of voters favoring the three bourgeois parties. Only 6 percent of the French believed that they would have fought against the revolution. As we can see, the French people of today are continuing to be excited by the actions and ideas of their distant forefathers. In our time as well the struggle is continuing in France, waged by the democratic forces, for the full triumph of the noble ideas of the Great French Revolution.

#### **Mankind, Awaken to Hope!**

"Whatever errors may have been made by the French Revolution, willingly or by the force of circumstances,

the results are of tremendous significance," Jean Jaures wrote. "The revolution... accelerated the rhythm of life of all nations."

The French Revolution had a powerful impact on public opinion and the development of events in Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Greece and other European countries. The progressive people in Russia, the young in particular, welcomed enthusiastically the fall of the Bastille. The flames of the French Revolution triggered in their hearts sparks of hope for the overthrow of absolutism in Petersburg as well. The example of that revolution inspired Aleksandr Radishchev and his spiritual heirs—Pestel and other Decembrists. It inspired generations of Russian fighters for freedom, such as Herzen, Chernyshevskiy, Pisarev, Kropotkin, the Narodovoltzy and Plekhanov.

V.I. Lenin paid close attention to the experience of the revolution of the end of the 18th century and the other uprisings of the French people, the 1871 Paris Commune above all. In mid-1918, on Vladimir Ilich's suggestion, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree on erecting a monument to "great people in the areas of revolutionary and social activities." This included Jaures, Saint-Simon, Lafargue, Fourier, Babeuf, Danton, Marat and Robespierre.

Today, when our country is experiencing a period of revolutionary renovation, once again we turn not only to the Great October but also to the experience of the French Revolution. As M.S. Gorbachev reminds us in his book *"Perestroyka i Novoye Myshleniye"* [Perestroika and New Thinking], in his time Lenin noted that in France, after the Great Revolution of 1789-1794, three other revolutions were needed to complete its work (1830, 1848, 1871). "Why should socialism, which is called upon to make even more profound economic, sociopolitical and spiritual changes in society compared to capitalism," the author of the book asks, "not cross several revolutionary passes before it can reveal its entire potential and definitively crystallize as an essentially new system?"

The freedom-loving traditions, variety of historical ties, similarity of cultures and coincidence or similarity of national interests were all factors which have long nurtured feelings of reciprocal sympathy between the peoples of France and the Soviet Union. "Happiness is a new idea in Europe," Saint-Juste said. To paraphrase these words, we could say that today trust is becoming the "new idea" in the old world. We believe that France and the Soviet Union, like other countries on the old continent, constantly strengthening reciprocal trust, will be able to build a European home for the creation of which our country is appealing.

The exceptional importance of this historical task was reasserted also in the course of the recent Soviet-French Summit and at the Paris meeting of the Conference on the Universal Human Dimension of the European Process (as we know, after this conference, in the next 2

years similar international fora are scheduled to take place in Copenhagen and Moscow).

"People! Awaken to hope!" was the appeal launched by Gracchus Babeuf, one of the knights of freedom who, not sparing his own life, continued the work of the progressive fighters of the French Revolution. The new political thinking, which was proclaimed by our country in the age of its own revolutionary renovation, is restoring the hopes of mankind for freedom from nuclear and other threats and for fruitful cooperation among all nations and states. It is only under the conditions of a durable and noncoercive peace that the undying principles for which the makers of the French Revolution—liberty, equality and fraternity—shed their blood, can fully triumph!

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### **The Eve of World War II: Testimony of an American Scientist**

*180200171 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 89 (signed to press 17 Jul 89) pp 101-109*

[Text] This document, although attributable to the category of an evaluation by an expert (of which there can be more than one), written in the immediate aftermath of events, is nonetheless, we believe, the product of a thorough assessment, for which reason it could be considered an important testimony of the dramatically developing events on the eve of World War II.

Generally its author (a leading U.S. specialist in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, a person who would be today described as a Sovietologist) tried to remain impartial in matters applying to his own country and the USSR. Chicago University Professor Samuel M. Harper (1882-1942) could afford the luxury of speaking frankly: his attitude toward the Soviet Union immediately after 1917 had made him known as someone who could not be suspected of sympathy for the "Soviets." Subsequently, Harper changed his view on the role of the Soviet Union in global developments and on the possibility of cooperation between it and the Western countries in opposing the threat of aggression on the part of Hitlerite Germany and Japan. Naturally, this was largely the result of internal reevaluations but, to an even greater extent, under the influence of a gradual change in the social climate in the United States reacting to the sterility of the policy of "pacification," Munich and the approaching war.

Nonetheless, such moods appear to have been much more complex and conflicting than we have been accustomed to believe until recently. They reflected the thrusts of despair or vague hopes of seeing peace extended by making one more compromise, or else a firmness in opposing the aggressor, or else again the egotistical hope of securing for America a position "above the conflict," with subsequent extraction of maximal benefits. The electrified nature of the situation

made itself constantly felt. This was helped by feverish diplomatic activities, both overt and covert. The growing feeling of impasse, and the blocking of all exits from the existing situation had as its origins the atmosphere of mistrust which was established after Munich between England and France, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. The USSR found itself in a situation which was like being "outside the game." Its views were not considered. Its role in European affairs and security was neglected. The 18th VKP(b) Congress, which was awaited impatiently, and which opened on 10 March 1939, not only did not eliminate this sensation but intensified it even further.

The commentators in the American press were almost unanimous in their assessment of the respective part of the Central Committee accountability report delivered by Stalin: the Soviet leadership was proclaiming its resolve to prevent its country from becoming involved in a military conflict with Germany and Japan. It intended to remain outside the war unless it was launched against the USSR. As a whole, this was a natural and logical position. However, it seemed to many people that the West, which had become accustomed to seeing the Soviet Union stubbornly pursuing an agreement with it, had met with a new challenge, for Moscow no longer concealed its growing doubts about the possibility of reaching an agreement with London and Paris on joint actions against the spreading of aggression.

There were as many interpretations as there were questions. The majority of American observers, however, agreed in their view that ignoring Moscow's warnings would be risky. A certain interconnection could be traced between the features of the domestic development of the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1930s, manifested in the growth of political repressions, and changes (whether real or imaginary, it was not clear as yet) in the foreign policy course charted by the Stalinist leadership. Most frequent among the various considerations was the version of a drastic lowering of the combat capability of the Red Army as a result of its upheavals, the destruction of its command cadres, and transfers. Priority, however, was given to the analysis of the changes which over the last 5 years had led to the virtually total renovation of the Soviet political leadership in the center and in the local areas. In a 12 March correspondence the NEW YORK TIMES unequivocally wrote that the speech by the Soviet leader should be viewed as a conciliatory gesture toward Germany and a serious warning to the West. The newspaper concluded as follows: "Do Stalin's words indicate that we should expect improvements of relations between Russia and Germany? In general, what is their actual meaning?"

America, divided between the camp of the isolationists and the anti-isolationists, the supporters of conciliation with the "Third Reich" and its firm opponents, closely followed European events. Although many people thought that Chamberlain had gone too far in his concessions to Hitler, the majority still hoped that at a given point, when there would no longer be where to retreat, he

would be able to show his mettle. However, the events which followed soon afterwards, convincingly proved that the guarantees which England and France had given to Czechoslovakia in Munich were worthless. Even the occupation of that country on 15 March 1939 did not substantially affect Chamberlain's state of mind and his views. In the United States, the fact that the German invasion of Czechoslovakia and its occupation had not caused the expected shakeup in London made a staggering impression. "The liquidation of Czechoslovakia," the NEW YORK TIMES wrote, "was entirely insufficient to make England come out of its recently developed apathy concerning events in Central Europe...." Worse, it soon became clear that Hitler's seizure of Czechoslovakia, having created, so it seemed, a necessary and proper condition for reaching an understanding between London and Moscow, had actually undermined such an opportunity even further. To a certain extent this also applied to the reciprocal understanding between Moscow and Washington. The disappearance of Czechoslovakia from the political map of Europe, a country in the founding of which the United States had been involved, revealed even more starkly the lack of interest which America showed in the destinies of the European peoples. In a report from Moscow which appeared in the NEW YORK TIMES on 16 March Walter Duranty wrote that the reaction in the Soviet Union could be expressed with a single sentence: "What did you want?" According to Duranty, this was related to the aspiration of the Soviet leadership to emphasize that the Soviet Union was prepared to be concerned with its own safety. Arthur Crock, another political commentator for that same newspaper, in analyzing the "theories" of the U.S. Department of State concerning the development of the European situation, confirmed the existence of plans which took into consideration the possibility that Germany would start a war against the Soviet Union while the Western countries would remain neutral and with no objections by Poland.

The map of Europe which came out in the NEW YORK TIMES on 19 March 1939 showed, as one of the most likely directions of Hitler's next strike to the East, the Ukraine. "Will Russia resist or will it reach an agreement with Germany?" the newspaper questioned. Skepticism prevailed in the assessments. "Russia in a state of chaos," the NEW YORK TIMES wrote, "is not considered as a power factor in Eastern Europe...." Those who were more familiar with the internal situation of our country were of a different opinion. As a whole, however, there was total lack of clarity. Nor was clarity improved by information coming out of the embassies in Moscow. Nonetheless, among the various views and guesses related to the presentation of the Soviet view on problems of foreign policy at the 18th VKP(b) Congress, the following forecast was considered most reliable: 1. Under the existing circumstances, taking into consideration the experience of Munich and subsequent events, the Soviet Union will not be first in taking any steps which could involve it in a war with Germany; 2. The Soviet Union is concentrating on its internal affairs,

including the necessary mobilization measures and strengthening defense capability; 3. The possible resignation of M.M. Litvinov and changes in the personnel of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, as a result of the Stalinist "purges," is strengthening the hand of forces in the Soviet political leadership which prefer a state of "armed neutrality" in the face of events in Central Europe; 4. The activeness of militaristic Japan in the Far East would make the USSR twice as cautious which, as W. Duranty noted, and make the potential partners in an anti-Hitlerite bloc change roles even more quickly (the Western countries will become more interested in helping the Soviet Union than the Soviet Union in cooperating with them).

Lithuania was described as a dangerous area of Hitlerite expansion: this applied to plans for the German occupation of Klaypeda and adjacent Lithuanian territory (Memel), followed by the seizure of the entire Baltic area by Germany. As early as 19 March the American press wrote that Washington official circles provide "a single" interpretation to the demand for "fundamental changes" formulated by the supporters of the "reunification" of Klaypeda with Germany: any day Hitler could face Lithuania with an ultimatum (NEW YORK TIMES, 19 March 1939, p E3). On 21 March it was reported that Lithuania, threatened with a German invasion, and considering the noninterference of the Western powers which had guaranteed Lithuanian rights on this territory, had "agreed" to a "voluntary" transfer of the Memel area to Germany. Washington by no means ascribed Hitler's actions toward Lithuania merely a local significance. It was considered a proof of the policy of exclusive right on the part of the "Third Reich" to deal with the fate of small European countries and as a prelude to a new tragedy—the tragedy of Poland and the remaining Baltic countries. And whereas the seizure of Czechoslovakia, the NEW YORK TIMES wrote on 23 March 1939, opened Hitler's way to the southeast, "the seizure of Memel gave Germany new power over the entire Baltic area.... There was hardly any doubt in this case that Lithuania, having lost most of its coastline, would now become the actual vassal of Germany."

It may be assumed that Moscow read the American press but saw no desire on the part of the Western countries and even of Poland to prevent the development of events in that sense, thus drawing suitable conclusions for itself. One could entirely confidently claim that it was precisely the seizure of the Memel area by Hitler that faced the Kremlin particularly urgently with the question of neutralizing any further Nazi penetration into the Baltic area. The means through which this was to be achieved would be indicated by the circumstances. It was clear, however, that Hitler intended to move East, particularly via the Baltic countries.

Apparently, it was precisely for such reasons that the news that England had given guarantees to Poland was welcomed, according to Duranty, in Moscow only with "restrained satisfaction" (NEW YORK TIMES, 31 March 1939, p 1; April 1, 1939, p 1). The adjective,

"restrained" was in the sense of a predicate. Everyone understood that the mistrust shown by the Soviet leadership of the Chamberlain-Bonnet line and the obvious unwillingness of the Polish government to conclude an alliance with the USSR were a real and difficult obstacle. The United States as well realized that, furthermore, the promises given by England and France to help Poland did not indicate the abandonment of efforts to settle the Polish-German difficulties, as was said in London, "by ordinary diplomatic means." The American press ascribed particular significance to that stipulation. It was emphasized that if Poland would willingly sign an agreement with Germany on making territorial concessions (which was considered entirely admissible), in that case neither England nor France would consider themselves bound by their promises (*ibid.*, April 2, 1939, p L43). Nor was the remark in the London *TIMES* ignored, to the effect that British guarantees do not apply to every inch of the existing Polish border, i.e., they do not pertain to Danzig or the "Polish Corridor."

Another Munich? Yes, the ghost of another Munich loomed on the horizon. In that sense as well, Duranty wrote, "whether we like it or not, the Russians have the right to a more than vague suspicion that Hitler and company show greater common sense than France and the British taken together, even adding the Poles."

As we can see, caution in assessing any British definitive turn in its foreign policy was manifested not only in Moscow but also in Washington's political circles. Thus, for example, in writing that the reaction of leading industrialists in Birmingham to British guarantees to Poland were an explosion of indignation, the *NEW YORK TIMES* concluded, not without biting irony: "Great Britain may hesitate in pursuing its policies. It is firm, however, in its belief that in the final account they are bound to prevail" (*NEW YORK TIMES*, 3 April 1939, p 14). That is why, when in the middle of April, the conflicting trends appeared more clearly in Soviet foreign policy, which were discussed with concern in the Western press, starting with March 1939, analysts in Washington did not consider them unmotivated. They were considered as the result of a historically existing situation in Soviet-British and Soviet-French relations. Thus, in his correspondence from Paris, as early as 14 April A. McCormick wrote that "Moscow's intransigence" stems less from the "unwillingness on the part of Poland and Romania to accept Moscow's guarantees" than the Kremlin's hesitations concerning the expediency of "entering into a big bloc under conditions suggested by countries which so far have tried to prevent the Soviet government from organizing coordinated actions in Europe."

The need for "firsthand" information about European affairs increased and, to the politicians in Washington, assumed prime significance. One can easily understand why the readiness to visit a number of European capitols and Moscow, shown by Chicago University Professor Samuel Harper, seemed quite timely to Washington. The Department of State, with which Harper had cooperated

for some time as a consultant, saw in this one more opportunity for lifting the curtain of the European diplomatic kitchen, taking a fresh look at events and "sifting" them through a double sieve—its own analytical service and the insight of a scientist with a proven ability to think soberly. Harper, who had dedicated many years to the study of Russia and the Soviet Union, was well-known in the political circles of many countries, including above all the Soviet Union, Poland and England. Formalities were quick and his packed schedule of stay in Washington prior to his departure was filled with talks with State Department Secretary Cordell Hull, K. Umanskiy, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, and the Polish ambassador.

Harper visited Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov and Ivanovo. On 5 June, after a roughly 2-month stay in the Soviet Union, the American scientist left for Poland and, hence, for his homeland. He submitted his report on 26 July 1939, addressed to several people. By then Harper was most likely unfamiliar with the decision made by the British and French governments to accept the Soviet government's suggestion of sending military missions to Moscow which, however, were in no hurry to get there. This decision was made on 25 July. However, it took 17 days before the military missions headed by Doumenc and Drax to reach Moscow.

The questions which Harper formulated at the end of his report indicate that its author was anticipating new delays in the Moscow talks. He also warned that they could end with the collapse of the very "idea of talks" and a decision by the Soviet Union to seek ways of strengthening its safety through other means. No one can claim that Harper was right in everything. However, he had painted a picture "from nature," for which reason many of his views, particularly in discussing the possibility of the appearance of new configurations of forces in Europe as a result of the failure of the Anglo-French-Soviet talks, were distinguished by thoroughness and depth. Let us remember that the document which follows was written at a time when few people could remain totally neutral. Here as well we cannot fail to see another feature of its historical accuracy.

Harper ended his report-forecast on a pessimistic note. The chances of salvation, taking into consideration both the objective and subjective aspects of the situation, were very poor. The worst fears were justified very quickly: the forces of repulsion prevailed over the brittle trend toward closeness. Although it was this trend that had led the USSR, Britain and France to the table of military talks in Moscow on 12 August 1939, they soon afterwards found themselves in an impasse. The Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact of 23 August 1939 was, possibly, the most cruel cost of the crisis of trust among the potential allies in the future anti-Hitlerite coalition, over which the shadow of Munich continued to loom.

Harper's report is part of the archives of the noted American diplomat and former (until 1938) head of the Russian department of the State Department, Robert



Kelley. This file was presented to the department of manuscripts of the Georgetown University Library (Washington, District of Columbia).

*(The preceding article and the translation were made by V. Malkov, doctor of historical sciences, professor, department head at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of General History).*

### Sixth Visit to the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>

#### *For Official Use Only*

To: Walter S. Rogers, Institute of Contemporary International Relations, 522 Fifth Avenue, New York (New York)

From: Samuel N. Harper, Chicago University, 26 July 1939

This document is an account of my recent trip to the Soviet Union. It includes a memorandum which I wrote and sent from London, dated 3 May 1939, on a preliminary basis. The main theme of the document, naturally, is the Soviet Union. However, I have allowed myself to express my viewpoint also concerning other countries, Poland and Britain in particular, as well as the global situation as a whole to the extent to which it relates to the main topic, i.e., to the question of Sovietism on the 22nd year of its life and in connection with the international tension of recent years. It should be noted that in England I felt perfectly at home, for I had worked there in the past as a university professor in Liverpool. My stay in Poland had become traditional considering my trips to prerevolutionary Russia and the Soviet Union. That year, my stay in Poland was longer, considering the particular significance assumed by Poland in the context of the contemporary international crisis.

#### I.

A great deal of what I experienced in Poland, as in England, dealt with the extensively debated "Maginot psychology," and questions were asked whether this mentality remained dominant in France as had been the case, in all likelihood, during the events in Czechoslovakia and Spain. Many were those who feared that France, in case of war, would simply sit behind its powerful defense line instead of, as the simple Poles think, lobbing shells on the German "Ziegfried line," or else mount offensive operations against Italy.

#### II.

The messages which President Roosevelt sent to Hitler and Mussolini last April threaten the small countries, for there is no effectively functioning bloc of nonaggressive countries. The question arises of whether Roosevelt sent his messages expecting that, under the pressure of Poland or with the initiative role played by Chamberlain, an efficient program would be formulated without delay under the slogan of "let us stop Hitler?" It turned out, however, that the presidential messages were to the detriment of the small countries, for they faced the need

to assure Hitler with humility that they did not fear to become the target of attack on his part (which is what they did) and to sign with him nonaggression pacts, despite Hitler's universally known custom of ignoring such agreements should he find it convenient to reject them (...).

#### III.

In the course of my periodical visits to the Soviet Union, starting with 1926, the latest of which was my sixth, their main objective has always been to assess the development of the experiment in socialism. It is thus that I tried to broaden my own and mostly official observations conducted in Chicago with live impressions from discussions with researchers from other countries and with Soviet people representing a great variety of social strata. This year, this approach seems twice as expedient, for the question has assumed its specific feature. Of late everyone has been asking about the extent to which the crisis which led to the purges and the purge methods themselves had politically and economically weakened the Soviet system. Since Soviet military power is directly dependent on the political situation in the country at the time that such steps are being taken, as well as on the conditions of the economic activities within the framework of the new management system, which is based on the principle of a "planned economy," the answer to these questions is also an answer to another most pressing and relevant question: the question of the role which the Soviet Union could play in the implementation of a new program of collective security. It is more likely that it is contemplated by England than France in their proposals to the Soviet Union of concluding some kind of a pact, proposals which have been a topic of discussion among these countries for the past 3 months.

In the evaluation of the political and economic situation in the country, the necessary starting point for comparison was the situation which existed in the autumn of 1936, which I had found in the course of my previous visit to the Soviet Union (...). The fact that there were major reasons to assume failure in the implementation of the stipulations of the 1936 Constitution is being acknowledged even by people who are not among its harsh critics. Suffice it to say that on the very same day that the supreme legislative authority of the soviets approved the new constitution, the signing by Germany and Japan of the so-called "Anti-Communist Pact" was announced (what S. Harper had in mind was the "Anti-Comintern Pact"—V.M.), which was subsequently joined by Italy (...). The Soviet leaders had reasons to interpret this pact as a declaration of intentions hostile to the Soviet Union on the part of two of its aggressive neighbors, as well as a cover for a general joint campaign by the aggressors (...).

The military conflict would have been an even greater trial for the political stability of the Soviet system. A number of people see in the open aspiration of the bolsheviks for peace a fear of finding themselves confronting the opposition which could create wartime

conditions. On the other hand, the positive approach taken by the Soviet leadership to foreign policy, regardless of how strongly it is encouraging its armed and aggressive opponents abroad, leads us to assume that the bolsheviks fear neither the political consequences nor the trials of war (...). In summing up my impressions from the domestic situation in the country, I find that today it is better than I expected: there is less political tension and fewer economic difficulties. Actually, conditions are better than they were 1 year ago. Other observers who are studying the situation on the spot agree with me that the Soviet system is domestically strong. Although no one, naturally, could determine its strength, nonetheless it is entirely obvious that today the Soviets are stronger than they were 1 year ago (...).

Soviet foreign policy of recent years has been distinguished, as a rule, by its clarity. In the course of my numerous talks with foreign observers in Moscow and with Soviet officials, with scientists studying global politics and even simple people, I compared my impressions with the conclusions which I had reached over the past few years on the nature of foreign policy. Allow me to sum up these conclusions as a necessary introduction to the analysis of Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks which have been taking place in recent months.

In the past few years the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has been based on the confidence of its leadership in the country's defense capability. While emphasizing their aspiration for peace, the Moscow leaders have proved in a number of cases and, particularly toward Japan, that they do not fear war; they have even increased their efforts at strengthening their defenses as a consequence of increased international tension. At the same time, the Soviet government has steadily acted as a supporter of collective security measures, expressing its readiness to participate in any efficient program for collective security. Moscow, judging by what it says, bases its attitude toward collective security on the following two considerations: first, it raises the principle of the indivisibility of peace and, furthermore, of aggression, which presumes the creation of collective guarantees against it. Furthermore, Moscow believes that it is precisely such a program that would prove effective in preventing aggression, which is fraught with the danger of a world war (...).

Although remaining a supporter of the principle of the indivisibility of aggression, the Soviet Union is not changing its line of maintaining mutually profitable trade with all countries. Nonetheless, it has undertaken to reduce trade with countries which are engaged in aggressive actions against other countries; at the same time, it has sold military ordnance to countries which are opposing aggression, such as the Spanish republican government and the Chinese nationalist government. In an effort to support any collective actions which can prevent war, the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations the moment it decided that that organization was becoming an efficient weapon for the prevention of war, after Germany and Japan had left it. It has also

signed pacts of mutual aid with France and Czechoslovakia and nonaggression pacts (in a number of cases including a definition of aggression) with all neighboring states with the exception of Japan which declined the offer of the Soviet Union to conclude such a pact.

To mention other pacts briefly, which illustrate Soviet foreign policy and, particularly, the peaceful nature of this policy, we should mention proposals (caused by a number of reasons, particularly after each new act of aggression) of holding a conference of countries which oppose aggression. Moscow supported the suggestion of President Roosevelt on immediately convening a major conference in a neutral country, which was made in the last days of December 1938. The idea of the conference was raised as a counterbalance to the meetings set up by Hitler in Munich. On the other hand, the Soviet government has tried to expose the hypocrisy of the policy of "nonintervention" in Spain, has publicized "pirate" operations in the Mediterranean serving the interests of Franco, and has opposed the policy which has made the League of Nations helpless, and entirely ignored it in September 1938. Although Moscow did not protest the fact that it was not invited to Munich, the Soviet Union expressed that protest in connection with the semi-official statements made in London and Paris to the effect that the Soviet government had participated in the preliminary consultations on the subject of the agreements concluded in Munich.

Nonetheless, all these facts do not allay the suspicion felt toward the Soviet Union in some circles, particularly in England and France (...). Nonetheless, taking all this as being the principles governing bolshevik policy today, it would be logical to assume that Moscow is hoping for the trust and respect of countries which support the idea of collective security. Although claiming that the Soviet system ensures the full protection of the rights of the working people and the independence of small countries, the Soviet leaders acknowledge that our democratic system, which they describe as "bourgeois democracy," grants more freedoms than the various forms of fascism (...). On this basis, Moscow suggested to all democratic elements in all countries to cooperate in preventing aggression (...). Nonetheless, despite the positive "record" of recent years, the bolsheviks remain suspect. In turn, they answer with the same suspicion toward the ruling groups in England and France and some countries which are their closest neighbors (...).

#### IV.

Having expressed my general considerations on Soviet foreign policy, I shall now turn to the final part of the report in which I shall discuss the talks which were initiated in April on British initiative, with a view to concluding a kind of collective agreement between England and France, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other.

Having failed to receive an invitation to participate in the Munich Conference in September 1938 or, perhaps,

even having been "turned back," and, nonetheless, not finding in the Munich agreement any obvious anti-Soviet trend on the part of England and France, the Soviet government stated that it would wait for the "pacifiers" to draw tangible lessons from their own policies. If after all this becomes entirely clear, efforts to create an efficient program for collective security are not resumed, in that case, as the political leadership in Moscow has let it be understood, it will feel free to conclude treaties on an individual basis so as to ensure the safety of its own country. However, the Soviet leaders insisted, as they had done on the eve of Munich, on collective security measures aimed at preventing the development of aggression and rescuing the weakened structure of peace. Moscow expressed its belief that the forces which are for peace are still strategically superior and, if efficiently united, would be able to preserve their advantage (...).

The seizure of Prague led Moscow to the conclusion that the lessons of Munich had been learned, for which reason the Soviet government suggested that a conference be convened to discuss what should be done in the face of mounting aggression. The answer to this suggestion, on London's part, was a declaration that it considers such a conference premature. Subsequently, in response to actions which it deemed threatening to its independent economic existence, Poland took some defensive measures and rejected Hitler's demands. Following such Polish steps, Chamberlain was forced to do something. He began by granting Poland guarantees of aid by the end of March, and signed with Poland a pact in the first week of April. Until 10 July, however, Chamberlain had not removed all doubts concerning the inclusion in the British guarantee of a point dealing with violations of international agreements pertaining to Danzig. This holdup was possibly related to the revolutionary changes taking place in British policy, manifested in giving guarantees to Poland. Meanwhile, this delay did not lift doubts concerning the new line taken by Chamberlain in its policies and, particularly, its rejection of the policy of "pacification." In Moscow these doubts were manifested quite clearly, something which should also be pointed out. Whereas in the British Parliament, as late as the middle of May, in answer to Chamberlain's latest statements, there were shouts of a "new Munich!," one can easily realize why in the eastern European countries such questions remained. In Moscow they were discussed most openly with the sharpness typical of the bolsheviks.

The giving of guarantees to Poland and other countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe was a gesture aimed at the Soviet Union, which stated that, after awhile, it will act on the basis of its own interests. Yes, actually Chamberlain was forced to swallow a bitter pill. In his 13 April speech he did not intend to mention the word "Russia," but was reminded of it from the parliamentary benches. Meanwhile, the British suggestions concerning joint measures had already been sent to Moscow. On that day, Chamberlain finally made a statement which, for

the past 2 years, Moscow had urged leaders of the Western countries to make. He said that ideological differences affecting various aspects of domestic policy should not prevent countries which are trying to strengthen peace to join efforts in order to achieve this objective.

It is entirely clear now that it was precisely Chamberlain who insisted on the fact that not a single country participating in the talks would make public proposals and counterproposals. Moscow scrupulously observed this condition to the point of even refusing to inform the republic through its controlled press that such talks were taking place at all. The press in the Western countries—the so-called free press—tried to inform its readers of the basic proposals and counterproposals. Their public discussion in the press of the so-called democratic countries most likely forced the Chamberlain government to try more sincerely to reach an agreement with the Soviets. The question, however, arises as to whether all sorts of "assumptions" on the nature of the talks and their difficult progress are contributing to their fruitful conclusion. At the time of this writing they are still under way; for that reason I shall present only my strictly personal view on the possibility of their conclusion with an agreement on a pact. However, I shall do this only after having briefly described their origins, nature and significance.

#### V.

The official silence as to the precise nature of the British proposals and Soviet counterproposals was violated by both sides roughly on 10 May. In answer to a statement by the British Reuters News Agency, believed to have been sanctioned by the official circles, in an editorial article in the semiofficial newspaper IZVESTIYA, on 11 May, the Soviet government expressed its own views, claiming that the British statement provides a wrong interpretation of the state of affairs. This incident, which took place as the talks were still being held, indicates that from the very beginning mistrust or at least a certain suspicion existed between London and Moscow based on the views which each of the sides believed to be accurate about the other.

Although the full text of the initial British proposals and some counterproposals were not made public, nonetheless the declarations made by Chamberlain and Soviet Prime Minister Molotov provide a basis for assumptions on the general natures of the attitude of the parties in the course of the 3-month talks concerning the exchange of counterproposals (...). On 5 June, the day I left Moscow, my doubts as to whether the talks could be concluded successfully, were quite strong and I openly mentioned this in Moscow and, subsequently, in Warsaw.

It seems clear that London's initial proposals called for the conclusion of nothing but a general agreement of a declarative nature (...). Moscow, apparently, suspected that Chamberlain would be able to make use of such a general and actually meaningless agreement as a cover

for returning to a policy of "pacification." Moscow also interpreted the British proposals as a symptom of a remaining secret hope which, it believed, was still shared by some groups in England and France, which was essentially that the Nazi aggression could still be entirely directed to the East, "against those bolsheviks" (...). Another reason for difficulties in the course of the talks was the fact that both England and the Soviet Union look at each other as countries which need help. This, I believe, is the basic error of the British prime minister. He thought that the Soviet Union was in such a state of panic that cooperation with it could be ensured for a very small price. In my view, the situation was entirely different, for it is precisely the British Empire which is now threatened in a number of cases. It is precisely it that is less prepared for self-defense and, furthermore, because of its obligations in Eastern and Southeast Europe, it needs or even must seek cooperation with the Soviet Union. I, however, saw no proof whatsoever that Moscow had tried to extract benefits from this situation in which England, together with its ally France, found itself, the latter strategically weakened as a result of the German-Italian control of Spain. If the Soviet Union feels itself alone, as was the case in September 1938, and in isolation, the German-Italian-Japanese bloc will be given a very free hand to act against England and France and those whom they protect (...). Meanwhile, the Soviet leaders have frequently and unequivocally stated that at the present time the interests of the Soviet system would be more reliably secured with a strong British empire, a strong France and a strong Poland.

Without imposing itself on anyone as an ally, the Soviet Union would not like to enter into any kind of agreement which, in its view, should this take place, would be doomed in advance to failure because of its vagueness. Such an agreement would rather encourage aggression instead of preventing it and could take the USSR to the brink of the precipice. That is why Moscow insisted on an immediately military accord among the three great powers—England, France and the Soviet Union—which would call for consultations among the general staffs as an intrinsic part of the political agreement. Let me point out that the present Franco-Soviet Mutual Aid Antiaggression Pact of 1935 did not call for formal consultations among members of the general staffs of the two countries.

Moscow insists on the fact that it is only the procedure suggested by it that could give the small countries confidence in the possibility of formulating an efficient program for collective security which they could join after the failure of the efforts to create a similar program which had been suggested on the eve of Munich. Such a procedure, the Soviet leadership believes, could prevent the expansion of aggression without the use of force. Realizing, however, that the use of military power could become necessary, the Soviet leadership insists on formulating conditions for an agreement which would call for the automatic use of force if it is to be effective. Taking into consideration the events in Danzig of the

past few months, Moscow believes that internal subversive activities like direct military invasion could justify the automatic use of steps against aggression as stipulated by the agreement. It is precisely the insistent demands of Moscow to include this item, in addition to the stipulation of the situation concerning the three Baltic states bordering the Soviet Union on the north-west and the west, that have blocked the talks in their final stage. Possibly, in its 10 July 1939 statement on the subject of the "subversive methods" used by the Nazis in Danzig, Chamberlain finally considered justified Moscow's insistence on including the item of indirect aggression.

Chamberlain's aspiration to avoid any particular mention of the three Baltic countries has reawakened Moscow's suspicions which, judging by everything else, had abated in the course of the talks. Therefore, the attempt to avoid any particular mention of these countries meant that these concepts in the draft agreement on reciprocal guarantees did not equally apply to all participants in the talks. For that reason Moscow refused to accept the explanation according to which these three small countries were unwilling to be given guarantees since other bigger countries (such as Poland and Turkey—V.M.), having accepted such guarantees, somehow silently acknowledged that their security was threatened. To be even more specific, let me point out that the British aspiration to take these countries out of it is triggering in the Soviet Union the suspicion that, possibly, some Western countries are still hoping for a Nazi aggression toward the East. That is why it would be convenient to maintain this corridor open for a passage to the Soviet border. When the British said that if the Nazi aggression develops in said direction they will help the Soviet Union immediately, the moment the aggression reaches the Soviet border, Moscow's suspicions became even stronger. The British answer confirmed the existence of that same hope of a conflict between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and an easing of the fascist pressure in the West and the South.

I already expressed my skepticism concerning the possibility of signing an Anglo-Franco-Soviet pact. Moscow will not sign it until the conditions it has raised have been met. Such conditions would seem entirely reasonable if this pact is an efficient program which could block any further aggression. The latest more positive statements concerning British policy, made by Chamberlain and Halifax, and about French policies, made by Daladier, are symptomatic of a more honest approach to the talks on the part of the British and French governments, which could correspondingly reduce Moscow's suspicions. It is very important to note that the full text of the speech which Halifax delivered on 29 June was carried in the Soviet press, and that major excerpts from Chamberlain's 10 July speech were quoted. The recent foreign policy steps taken by Halifax and Daladier on behalf of England and France, could contribute to extracting the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks, which have been going on since 1 June, out of their impasse. Taking into consideration the attitude shown by Chamberlain and Bonnet



toward the Soviet government, it would be difficult to expect of the latter total confidence in these two politicians. However, Moscow still believes in the usefulness of a collective security program and, from my viewpoint, would willingly cooperate in the implementation of such a program which would take into consideration its national interests, but only providing that this program is entirely based on the principle of reciprocity and stipulates concepts which make its true implementation possible.

Anyone following the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks can realize that they have a certain pertinence concerning America. In turn, all the indications are that American policy is being influenced by these talks and, particularly, by their dragging out. The presidential messages to the "aggressors" of last April were considered by some circles in London as an attempt on his part to help create a front of antiaggressive countries, the idea of which, it was believed, was contained in the British proposals to the Soviets. As has been noted everywhere, these messages make a contribution to the security of small countries, which depends exclusively on the conditions for the formulation (desirably without delay) of a new and efficient collective security program. The presidential messages were extensively publicized in the Soviet press and all comments on their subject were exceptionally positive. During a lunch at a kolkhoz in the Ukraine, the talk turned to America and it was interesting to hear how a young rural girl expressed her high regards for Roosevelt in connection with his contribution to strengthening peace.

Possibly, this is no more than an assumption, but it seems to me that America's refusal to implement in a positive spirit, by changing its legislation on neutrality, the foreign policy concept which appears to be formulated in Roosevelt's April messages, has forced the Soviet participants in the talks to assume a more cautious attitude in terms of signing a final pact with England and France. It is also entirely possible that, as I imagine, the delay in the talks with the Soviets has influenced the strengthening of the isolationist trends in America, particularly when it became obvious that Chamberlain is in no hurry to sign with the Soviets a type of agreement which would be of real significance. Therefore, in the final account, both the Soviet Union and America are having equal doubts as to the sincerity of Chamberlain and Bonnet. The Soviet Union may fear to conclude an agreement with England and France which would not stipulate either material or even moral support on the part of America. In turn, neither the United States nor France could hope to make their collective security programs sufficiently meaningful without the involvement of the Soviets.

A very defeatist person may claim that efficient cooperation among England, France, America and the Soviet Union is totally impossible. If such is the case, the alliance among the aggressors, created by Hitler, could unobstructedly carry out its intentions, as has already been the case in the past. In March and April the position

held by Poland, the British and French guarantees, the Anglo-French proposals to the Soviets and, finally, Roosevelt's messages to the aggressor countries, may seem to have given Hitler a pause. In his 28 April speech, while remaining as malicious as possible, Hitler did not seem as provocative as usual, judging by the tone and choice of words. By mid-June, however, the provocative and even aggressive nature of his speeches reappeared on the subject of Danzig, Tientsin and the Outer Mongolian Border. Could the delay in the talks in London and Moscow become a prerequisite for a defeat of the very idea of talks, thus encouraging the aggressor instead of being an instrument of restraint? The answer to this question which, as I realized, concerned many people at the time that I left Europe, by the end of June, may come next week.

Footnote

1. Georgetown University Library, Robert E. Kelley Papers, Box 3, Folder 11a. Samuel H. Harper. A Sixth Visit to the Soviet Union, July 26, 1939). Harper's report has been translated from the original with minor deletions of no essential significance.

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## THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

### The Capitalist Economy After the Latest Turn

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[Text] In the past 12 to 18 months a view which has been formulated by various authors differently but which, in the final account, may be reduced to noting a new qualitative condition in the capitalist economy, has become quite popular. Indicative in this connection are, among others, the articles by Yu. Borko (KOMMUNIST No 15, 1988), and G. Diligenskiy, Ya. Pevzner and V. Sheynis ("The Global Economy and International Relations," Nos 3, 6 and 9 for 1988). Nonetheless, the detailed and systematic presentation of the reasons, motive forces and consequences of the changes have not been provided as yet. Also set aside has been the interpretation of the interconnection between production relations and production forces within capitalism by the turn of the 21st century, although many Soviet economists have pointed out, not without justification, the relative consistency between contemporary capitalist

production relations and production forces, developing under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution. As part of the current development and debates taking place within Soviet economic science, we would like to express our understanding of a number of aspects of this major problem of political economy.

### A New Style of "Times of Trouble"

In the 1970s the memorable "accomplishment" by our social science was views on the growing instability of the capitalist economy. On the one hand, already then such views could have seemed not simply dogmatic but extremely so, to a cynical degree. It was cynical, for the concept of the "intensified instability" in the opposite political and ideological camp concealed quite well our own economy which was running idle. On the other hand, the past decade was indeed distinguished by extraordinary events in economic life. Suffice it to recall the sudden quadruple increase of petroleum prices in 1973, stepped up unemployment, the conversion of "sliding" into galloping inflation, combined with a decline (the stagflation phenomenon) and so on. Added to this in the 1980s were the lengthy several-month-long rises in interest rates to a level which was previously typical either of usurious loans or, for a short period of 2 to 3 weeks, reaching a paroxysm of crisis; increased fluctuations in exchange rates (the price of the dollar initially doubled and then, starting with the spring of 1985, depreciated by almost 50 percent); and the debt crisis of the developing countries.

It would be difficult to avoid the temptation to describe all of this as the "times of trouble" (the more so since we by no means listed everything which could be said in this connection). To begin with, however, there was also another side to this: the side which the Western economy considers, frequently with full justification, as its gain. Let us limit ourselves to the main one: the initiated large-scale and very successful economic application of the achievements of the present stage in the scientific and technical revolution. Second, the enumeration of negative phenomena should be considered from a somewhat paradoxical viewpoint yet nonetheless important in terms of understanding what was happening: it was a question of an economy which had been able to deal without any catastrophic losses with the tenfold increase in petroleum prices, if we consider the second round of the energy crisis, at the end of the 1970s; with unparalleled fluctuations in interest and currency exchange rates; with galloping inflation; with huge masses of speculative capital flowing from one country to another, etc. How at this point not to consider the internal structural development of capitalism in general and its manifestations in recent decades? Naturally, we should in no way belittle the gravity of the 1974-1975 and 1980-1982 crises. However, this does not refute our claim but even, in its own way, supports it. The economy coped with these crises, they did not grow into something like the "great depression." Therefore, during the "times of trouble" the capitalist economy not only withstood

blows of tremendous destructive power (although triggered by itself and not by external circumstances) but, as a whole, even continued to develop quite successfully.

In the long run, it is worth thinking about whether an economy which has experienced such events could be threatened by anything. How could it adapt to the new rigid conditions and what are the limits of such adaptability?

As we continue our discussion of the specific nature of the "times of trouble," we cannot avoid its social aspect. The stormy events in economic life were not paralleled by social battles of corresponding force in the area of economic problems. Economic demands were most frequently formulated as though as an appendix to the main ones around which one social movement or another rallied (against the war in Vietnam, in defense of the environment, etc.). In France May 1968 marked the biggest social storm of recent decades. Everything seems to indicate that its importance has still not been fully realized. These events had a great impact on subsequent developments, and not only in France. But here is something characteristic: even on that scale of social explosion, the economic component, although present, was quite dulled, in any case judging by the yardstick of the older class battles. A great deal in the history of our civilization began in Paris and also ended there.

The French May of 1968 thundered precisely on the eve of the "times of trouble" which had begun for the capitalist economy. Consequently, already then the role of the economic factor had substantially changed in shaping the social atmosphere which, actually, enabled capitalism to withstand the period of economic cataclysms, not only without making any new and substantial concessions of the working people (as had been the case in the 1930s), but also, under the banner of neocoonservatism, mounting an offensive on the social gains of the working class. It became clear, on a broadest possible level, that in the 1930s, brought to a state of despair, the proletariat had nowhere to retreat; in the 1970s and 1980s, operating on a different level of satisfaction of needs, it had room for a retreat. We believe that this question is worth special attention.

### Needs and Level of Their Satisfaction

During the first postwar decades, thanks to the turn in production forces, related to the scientific and technical revolution, the capitalist economy acquired a basic possibility for stably meeting the main vital needs of the majority of the population (for food, clothing, housing, and health care). A new situation was created in which primary needs (which had been primary for many centuries) yielded to rapidly increasing secondary needs, born of the development of the individual and functioning in ordinary life as "leisure time needs." Such needs appear on the basis of the primary needs but, unlike them, they are unsated and boundless, not only with the development of the individual. The latter has

been quite substantial under the conditions of bourgeois society with its specific ideals and scale of values.

Taking contemporary capitalism as an example, we can observe the extent to which a society can be "carried away" by the new needs. The production of most complex types of equipment, such as personal computers, videos, and so on, is growing at an amazing speed and, subsequently, turns into the production of the next generations of such goods or else to the development of new types of goods. The impression is created that the production pendulum is swinging ever more widely, as though unable to stop, broadening the boundaries of the "leisure time needs." This is helped by their very nature. Despite their initially objective nature, the most significant are needs which are subjectively considered as principal. It is inherent in the individual to identify his interests with that which brings him personally tangible and, in his view, useful results.

"*Das Kapital*" was written "in the footsteps" of one of the most important periods in the history of mankind: "the steam age." From our point of view we can say that despite all of its accomplishments, the "steam age" revolutionized consumption (in the sense of the array of consumed goods) to a much lesser extent than the "age of electricity." The steam engine "brought into the home" of the ordinary consumer an increased amount of traditional material goods. Their cost declined and the amount of social leisure time increased. Naturally, this benefit did not affect all members of society but was concentrated, in addition to the ruling class, in the strata which serviced the bourgeoisie and were close to it. It was precisely stability—a forced stability based on the insufficient level of development of production forces—of the array of goods consumed by man that enabled K. Marx to take as an example in his study of commodity production the exchange of traditional goods, known since biblical times, such as clothing, wheat, etc. The pairs of bulk goods which Marx analyzed as specific cases of the equation "x commodity A = y commodity B," were almost identical in the 19th century, the antiquity or the middle ages. This was not because the author of "*Das Kapital*" wanted to emphasize how old both the market and commodity production were.

The "age of electricity" ensured a qualitative leap in the volumes of output of material goods and sharply increased their selection. However, this selection largely retained its previous rates. It was dominated by the "minimal variety" needed by every individual. It was only with the development of the scientific and technical revolution that conditions were created for greater choices of consumer goods. Mass standardized consumption is characteristic of contemporary bourgeois society. It does not exclude but, conversely, presumes extensive variety and choices of commodities or services with which to "furnish" one's leisure time. The ordinary set of age-old "varietal minimum," needed to satisfy primary requirements, assumed a more modest share. Thus, the American family spends an average of 18 percent of its budget on food. In the new situation,

reducing consumption in the case of economic difficulties has meant, for the majority of the population, a worsening of conditions for the satisfaction of "leisure time needs." Social tolerance of economic difficulties has increased, for the prime needs continue to be satisfied quite steadily during periods of crises as well. In our view, this situation appeared by the end of the 1960s. It was precisely this that enabled capitalism to surmount the "times of trouble" without any particular social losses.

The description of "leisure time needs" must be specified from the political-economic viewpoint. Let us note, above all, that however much such needs may have increased, they depend on the production process and are part of social reproduction. The conflict between production and consumption is not eliminated but assumes new dynamics which involve not only reproduction capital as such but the entire bourgeois society. This eliminates the narrowness of the consumption area which is saturated with new needs felt not only by the participants in the production process but also by all strata in bourgeois society.

It would be pertinent to bear in mind at this point that in the initial period of its establishment, capitalism itself created and broadened a market both for means of production and consumer goods. The periodical crises aimed at restoring proportionality in this process did not stop the advance but, conversely, each time on a new level reached a reciprocal adaptation between the production and consumption structures. At the present stage in the development of capitalism we can see the way, on the one hand, production shapes "leisure time needs" and, on the other, itself precisely needs the type of people whose requirements meet the requirements of the current production process.

In their time, criticizing the Western concepts of the so-called "consumer society," Marxist scientists justifiably noted a distortion within such concepts of the nature of consumption itself and the erosion of its social boundaries in bourgeois society. In considering now the "leisure time needs," we are not describing contemporary society in the developed capitalist countries as a "consumer society." It is a question of the "scope" which is opened for production and for the system of production relations by the new scale and nature of needs. It is understandable that this circumstance does not change the nature of the capitalist system, although it creates new internal impetus for its development.

The sociological law of time saving is making itself felt particularly strongly under contemporary conditions. Its main manifestation is that with the tempestuous growth of labor productivity production time is reduced, thus contributing to the further growth of the social nature of the production process. Correspondingly, the amount of leisure time increases. This is not a vacuum but a time which is needed to meet objectively arising needs. In the final account, this means a time needed to enable production forces and, above all, the main one among

them—man—to reach a new standard. “Both for the individual as well as society,” Marx wrote, “the comprehensiveness of their development, needs and activities depend on time saving. In the final account, any economy is reduced to the economy of time” (K. Marx and F. Engels, “*Soch.*” [Works], vol 46, part I, p 117).

At this point we can only remember the increased attention paid to the quality of manpower which began to appear in the advanced capitalist countries as early as the 1930s. One of the reasons for this was obvious: the increased complexity of the production process and the share of capital invested per worker, as well as the fact that labor productivity had reached its maximum through increases in ordinary production efficiency. Another reason for the increased role of the “human factor” may not be all that obvious although it is related to the first and is based on the changed structure of the needs of the working people. Capitalism could not ignore this circumstance, for the range of motivations for labor activity began to broaden rapidly. For that reason, already then business began to apply the principle of “human relations” in company activities.

All of this draws our attention to that aspect of contemporary capitalist production which reflects the influence of “leisure time needs” not only on consumption itself but also on the production process, both in terms of the attitude toward the labor process as well as the variety of produced goods and services.

The law of increased needs has operated throughout the history of mankind. Never before, however, has it been based on such a powerful production machinery. Nonetheless, the dialectics of development is such that said production machinery is becoming increasingly costly in terms of the human habitat. The needs of other groups—collective but, essentially, universal, are beginning to be felt increasingly. This applies, above all, to the need for ensuring harmony between economic activities and nature (we are not dealing with other global problems). The point is that in the future the satisfaction of individual needs will be possible only on the basis of the satisfaction of the third group of needs. Nonetheless, the fact that capitalism has emerged on a new level does not mean in the least that, having conquered one obstacle it would be able “on the run” to take the next one as well.

#### Capitalist Economic Management: New Features

One of the most important characteristics of the 1970s and beginning of 1980s was the crisis in state-monopoly control of the economy. This is a multiple-factor phenomenon. The main thing, we believe, is the following: the conversion to the new technological system and the adaptation to new reproduction ratios are taking place in the commodity-capitalist economy above all through competitive market methods. Naturally, this is not to say that state regulation is unable to adapt to the new conditions. The problem is, first, that the system of governmental participation in economic life, which was established in the postwar decades, was called upon to

solve different problems. Therefore, it proved poorly adapted to handle the new situation which arose as a result of the technological restructuring of the production process and the respective structural changes in the economy. Second, at the initial stage of such a restructuring, its internal laws were not as yet clear and any deliberate interference in its development could prove to be quite ineffective. The conversion to a new technological system, which is currently developing in the area of highly developed capitalism, makes it necessary to reconsider the correlation between uncontrolled and controlled principles in economic life.

In our view, from time to time situations may develop in the economy in which any categorical one-dimensional pitting of these two principles against each other (the uncontrolled as being negative and destructive, and the controlled as being positive and constructive) turns out underproductive. Obviously, we must acknowledge that during certain periods (above all within the system of a contemporary commodity economy) the very nature of economic processes gives priority to spontaneous factors. Under such circumstances the level of uncertainty increases to such an extent that it becomes extremely difficult to implement the deliberate principle on the macroeconomic level. Furthermore, there are no guarantees whatsoever that any such interference in economic life would bring about better or faster results. A certain amount of time must pass for the new laws and new proportions to become apparent. It is at that point that the conscious principle may make itself visible. Furthermore, the need for broad-scale control becomes substantially greater.

The duration of the transitional periods in economics in general, and even more so within a commodity-capitalist economy, is largely predetermined by the level of activeness of spontaneously operating factors. The very origins of capitalism and the establishment of a technological system consistent with it—large-scale machine production—required the elimination of noneconomic controls which capitalism had inherited from previous production systems, and granting competition unlimited freedom. The condition of maturity of large-scale machine production and the relative stability of reproduction processes corresponded to the increased regulatory principles: a monopolization of production and circulation took place.

The greatest breakthrough of the spontaneous forces in the economic history of contemporary capitalism was related to the surreptitiously growing disparity between private monopoly regulation and the requirements formulated by the increasingly widespread mass assembly line-conveyor belt production. The 1929-1933 crisis is usually considered primarily only as the reason which motivated the bourgeois state seriously to undertake to deal with economic life, to limit its uncontrolled aspects and to create a system of governmental regulations. This is unquestionable. However, it is important not to ignore another side: that system developed after the spontaneous forces had “played at will.” In that sense the



outbreak was not simply the reason for a conversion to active state control but also a prerequisite which made it possible to clarify and define its trends and forms.

During transitional periods the increased uncertainty of economic life hinders controls largely because forecasting the development of events becomes extremely complex. Given the absence of a reliable forecasting the implementation of deliberate principles is extremely hindered and the choice of a given line of behavior essentially turns out to be random, for which reason it can only increase the uncertainty and play a disorienting role. In principle, evaluations based on extrapolation of already visible trends provide entirely satisfactory results. However, should the dominant trends change this method becomes unreliable. That is precisely what happens in economic life during "times of trouble."

The reduced practical usefulness of forecasts has been noticed with concern by many bourgeois economists. One of them even described the science of economics of the past 15 years as a "pile of discredited equations" (INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 8 January 1988). It is clearly no accident, therefore, that 43-year old Stanford University Professor M. Boskin, becoming chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors of U.S. President George Bush, formulated his credo as follows: "I have always considered seriously the studies of all scientific schools. I have never had any prejudices against the fact that someone may be right, for I have not been affiliated with any camp whatsoever." Nonetheless, this reliance on the "pluralism of opinions" did not prevent Boskin from providing a one-dimensional assessment of the deployment of regulatory instruments in the economic mechanism of the contemporary American economy. From his viewpoint, market forces as a whole "work perfectly but, in the existing situation, are not perfect" (TIME, 30 January 1989, p 36).

Against the background of chaos which was created during that time in the Western economy, a new correlation appeared within the capitalist economic management mechanism between spontaneous and controlled principles and between competition-market methods and state controls. For a while, based on past experience and several cycles, this new correlation could contribute to the quite dynamic and stable development of the economy. Actually, the economic upsurge which began in the United States in 1983 and, in Western Europe somewhat later, has already indicated a substantial amount of internal energy. Naturally, quite strong disproportions have accumulated as well. Conditions for the advent of the next crisis have matured. Fears are being expressed in the West (heard particularly loudly during the period of the stock market collapse in October 1987) to the effect that the likelihood that such a crisis could develop into something similar to the "great depression" were expressed. Several books were even published describing a possible economic crisis in 1990. We believe that in all likelihood this will be no more than an ordinary crisis in the reproduction cycle rather than a crisis characteristic of "times of trouble."

Changes occur in the correlation between competition-market and control principles under conditions in which competition itself substantially changes. In the final account, competition is a spontaneous method inherent in commodity production, leading to the choice of the optimal economic decision. Actually, since the results of the competition among capitals show up on the market-place, the appearance is created that a selection has been based on results, i.e., on the finished product. Actually, this in itself confirms the accuracy of the economic decision.

In the early stages of development of the commodity economy it was impossible to test the accuracy of a decision before the results. With the increased socialization of output and the greater difficulty of testing the product, increasingly the accuracy of decisions is tested at the time they are made. Thus, ideally it would be expedient to choose the best of all possible projects and to continue work only on such projects. As a rule, however, such a selection is impossible. Therefore, in an effort to lower the cost of the competitive struggle, the concerns may make agreements, even though with only some among their competitors. This, as a minimum, gives confidence that the decisions which are being made by the partners will not be better than one's own. The need to postpone the moment at which the decision has been made, affecting several individual capitals, forces the concerns, during the preproduction stage, to conclude agreements on cooperation, set up joint enterprises, etc. The most important decisions are made jointly in that case (such as what element base to be chosen for electronic equipment). Less important decisions (such as design) are made independently and it is in that area that the competition develops.

In circumstances in which competition is objectively aggravated as a result of technological restructuring of the production process and when a fierce struggle is being waged for leadership in the development of new types of goods and the division of new markets, the shift in the process of decision-making to the preproduction stage improves economic management efficiency.

Yet another important shift in the capitalist economic mechanism is, in our view, the following: mandatorily, the system of commodity output must have built-in variable parameters with the help of which, for a while at least, disproportions can be eliminated. In the period of premonopoly capitalism there was no relative determination of parameters such as wages, employment, etc. During periods of crises, let us say, prices dropped sharply, unemployment increased spasmodically and wages dropped substantially. Under the conditions of contemporary capitalism, however, such parameters are far less flexible. This is explained with the effect of a number of factors, not the least of which is the aspiration of the ruling circles to lower the intensity of class conflicts. Nonetheless, the amount of "work" to maintain and periodically restore proportionality has increased substantially. Consequently, some of the "obligations" assumed by the established parameters is

assumed by fixed parameters. Hence the amplitude of their fluctuations should increase.

We believe that at the present time the greatest burden in maintaining the proportions is assumed by the rates of exchange, interest rates, the amount of money in circulation, the national debt, etc. On the one hand, the mobility of such parameters gives the economic mechanism substantial maneuverability. On the other, it creates new difficulties, such as deforming the internationalization of economic life both within the global capitalist economy as well as on the scale of the overall global economy as a whole, and in this sense and at that stage holds back the potential possibility of taking steps aimed at solving global problems.

### Multiple Adequacy

The flexibility of the economic mechanism and its ability for self-development, reacting to changes both in production forces and in the superstructure of bourgeois society, made it possible for production relations to surmount the barrier of hindrances to economic growth, which arose with the appearance of capitalist monopolies. As a result, the capitalist production method showed history a seemingly intricate picture: both during the period of free competition and with monopoly capitalism, as a whole production relations did not become an obstacle to the development of production forces.

Therefore, when we speak of the consistency of monopoly capitalism with the nature of the bourgeois system, this is not to say that with the blossoming of free competition consistency in the interconnection between production relations and production forces was lacking. Capitalism was able to preserve competition despite the tempestuous growth of socialization and monopolization of production and with the active involvement of the bourgeois state in economic life. In our view, it is precisely to competition that capitalism owes the fact that production relations did not become ossified or deprived of the ability to develop. As a form of capitalism, monopoly did not destroy or was unable to destroy competition, for the latter, according to Marx, "is nothing other than the **inner nature of capital...**" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 46, part I, p 391). The appearance of monopoly in production and the monopoly dictated by the producer, and even more so his aspiration to acquire absolute monopoly inevitably clash against counteracting factors which are part of the very nature of capitalism.

Competition imbues all areas of bourgeois society. However, it plays its biggest role precisely in the economic mechanism, which is a kind of transmission belt between production and superstructural relations, on the one hand, and production forces, on the other.

Could it be said that now, when more than 100 years have passed since the first forms of monopoly appeared, that we are witnessing a "revival" of competition? In the light of what was said, it would be more accurate, obviously, to emphasize the changed conditions in the

reproduction of public capital and, therefore, above all the changes in the content and forms of the competitive struggle. We could single out at least three most important circumstances. We already mentioned one of them, which functions directly in the production area, in connection with the correlation between the spontaneous and regulatory principles in capitalist economic management. The second is the tremendous influence on processes within the national economies created by competition within the global capitalist economy. It is precisely the establishment of a global economy under imperialism that gave competition its "second breath." In order to survive among the business giants, the monopolies must be able to withstand in the competitive struggle on a global economic level. Whereas Marx's "*Das Kapital*" does not consider at all global competition, today it has become an equal member in the "family" of each "national home."

Finally, the third is related to the fact that the tempestuous development of the scientific and technical revolution is leading to an accelerated change in labor objects, production technologies and sources of energy, increasing the role of new developments, inventions and discoveries in a great variety of areas. This is no longer simply the "age of electricity." Under such circumstances, no single concern or group can monopolize the scientific and technical revolution. Even small or medium-sized companies frequently find themselves in the ranks of discoverers. This has led to the creation of a kind of "technological" base for competition in the eyes of which anyone is equal, regardless of the size of his capital. The result is that in the past it was competition that encouraged capital to master the scientific and technical revolution, after which that same revolution became a new impetus for its development. Such is the dialectics of economic management in contemporary capitalism.

However, despite the entire importance of competition in the internal formative development of capitalism, we cannot fail to see the result of the ownership relations and the development of capitalism which, in the past 10 to 15 years, was by no means straight. The appearance of new forms of capitalist ownership, consistent with the level reached in socialization on the national and global economic scales, did not lead to the elimination of the previous forms. Furthermore, the appearing forms of ownership (monopoly and state above all) seem to broaden the area of the functioning of its historical predecessors—private, private-capitalist, cooperative-capitalist, etc. As a result, all ownership relations were restructured on a new basis, being always in a state of motion. For example, despite the high level of socialization and monopolization of the American economy, in which the 500 biggest concerns account for more than 40 percent of the GNP, the country has more than 11 million different enterprises individually owned; two or more individuals are the owners of 1.7 million enterprises, and more than 3 million enterprises are stock holding companies. Although stock holding enterprises

account for the overwhelming majority of goods and services, they do not "claim" a comprehensive domination of the national economy.

In describing monopoly capitalism as the age of the rule of financial capital, scientists and journalists frequently ignore the other types of capital. Yet financial capital, despite its monopolistic nature, did not absorb all the varieties of capital which are continuing to develop entirely successfully in a great variety of sectors. Furthermore, financial capital either feeds from other forms of capital, "redoing them to fit itself," or else in general cannot exist without them such as, for example, without state capital. We also know that nonmonopoly capital in industry and services is reproduced today not simply because the financial magnates "have overlooked it," having been unable to find the time so far to deal with all small and medium-sized capitalist producers. Nonmonopolized capital not only serves the interest of financial capital but is also relatively independent of it. It would be erroneous in this connection to assume that financial capital alone is consistent with the production forces under imperialism. Equally adequate is the entire system of production relations, based on the sum total of all forms of capitalist ownership as well as the variety of all types of capital.

#### Paradoxes of Asymmetry in the Global Economy

Clearly, the term "crisis" was used in publications in recent years most frequently in characterizing the global capitalist economy. Indeed, it included a number of critical processes. Let us take perhaps the catastrophic level of indebtedness of the third world to banks in the developed countries. Nonetheless, crises may be different. Whereas an economic crisis is a normal phenomenon in a market-oriented economy, and a regular method for restoring development proportionality in the new round of structural changes, any noncyclical crisis frequently does not have clearly delineated parameters. This expression may imply any relatively lengthy aggravation of economic and social contradictions. That is why it makes great sense to use in political economy the term "crisis terminology" only as applicable to reproduction processes. As to the global capitalist economy, at a first approximation, we can see here an obvious asymmetry both in its structure and in the development of its individual parts.

Is consistency within contemporary production forces inherent in global economic relations? We believe that the answer cannot be simple. The trend is such that at the present stage, in the advanced countries, in principle the reproduction of social capital could take place normally also whenever the material and human resources of the developing world would be used only on the basis of an equivalent trade, cleansed from financial exploitation. In that sense the developed countries could do without the financial resources of the third world although they are infinitely distant from the idea of agreeing to a complete write-off of the third world's debts. As to the material and human resources of the developing countries, whatever the

option, they are objectively involved in global economic circulation. Even if there were no financial exploitation and international economic relations were based on full equality, the third world could not, by itself, make a qualitative leap in the area of economic upsurge.

This leads us to conclude that in the global capitalist economy the consistency between production relations and production forces exists in the area of developed capitalism, whereas no such situation is to be found in the third world. This is manifested most obviously also in the fact that the gap between developed and developing countries is not shrinking but widening. Therefore, the new qualitative condition of contemporary capitalism and the more or less stable satisfaction of many human needs were achieved and maintained not least at the expense of the neocolonial exploitation of countries enslaved by their debts. To the third world, however, settling the debt problem is only one side of the overall problem. The other is to obtain the help of the global community.

Although the world of the liberated countries has many faces, with its own leaders and outsiders, nonetheless it does not fit in the least in the "prosperous" picture of contemporary bourgeois society. There is an asymmetry here and we see the paradox of the 20th century, in which the "North-South" problem has a clearly social rather than geographic aspect.

Meanwhile, virtually all developed countries are closely interwoven in the fabric of global economic relations, without which the individual national economies would, under contemporary conditions, find themselves on the verge of bankruptcy. The experience of Japan and the Western European countries, the so-called new industrial countries, clearly proves that integration relations in the global economy, the bearer of which is, above all, multinational monopoly capital, have become the boosters of economic growth. Therefore, the contemporary level of production and capital internationalization "binds together" the global capitalist economy and is an essential feature of the new qualitative condition of the capitalist economy.

However, even after reaching such a condition, and even from its own capitalist viewpoint, capitalism has failed to solve all problems. The problem remains of satisfying the most basic needs of man, not only in the developing world but also among the lower strata of bourgeois society. Returning to the "leisure time needs," we can see here the huge distance which must be covered by the majority of the population in the capitalist world. Neither on the national nor on the global economic level does the new quality status eliminate the struggle among interests and among different capitals for profit and survival.

The scientific and technical revolution became a catalyst for the change in the evolution of capitalism. At the same time, more than ever before it has increased the pressure which the economy exerts on the habitat. For a while the developed countries had been able to "safeguard" their

own nature by increasing the pressure on the resources of the liberated countries. The time has now come, however, when ecological problems are affecting everyone in the world, wherever the environment may be subject to destruction. We are faced with the ecological commonality of all countries and continents. Capitalism has not been faced as yet with such a problem. Essentially, it is necessary to convert from the coordination of economic activities in individual integrated groups to its coordination on a planetary scale. Will capitalism be able to cross this line of universal human needs?

Under the conditions of the coexistence between the two global social systems which constitute the global economy, neither capitalism nor socialism alone can solve a single global problem. The planetary unity of civilization also requires a planetary approach to surmounting it. The universal human values and interests clash with the egotistical nature of capitalism. However, capitalism cannot exist today without taking them into consideration. In short, capitalism must make a new turn, this time related not only to the capitalist economic system but also one determined by the contemporary stage in the development of civilization as a whole.

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## CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

### On Our View of the 'View From the Outside': Perestroika and Sovietology

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[Survey by Yu. Igritskiy, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] Some of the questions which were quite clearly put on the agenda of perestroika and new political thinking include the need once again, more closely and profitably to study the processes governing the shaping of concepts about our country abroad and the making of the image of the USSR in the eyes of world public opinion. Why is it what it is and not something else? How realistic is it? What are the factors which have contributed to its establishment and what is preventing us from making it more accurate? An awareness of the global interconnection among the processes occurring in the world enhances the relevance of such problems.

In seeking answers to them we must not ignore the quite voluminous set of ideas and concepts which have existed in the biggest capitalist countries for the past several decades, known as Sovietology. Until recently, in the Soviet press this term was used most frequently in quotation marks, which essentially meant that any objectivity and lack of prejudice in the works of all Sovietologists was automatically denied.

The roots of our mistrust in the "view from the outside" are heterogeneous. This is largely explained by the huge blocks of disinformation which were erected on the path of international reciprocal understanding by militant anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. It is worth recalling that as early as 1950 the Pentagon had its "National Psychological Warfare Plan," aimed at the USSR (the theoretical foundations of "psychological warfare" themselves were initially formulated in the United States and Western Europe). At the start of the 1980s, according to many American researchers, who could hardly be considered leftist, the Reagan administration had sharply intensified this warfare (*"Ego Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 80s."* Boston, 1983, p 205).

The second reason for our cautious attitude toward the way the West interpreted problems of the socialist society was of a different nature. It was the still extant complex of ideological infallibility and superiority, which excluded the idea that supporters of non-Marxist ideological trends (as well as even those originating in Marxism but differing from our views) could understand the real world. The problem of what is true in ideology is a topic of special profound study. It is clear, however, that the auto-suggestion of the monopoly of the truth is incompatible with creative Marxism.

The third reason, the roots of which can be traced to history, is the inner need to preserve the mentality of the "besieged fortress," which was greatly due to the unsolved practical problems of socialism and led to seek ideological subversion even where it was a matter of simple lack of understanding of events or disagreement with our viewpoint. A clear example of such an aberration was the painful reaction on the part of our propaganda to the accurate notice taken abroad of the worsening difficulties accompanying the economic development of the USSR in the past decade.

This is made clearer by reasserting the specifics of sociology as a scientific discipline engaged in the study of a country whose tasks, means and ways of acting are not identical to the objectives, means and forms of antisocialist propaganda. Sovietological concepts unquestionably play a certain role in the struggle of ideas and are involved in the "psychological warfare" against socialism to the extent to which they are used by the mass propaganda organs of the West in creating an absolutely negative image of our country. Furthermore, a number of Sovietologists, who are quite well-known in scientific circles, appear in the press and on radio and television, thus contributing to the shaping of this type of stereotypical ideologized concepts.

Nonetheless, it would be erroneous to ascribe to Sovietology as a whole a basic impulse of distorting our reality. No single scientific institution, no scientific school or government in the world is interested in supporting armies of researchers (in the United States, for example, trained Sovietologists number some 10,000, more than



3,000 of whom are members of the American Association for the Development of Slavic Studies), which would steadily supply them with notoriously unreliable conclusions. Therefore, to assume that the entire Sovietological output is aimed only at developing distorted images of the Soviet Union would mean to depict politicians and ideologues in the capitalist world as excessively short-sighted.

Considering the complex, contradictory and differentiated nature of development of socialism as a social system, Sovietology with its hundreds and thousands of specialists in different countries is also bound to display an extremely differentiated combinations of opinions. Actually, such precisely were the views on the land of the soviets abroad, starting with the first post-October years. In 1920 the British Philosopher Bertrand Russell, who was already then quite well-known, gave an equivocal assessment to the October Revolution. On the one hand, he described it as "one of the most heroic events in world history," noting that "bolshivism deserves the gratitude and admiration of the entire progressive segment of mankind." On the other hand, Russell opposed the "methods of bolshevism" which he (referring to the policies of war communism) assessed as "rude and dangerous" (B. Russell, *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism.* Lnd., 1920, pp 5-6).

The noted British Sovietologist Isaac Deutscher, a Marxist by training and turn of mind, who had been strongly influenced by Trotskyism and by the liberal concepts of industrialism, considered Soviet society as being in a state of "unfinished revolution." He was accused in our press of rejecting the legitimacy of the October Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet system. In reality, according to Deutscher, Russia had both matured and not matured for a socialist revolution. Russia's maturity had been manifested in the fact that "no single working class in any country in the world had acted with such energy, political maturity, ability to organize and heroism as the Russian workers, first in 1917 and then in the Civil War." The immaturity of the country was manifested in the underdeveloped social nature of the economy and the backwardness of peasant farming (I. Deutscher, *The Unfinished Revolution.* Lnd., 1967, pp 24-29).

For the sake of fairness, let us admit that neither Russell nor Deutscher, nor dozens of other similarly thinking Western philosophers, historians or political experts were anticommunist or anti-Soviet. Conversely, they saw in the Soviet experience a certain positive counterbalance to the negative sides of capitalism. However, they were unable to accept either barracks communism or Stalinism, with their arbitrary and coercive methods of political and economic management. From the positions of unsurmounted Stalinism, such a rejection of an essential structural component of the Soviet experience seemed like something ideologically hostile. Actually, it was a question of a natural positive-critical attitude toward a society under study, which was more useful to that society than its uncritical praise.

Confirmation of the complexity and contradictoriness of the process of shaping ideas about the USSR abroad is found in the significant disparity in the assessments made of our country in the mass propaganda media and scientific publications in the West in the 1970s and beginning of 1980s. During that period, which was characterized by the growth of conservative and neo-conservative trends in the ideological and political life of the biggest capitalist countries, the Western press, television and radio vied with each other in instilling the idea that the USSR was aggressive, totalitarian and inefficient. Fearing both the strengthening of the USSR as well as its greater integration in the world community after the Helsinki accords, conservative journalists restored the image of the "totalitarian enemy," a state which had totally subjugated society, was incapable of intensive development and threatened peace on earth.

It may have seemed that, with its entire scientific-theoretical set of arguments, Sovietology should have supported such propaganda efforts. Indeed, some masters of Sovietology saw this as their vocation. However, it was precisely then that the so-called revisionist trend in Sovietology strengthened (revisionist in terms of the concepts which prevailed during the period of the cold war): ideas germinated about the USSR as a modernizing corporate society of a model different from that of the West; quite serious studies of its individual subsystems appeared—of the soviets, the trade unions, the other public organizations, the local management authorities, etc. Through the efforts of G. Haff, D. Lane, S. Cohen, K. von Baym and other researchers, a perception developed of the USSR as a stable society with its own specific scale of values and system priorities which, to begin with, could not be assessed exclusively on the basis of Western criteria and, second, which was ahead of the West in a number of respects.

It is clear today that some of the descriptions of our society during the period of stagnation, noted by non-Marxist researchers (conformism, economic egalitarianism, the formal nature of participation of the citizens in social life), were actually based not on the nature of socialism but its deformations. However, at that time what mattered was that there were Sovietologists who questioned the persistent assertions of the fierce anti-communists according to whom everything "good" could come only from the West while everything "bad" came from the Soviet Union. The rejection of such a black and white vision of the world essentially also meant the rejection of the concepts of totalitarianism which put on one end of social development the "free" West and, on the other, the "nonfree" Soviet Union.

The topic of "totalitarianism" and the suitability of classifying the USSR as a totalitarian regime is of key importance in the struggle of ideas being waged along the axis of comparing socialism with capitalism. It cannot be avoided in the dialogue not only with non-Marxist but also with Marxist trends abroad; furthermore, it is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid in the formulation of the renovated concept of socialism.

Both supporters and opponents of the concept of totalitarianism in non-Marxist political studies and in sociology have been engaged in tempestuous debates for the past 50 years. Initially (in the 20s) the term itself was applied quite frequently only to fascist Italy. Subsequently (in the 1930s) it included Germany and the Soviet Union and, after World War II, having "removed" Germany and Italy, "added" to it were a number of small countries governed by juntas and, going back into history, Ancient Egypt, Sparta, Rome during the periods of highest centralization of supreme power, and medieval Rus, England and Japan during the same periods.

From the very beginning the supporters of the concept of totalitarianism were faced with two "uncomfortable" circumstances. The first was that those regimes for the description of which it had been created and equipped with corresponding criteria (a one-party system, one-man power of the leader, mass terror, etc.) had disappeared from the historical scene. The second was the practical impossibility of determining the extent of concentration of political power within the "center," beyond which the state became totalitarian (even more so if it was a question of countries during all historical ages and embracing all nations). That is precisely why many soberly thinking Western Sovietologists questioned the applied, the politicized nature of efforts to use the concept of totalitarianism in the study of the USSR. According to S. Cohen, the "totalitarian school... proved to be wrong in all areas" and led American Sovietology into a state of intellectual crisis (S. Cohen, *Rethinking the Soviet Experience*. New York, 1985, pp 4, 25).

The "*International Encyclopedia of Sociology*" notes that during the cold war "a great variety of objectives and dynamics of the Nazi and the Stalinist system were suppressed," for which reason it would be more accurate to describe the political system in the USSR as "state socialism" and leave the term "totalitarianism" to our descendants as a warning of the possibility of the degeneracy of a modern state (*The International Encyclopedia of Sociology*. Edited by M. Mann. New York, 1984, p 399).

Nonetheless, what could we say about improvisations on the totalitarian theme from the positions of Marxism? We believe that it is only a broad comparative analysis of repressive regimes within the framework of different social systems that could provide Soviet scientists with material for consideration regarding the accuracy of the use of this concept and the term "totalitarianism" itself in scientific research. Without clear criteria concerning the totalitarian state (the system, the society) which would make it possible to single it out as a separate entity in the classification of countries in general, no concept or term can hope to "pass" in science. However, the formulation of such criteria should not be a place for ideological dislikes and political adaptation to circumstances.

Let us repeat ourselves: this view is supported by many professional Sovietologists working in the scientific centers

in the capitalist countries. The differentiation in Sovietology means precisely the fact that the concept of totalitarianism is by no means the only one included in its theoretical arsenal. Western scientists proceeding from the presumption of the complexity and multidimensionality of Soviet society, are engaged in the study of other less ideologized "models," which are more consistent with the requirements of an objective analysis.

An example of this kind of research is found in the development of the concept of "group interests," in terms of Soviet society, which was adopted in non-Marxist social science after World War II. It is based on the assertion that in any society there are groups which are formed on the basis of social, professional and political (the existence or the absence of power) features and interests. The interweaving and struggle among such groups largely determine social development. This concept does not conflict with the Marxist theory of classes but, conversely, adds to and concretizes it. Differences between Marxists and non-Marxists may affect related class and group social structures, their individual elements, criteria for the classification of groups, and so on. These questions, however, are the subject of sharp debates also among non-Marxist scientists.

The existence under socialism of group interests is entirely consistent with the scientific Marxist view on the existence within socialist society of contradictions which are manifested under different circumstances with different degrees of strength. This does not exclude the coincidence of group interests but presumes that they could also differ and even be in a state of covert or overt conflict. In any case, the very elimination of class differences not only does not eliminate but strengthens differences of a nonclass nature—professional, cultural, age, national-linguistic, etc. Obviously, it would be useful in the study of intraclass and intergroup contradictions and conflicts by Soviet scientists to add to their class approach the contemporary methods of foreign sociology and political studies in order to provide a new interpretation to the acquired empirical data and to compare the results of their own studies with those of the best substantiated works by Western authors.

Our attitude toward Sovietology today could hardly be separated from the attitude of the Sovietologists themselves toward our country. It is precisely perestroika that is the "testing stone" with which one can check the degree of consistency (or inconsistency) of Sovietological concepts with the realities of life and the ability (or inability) of foreign observers to assess the changes in the USSR in their systemic-dynamic context and to revise, if necessary, their own obsolete views.

Naturally, the basic extent non-Marxist concepts of socialism and the development of Soviet society could not be revised or changed within such a short time. Nonetheless, as the forces of perestroika gathered strength, as glasnost spread in the USSR, and as a self-critical reassessment of the condition of the country

took place, it became increasingly clear that many negative features in the Sovietological picture of our reality were not a biased exaggeration but a simple notice of facts. This applied, above all, to the description of the condition in which the Soviet economy found itself. As early as the beginning of the 1980s, more than 40 American economists, based on econometric projection data, said that there were no grounds to conclude that there would be a future "collapse" of the Soviet national economy. However, it would be facing a "restless sea" and very difficult times (*"The Soviet Economy: Toward the Year 2000."* Edited by A. Bergson and H. Levine. Lnd., 1983, pp 21, 446).

It is hardly possible today to classify as ideological subversion those parts in the works of Sovietologists in which the foreign readers were informed of chronic shortages and the poor quality of our goods and services, corruption, the "black market," increased alcoholism and child mortality, bureaucratism and red tape, etc. All of these "sizzling facts," concerning the shady aspects of Soviet reality, which the foreign analysts could mention at that time pale today compared to the sharpness of reports and analytical summations published in the Soviet press itself.

As to the coverage of perestroika in the works of Sovietologists, from the very beginning it has been marked by caution, doubts and contradictions. To this day no clear answer has been given to many questions, even by the most erudite and thoughtful foreign researchers. However, a certain number of doubts have already been resolved. The intensification of perestroika convinced many foreign observers that it was not a question of a "cosmetic" operation but of comprehensive reconstruction of socialism as a social system. As S. Bialer, director of the Institute for the Study of International Changes of Columbia University (New York) wrote last December, "only 1 year ago the most frequent question asked in America was the following: Were the general secretary and his reform truly aimed at perestroika? Today the answer for many of those who ask is yes!" (U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 19 December 1988, p 25).

The range of evaluations and shades in the way Sovietologists are covering the problems of perestroika is too broad to classify. We must take into consideration that in the case of many non-Marxist researchers the question of assessing perestroika turned into a question of confirming or refuting what they had written earlier. Some of them, unquestionably, were guided by the barometer of Western official policies. Virtually all of them found themselves drowning in the floods of information pouring out of the USSR (something to which, for understandable reasons, they were unaccustomed) and were unable to catch up with events. Thus, we find in the book by S. Bialer *"The Soviet Paradox"* (which is perhaps the first major monograph with an attempt at interpreting perestroika in the West), written before and after April 1985, we find side-by-side openly pessimistic and a more cautious characterization of the condition

and prospects of Soviet society (S. Bialer, *"The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline."* Lnd., 1986). The doubt that the Soviet leadership would allow a profound study of the period of Stalinism was expressed in the American journal PUBLIC OPINION, in the spring of 1987; this, however, according to the authors, was the "test" of the course of glasnost in the USSR (PUBLIC OPINION, No 6, vol 9, Washington, 1987, pp 4-8). It can be considered that this semiofficial press organ of the United States thus issued to the policy of glasnost a certificate of having passed the main test, for 6 months later, in his report delivered on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, M.S. Gorbachev analyzed the reasons for and provided an overall political assessment of Stalinism.

The intensification of perestroika refuted the equivocal projections of some conservative theoreticians, whose prejudice is inertial. Thus, in the autumn of 1985 the American political expert W. Laqueur stated that "under the Soviet system... radical political reforms are impossible, at least in the immediate or medium-term future" (COMMENTARY, October 1985, New York, p 34). The resolutions of the 19th Party Conference and the USSR Congress of People's Deputies thoroughly devalued this prediction.

The fact that some Western researchers expressed viewpoints which were quite unexpected when compared to their long-held concepts can be explained only as a result of the influence of perestroika processes. For example, A. Ulam, a noted historian and political expert with right-wing views, who is a professor at Harvard University, said in the course of a discussion with other conservative theoreticians that Soviet society has significant inner resources for development which do not require it to reject the foundations of socialism (NATIONAL INTEREST, No 8, Washington, 1987, p 11).

Numerous examples could be cited on the way perestroika "shuffled the cards" in Sovietology. It would be more important, however, to emphasize that the majority of foreign researchers have tried seriously to interpret the processes occurring in our country on the basis of their own positions, which were sometimes quite different in their details but were similar in terms of a spirit of sympathetic interest in perestroika. Problems of reasons, motive forces and objectives drew the greatest attention.

In analyzing the reasons for perestroika, all Sovietologists noted their complex and overall social nature. M. Lewin, professor at the University of Pennsylvania (United States) believes that the halfway economic reforms of the mid-1960s already were a "harbinger of future change." "The weak economic indicators of the country and the accretion of shortcomings," the author wrote, "had a profound impact on the society and its culture. However, all the efforts to change the economic model were blocked by a political model which was unable activate the social and cultural reserves of the

country" (M. Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation.* Lnd., 1988, p VIII).

As to the motive forces of perestroika, not a single foreign observer denies that perestroika, whatever broad social forces may have been supporting it or were brought into motion by it, was initiated by the CPSU itself. A number of observers, as in the past, proceed from traditional concepts that in Russia for ages all radical change has always taken place "from above." However, in order for the "upper strata" to initiate changes a political will and a practical program for action are needed. Few Sovietologists doubted that leaders on different levels and in different sectors, who were trained under the conditions of the administrative-command system and themselves became its embodiment, either could or wanted to "rule as of old" (to use the meaningful Leninist formulation). However, other forces were found within the country's leadership, who tried to see (and saw) far into the future, something which many Sovietologists confidently note today, and had seen clearly long before 1985. This important feature is noted, in particular, by R. Charvin, professor at the university in Nice; for many years, he wrote, within the framework of socialism, in an atmosphere of suppressed conflicts, plans for the reorganization of the Soviet system were being generated and people were molded who were able to do this (POUVOIRS, No 45, Paris, 1988, p 119). Hence the frequently used definition in non-Marxist literature of "revolution from above" and the abundance of titles in which the terms "perestroika," "revolution," "phenomenon," and "challenge" are invariably placed next to M.S. Gorbachev's name.

In emphasizing that the "impetus for perestroika came from within the party," British historian D. MacForan explains the following: since perestroika is an attempt at the revival of the society on the basis of the Leninist standards, it is obvious that this can be accomplished "only by a renovated party which has surmounted inertia, conservatism and excessive organization" (INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW, No 4, Vol 63, Winfield, 1988, p 167). In the opinion of R. Lowenthal, professor at West Berlin's Free University, people outside the USSR have still not realized that the new Soviet leadership is deliberately leaning on quite a broad aktiv also outside the traditional political apparatus: scientists, economists, and men of culture. This is not a rejection of the apparatus in general but an attempt to broaden its consultative base and achieve a "constructive cooperation among relatively free social movements, on the one hand, and the ruling party, on the other" (R. Lowenthal, "Gorbachev and the Future of the Soviet Union," OSTEUROPA, H. 7/8, Stuttgart, 1988, pp 517-518).

The study of the role and objectives of the CPSU in perestroika, suggested by M. Lewin, seems interesting. Proceeding from the fact that the party was and remains the generator of all changes in the Soviet Union and "the main stabilizing element of the political system," M. Lewin sees as its main objective the rejection of strict command functions and the creation of a society of "enlightened socialism." This would not entail the loss of

leading role by the party and the political system in the USSR would not mandatorily become a multiparty system. "Not one of the reforms," the author writes, "sets itself the task of undermining the political supremacy of the party. It is not a question here of making concessions to the supporters of the hard line. Gorbachev's broad national reforms must be guided by a national political authority which is capable of doing this. In precisely the same way that a sluggish governmental machinery should experience pressure from below, the pressure of awakened citizens, the sluggish social cells should experience the pressure from above, not applied by a group of leaders but by the entire party." If, M. Lewin goes on to say, in the course of tempestuous discussions suggestions are being formulated calling for the adoption of a multiparty system, the objection could be that it is precisely the CPSU "particularly if it were to change, that would be the only institution which could guide this system in its condition of overstress without endangering the entire society" (M. Lewin, op. cit., p 133).

Therefore, Lewin concludes, democratization in the policy of perestroika does not mean in the least the introduction of a multiparty system. Perestroika is aimed at broadening the civil rights and the scale of the real participation of the citizens in social life. It is precisely this that would make it possible for the party to assume a new political role to replace the command-administrative system. The party's political decisions will be legally tested by the population including through the clashes among different interests. The features of the country's historical path as well will be reflected in this process. Whatever the circumstances, "a democratized one-party system is a clear possibility, at least as a stage in the course of the development process" (ibid., pp 134-135, 151).

We should introduce the stipulation that Lewin's views are not typical of today's Sovietology. The majority of his colleagues are not ready to agree with the concept of the development of democracy under the conditions of a single party system and do not believe that this course of events is the most likely. The leading French Sovietologist M. Tatu allows for the possibility of "if not democracy then a substantial extent of democratization" with a single party in the USSR. While the reader is considering the meaning of such writings, the author comes up with another verdict: "The Soviet-type communist system is drawing to an end" (M. Tatu, "The 19th Party Conference," PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, May-August 1988, Washington, pp 13, 15). The following question arises: In the final account, what is it that Tatu considers a "Soviet-type system?" Is it the Stalinist crimes, the more durable administrative-command system or else a "democratic model" of a one-party system? The author does not provide any whatsoever clear answer and this is, obviously, characteristic of today's Sovietology as a whole.

Of late, in assessing the future of perestroika, many Western observers have been repeating the cautious projections of the first post-April months or else predicting the collapse of perestroika processes. I The



Western mass press is not alone in printing headlines such as "Perestroika Is Not Working" (in one of the March issues of NEWSWEEK for that year); dark predictions are also found in analytical works. The noted journalist R. Kaiser pathetically explains in FOREIGN AFFAIRS that "the most dramatic experiment of the century is collapsing in front of our very eyes, slowly but surely" (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1988/89, p 113). In his latest book Z. Brzezinski predicts "the failure of world communism" as a whole, and no later than by the end of the century (Z. Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure. The Birth and Death of Communism in the 20th Century.* New York, 1989).

Brzezinski's book is the full presentation of the views of right-wing conservative circles whose predictable reaction to perestroika was manifested perhaps after a certain pause. These circles are interested not in constructive cooperation between the two systems but in isolating and weakening the USSR. Essentially, Z. Brzezinski formulates as a condition for a positive attitude toward our country the total rejection of the theoretical foundations of socialism. Unlike many other Western Sovietologists, he is not satisfied with the simple elimination of the consequences of Stalinism, for which reason he equates Stalinism with Leninism, depicting the latter as the embodiment of universal evil. There is nothing original in this view. However, it proves the main concept of this noted political expert, which is inversely proportional to his expository enthusiasm. He writes in the introduction to the book that the reforms themselves, which are being planned and implemented currently in the socialist countries, mark a "rejection of the basic postulates of communism." "Almost everywhere the praise of the state has yielded to the praise of the individual, human rights, individual initiative and private enterprise" (Z. Brzezinski, op. cit., p 12). However, in its undistorted aspect, Marxism-Leninism precisely concentrates not on state policy but on the working person. It is unlikely that Brzezinski is unfamiliar with Lenin's work "The State and the Revolution," in which this postulate is one of the main ideas.

The concept of the nonhumane and nondemocratic nature of a pluralistic socialism, cleansed from deformations, becomes essential in the interpretation of perestroika by conservative Western ideologues. Brzezinski only formally allows for a possible success of perestroika; in his view, much more likely are four other variants: a lengthy state of ferment; return to stagnation; "return to repression;" and division within the USSR. Former U.S. President Nixon expresses himself in the same spirit, in recommending to the Bush administration to take no practical steps which would contribute to the success of perestroika in the USSR (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, New York, Spring 1989, p 204). The West, he writes, should proceed from the fact that Marxist-Leninist ideology and progress are incompatible, and that if the USSR chooses progress, it would have to abandon the ideals of communism.

Let us not repeat the sacramental statements that the future belongs to communism. Fatalism is not constructive. The fatalism of the anticommunists blocks their

new thinking in international affairs. However, neither profound social processes nor their realistic interpretation in the West or the East could be turned back by propaganda exhortations. This is realized by many Sovietologists. M. Ferro, director of the Paris Institute for the Study of the USSR and Central and Eastern Europe, compares his colleagues who doubt the possible success of perestroika to the European school which, even after Magellan's travel around the world continued to question whether the earth was round (POUVOIRS, No 45, 1988, Paris, p 121). L. Marcou, another French researcher, although she cannot bring herself to predicting the definitive results of perestroika, nonetheless expresses her confidence that the process is irreversible (ibid., pp 128-129). It is interesting to note that of the nine authors who, together with Ferro and Marcou, participated in the discussion on the prospects of perestroika in this Paris journal, only two (A. Bezancon and M. Lesage) were frankly skeptical.

Opinion clashes among Sovietologists are largely a reflection of their essential sympathies or antipathies toward the USSR and socialism. However, to an even greater extent they are a confirmation of the process of the intensive interpretation of perestroika, consistent with its complex and comprehensive nature. Perestroika raised once again for the Sovietologists a number of key problems: on the nature and strength of socialism as a social system; on its undiscovered reserves and development prospects; on the significance of the changes which are occurring in the USSR in terms of the rest of the world; and on the role which strengthening the new thinking and broadening the dialogue between the USSR and the West could play in the fate of mankind. So far, most of these questions have not been given clear answers in Sovietological literature. However, a great deal of the thoughts expressed by foreign economists, political experts and sociologists are of unquestionable interest because of their consistency with our own thoughts.

For example, we can only agree with V. Leontyev, the head of the Economics Analysis Institute in New York, and Nobel Prize winner, to the effect that the main priority in perestroika should be to maintain the living standard of the Soviet people (see his interview "I Wish Perestroika Success," PRAVDA 27 February 1989). How to achieve this? The majority of Western specialists are convinced of the need for truly giving the land to the peasants and reviving in them a liking for efficient work with the land, and immediate price reform, including wholesale trade and granting enterprises greater autonomy. In the opinion of the American journal NEWSWEEK, the economic reform has stopped at an intermediary point in which are mixed "a somewhat more emancipated initiative and slightly weakened control" (NEWSWEEK, 13 March 1989, p 8).

J. Vanous, the head of the Planecon Scientific Research Company, notes even more firmly that "the old system is continuing to break down while the new one has not been created as yet" (ibid.). The inconsistency of the reforms carried out in our country is pointed out by West

German economist Hohmann (H.-H. Hohmann, "Economics and Politics in Perestroika." Koln, 1988, p 30).

Western researchers differ in assessing the significance of renovation processes in the USSR as they affect the capitalist world. The convinced opponents of reducing the confrontation claim that perestroika in the USSR "could turn out to be more dangerous than the experience of the past" (U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 13 March 1989, p 26). However, many Sovietologists disagree; they see in perestroika not only the possibility for Soviet society to come out of its state of stagnation but also a possibility of stabilizing global developments as a whole. The theme of a number of works is quite clear: the West should not believe that political instability in the USSR would be to its benefit.

The need for a close study of foreign public opinion and determining the reasons for changes within it toward socialism and Soviet society is obvious. The proper self-assessment of any social system implies a consideration of all possible viewpoints. A society which does not listen to an analytical view from the outside is essentially deprived of an important additional instrument for self-knowledge. Perestroika has enhanced interest in our country throughout the world. The fact that this interest is sympathetic is of particular importance. Conditions are being created for a mutually useful dialogue with political forces and social strata which earlier, for a variety of reasons, were unwilling to engage in it.

The intensification of perestroika processes and their embodiment in specific results will contribute to the more positive acceptance not only of perestroika itself but also of socialism and the policies of the CPSU, the Soviet state, and the Soviet people. The opposite is equally true: any slowdown in the pace of the reforms and a restoration of the practices of the past would lead to the sharp (possibly sharper than ever) cooling off of public opinion toward our country. Since we are living in an interrelated world, the "view from the outside" and even more so an analytical view, cannot be a matter of indifference to us.

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#### Chronicle

180200170 Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 11, Jul 89 (signed to press 17 Jul 89) p 128

[Text] A delegation of EINHEIT, journal of the SED Central Committee, headed by deputy editor-in-chief J. Vorholtzer, is visiting Moscow on the invitation of *KOMMUNIST*. The guests from the GDR studied the theoretical activities of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences and other Soviet ideological

organizations in implementing the tasks of perestroika in the various areas of social life. In the course of the meeting held with the editors a wide range of problems of the work of party journalists under contemporary conditions and the further cooperation between the two fraternal publications were discussed. The GDR delegation was received at the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department.

The editors were visited by George Huison, secretary general of the Canadian Communist Party. An extensive discussion was held on problems of the economic reform in the USSR. The discussion covered problems of the development of political and economic relations between socialist and capitalist countries, and prospects for eliminating the legacy of the cold war and strengthening universal peace.

*KOMMUNIST* editors met with a delegation of the leadership of the Chilean Communist Party, headed by V. Teytelboym, secretary general of the Chilean Communist Party. An extensive talk was held on problems of the political and economic reform in the USSR and the new political thinking in international relations. The guests described the policies of the Chilean Communist Party in terms of the topical tasks facing the Chilean people and its working class.

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